BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

3rd European Conference on Argumentation

Production

Johan Rodenburg (editor, layout)
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ECA 2019 Sponsors

3rd European Conference on Argumentation – ECA 2019

Monday, June 24 – Thursday, June 27 2019, Groningen, The Netherlands

Reason to Dissent

The special theme of this conference is Reason to Dissent. The goal is to inquire into the virtues and vices of dissent, criticism, disagreement, objections, and controversy in light of legitimizing policy decisions, justifying beliefs, proving theorems, defending standpoints, or strengthening informed consent. Dissent may spoil the cooperation and reciprocity required for reason-based deliberation and decision making. But then, dissent produces the kind of competition and criticism required for reliable and robust outcomes. How much dissent does an argumentative practice require? What kinds of dissent should we promote, or discourage? How to deal with dissent virtuously? How to exploit dissent in artificial arguers? How has dissent been conceptualized in the history of rhetoric, dialectic and logic?

We have reason to dissent, and we do reason to dissent – also in the study of argumentation. In the interdisciplinary field of argumentation studies, some scholars emphasise the importance of studying argumentation in natural settings. Others stress the value of theoretical models of argumentation, and start from theories on logic or probability or from dialectical systems. Yet others highlight the urgency of developing artificial systems of argumentation, like software support, automated reasoning or argument mining. The conference aims at exploiting this plurality for the purpose of a high quality exchange of research results.

Individual submissions are not required to focus on the special theme Reason to Dissent. We invite submissions on argumentation from various sub disciplines, taking various approaches and dealing with various themes, among which:

- argumentative design
- argumentation schemes and patterns: analogy, practical argument, conduction, …
- argumentation in special contexts: finance, medicine, law, policy making, academy, (social) media, …
- argumentative strategies
- artificial arguers
- children and argument
- cognitive and social biases
- controversy
- critical thinking
- criticism
- debate
- diagramming
- dialogue logic, empirical logic, informal logic, …
- dialogue types: deliberation, eristics, inquiry, negotiation, …
- disagreement
- discourse analysis
- fallacies
- formal argumentation
- linguistic features
- normative pragmatics
- pedagogy
- persuasion research
- philosophy of argument
- power and argument
- probability and argument
- rhetoric
- social epistemology
- strategic manoeuvring
- stylistics
- virtues
- visual and multi-model argumentation

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See http://ecargument.org

European Conference on Argumentation

The European Conference on Argumentation (ECA) is a new pan-European initiative launched in 2013 aiming to consolidate and advance various streaks of research into argumentation and reasoning. ECA's chief goal is to organise on a biannual basis a major conference that provides an opportunity for exchanging research results and networking in all areas related to the study of argumentation: philosophy, communication, linguistics, discourse analysis, computer science, psychology, cognitive studies, legal theory, etc. We are dedicated to work in synergy with other major events – such as the conferences organised by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation and the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation – by following their interdisciplinary spirit and avoiding schedule overlaps. As a distinguishing feature, ECA events offer a mix of plenary keynote sessions, thematic symposia, long papers with assigned commentators, and regular papers.

ECA is organised every other year at a different European location, starting with the ECA Lisbon 2015 conference hosted in Portugal by the ArgLab, Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA), Universidade Nova de Lisboa (New University of Lisbon). While based in Europe, ECA involves and further encourages participation from argumentation scholars all over the world.

Each meeting results in the publication of conference proceedings and may in addition lead to a dedicated selection of papers as a special journal issue or a collective volume.

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Contents

Keynotes

Deanna Kuhn
Columbia University, US

Critical thinking as discourse

Less than it is an individual ability or skill, critical thinking is a dialogic practice people engage in and commit to, initially interactively and then in interiorized form with the other only implicit. An argument depends for its meaning on how others respond (Gergen, 2015). In advancing arguments, well-practiced thinkers anticipate their defeasibility as a consequence of others' objections, in addition envisioning their own potential rebuttals. Whether in external or interiorized form, the dialogic process creates something new, while itself undergoing development.

This perspective may be useful in sharpening definition of the construct of critical thinking and in so doing help to bring together the largely separate strands of work examining it as a theoretical construct, a measurable skill, and an educational objective. Implications for education follow. How might critical thinking as a shared practice be engaged in within educational settings in ways that will best support its development? One step is to privilege frequent practice of direct peer-to-peer discourse. A second is to take advantage of the leveraging power of dialog as a bridge to individual argument – one affording students' argumentative writing a well-envisioned audience and purpose. Illustrations of this bridging power are presented. Finally, implications for assessment of critical thinking are noted and a case made for the value of people's committing to a high standard of critical thinking as a shared and interactive practice.

Monday June 24 17:00 – 18:15 Academy Building 3rd floor Geertsemazaal

Ruth Amossy
Tel-Aviv University, Israel

Revisiting Apologie de la polémique: about some "felicity conditions" allowing for coexistence in dissent

In my book entitled *Apologie de la polémique* (2014), I claimed that polemical discourse fulfils various social functions, among which "coexistence in dissensus" seems the most important. It means not only that disagreement is the basis of life in society, and the principle on which argumentation as a common, rational search for the reasonable, is built. It also signifies that agreement cannot always be reached in democratic societies recognizing the importance of diversity and difference, so that disagreement has to be managed through verbal confrontations, namely, agonistic discussions and polemical exchanges. It thus appears that the latter, though generally blamed for its radicalization and polarization, plays an important role in the public sphere. Among others, public polemics helps opposite parties to voice conflicting opinions and fight for antagonistic solutions without recurring to arms. To use Chantal Mouffe's words, it transforms "enemies" to be destroyed into "adversaries" who have a right to speak. Beside other social functions discussed in the book, polemics authorizes what the French call a "vivre-ensemble" – the possibility for people who do not share the same opinions, if not the same premises, to share the same national space and live together without outbursts of violence.

However, the emphasis on dissent and its polemical management is not without raising multiple questions concerning the conditions of possibility and the limits of the so-called coexistence in dissent. Obviously, the use of polemical discourse is not enough to prevent citizens from physically fighting each other and even, sometimes, to dispel the specter of civil war. Outbursts of violence against refugees regularly occur in Germany where the polemical discussion is vivid. In France, the polemical exchanges on Emmanuel Macrons' reforms and the authorized street demonstrations did not prevent urban violence. Even if polemical campaign discourse is tolerated, it did not prevent armed confrontations in certain African countries such as Ivory Coast. What, then, are the "felicity conditions" needed in order for public polemics to secure a peaceful "living together" in the framework of persistent and sometimes deep disagreements that can hardly be avoided in the democratic space? My contention is that to answer this question, it is necessary to explore polemical confrontations in their institutional framework, and to examine the functioning of polemical discourse in relation to the political, forensic and cultural factors that determine (at least partly) its degree of success. After synthetizing the finding of my first research into dissent and its polemical management, I will try – on the basis of a few case studies – to gather some of the "felicity conditions" necessary to make coexistence in dissent possible.

Tuesday June 25 17:45 – 18:45 Academy Building 3rd floor Offerhauszaal

Katie Atkinson

University of Liverpool, UK

Dissent needed: Argumentation for AI and law applications.

As technological advances in artificial intelligence are being turned into deployed products, societal questions are being raised about the need for AI tools to be able to explain their decisions to humans. This need becomes even more pressing when AI technologies are applied in domains where critical decisions are made that can result in a significant effect upon individuals or groups in society. One such domain is law, where there is a thriving market developing in support tools for assisting with a variety of legal tasks carried out within law firms and the wider legal sector. Law is a domain rich in argumentation and support tools that are used to aid legal decision making should similarly be able to explain why a particular outcome of a decision has been reached, and not an alternative outcome. Dissent needs to be captured and revealed within AI reasoners to ensure that the decision space is explored from different perspectives, if AI tools are to be deployed effectively to assist with legal reasoning tasks. In this talk I will discuss a body of work on computational models of argument for legal reasoning and show how dissent features within this work to promote scrutability of AI decision making.

Wednesday June 26 16:30 – 17:30 Academy Building 3rd floor Geertsemazaal

Abstracts

Long papers

A

Argumentative Design and Polylogue
Mark Aakhus (Rutgers University, US)

Tuesday 25 June 16:00 - 17:00 Room 30   Commentary by: Reisigl

B

Deliberation, Knowledge and Luck
Moisés Barba Magdalena (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, ES)

Deliberation can bring us to form true beliefs. For those beliefs to be knowledge, they must fulfil a necessary condition, namely, that the deliberation that leads to them takes place in collective belief-making contexts. For deliberation can take place in either quotidian or collective belief-making contexts, and only in the latter do deliberators have enough control over the deliberation for the resulting true beliefs not to be true merely as a matter of luck.

Tuesday 25 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 13   Commentary by: Aikin

What is wrong with deductivism?
Lilian Bermejo-Luque (University of Granada, ES)

In a recent paper, David Botting (2015) criticises Bermejo-Luque's (2011) rejection of deductivism as a standard for argument evaluation. The main goals of this paper are to explain why Botting's criticism misses the point of Bermejo-Luque's argument against deductivism and to show further why deductivism is wrong.

Thursday 27 June 9:30 - 10:30 Room 13   Commentary by: Hansen

Is there "an informal logic approach" to argument?
J. Anthony Blair (University of Windsor, CA)

One encounters references to "the informal logic approach"—either in praise or criticism. That presumes there is such a thing. There are considerable differences among the approaches taken by the older generation of textbook authors and scholars who all self-identify as informal logicians. So far as argument analysis goes there are differences between deductivists and non-deductivists (for example). There have been some attempts to provide a unified approach. The paper will attempt to supply a defensible answer to the question in its title.

Tuesday 25 June 16:00 - 17:00 Room 13   Commentary by: Olmos

Structural differences between practical and cognitive presumptions
Petar Bodlović (University of Groningen, NL)

I argue that the difference between practical and cognitive presumptions is not only contextual but also structural. More precisely, I show that the contextual differences entail essential, fundamental or structural differences. The first difference is related to the conditions of the presumption's defeat, i.e. to the content of the opponent's burden of disproof. The second difference is related to the conditions of the presumption's weakening, i.e. to the definition of the presumption's strength.

Wednesday 26 June 14:00 - 15:00 Room 24   Commentary by: Freeman

C

Reliability of Argument Mapping

Sebastian Cacean (KIT/WMK, DE)

This paper formulates a model to characterize the margin of interpretation in argument mapping in order to deal with hermeneutic underdetermination. Quantitative and qualitative content analysis both provide their own strategy to meet the challenge of hermeneutic underdetermination, but also come with severe caveats. This paper combines the positive aspects of both strategies by introducing context dependent reliability thresholds for argument mapping. This allows generalizable results in spite of unavoidable hermeneutic underdetermination.

Tuesday 25 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 19　　　　　Commentary by: Pilgram

Critical discussion for sub-optimal settings

Diego Castro (University of Groningen, NL)

This paper aims at answering the following question: when some of the higher order conditions for a critical discussion are not met, should we adopt a policy of applying the rules for critical discussion? I will defend a moderate answer in between two extreme ones. The first extreme position is "anything goes policy", which implies that the rules do not apply in these cases. The second position is "business as usual policy", implying that the rules apply anyway. The moderate solution implies that only some rules apply, which will be determined by the specific conditions that are not met.

Tuesday 25 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 12　　　　　Commentary by: Godden

Democratic legitimacy and acts of dissent

Cristina Corredor (University of Valladolid, ES)

The aim of this paper is to study the role that dissent may have in public political deliberation in democratic societies. Out of argumentative settings, dissent would seem to have a disruptive effect. In my view, dissention effectively puts into question the political authority's hypothetical legitimacy. To the extent that this is so, acts of dissent have illocutionary force and give rise to certain changes in the dialectical duties and rights of the participants.

Tuesday 25 June 16:00 - 17:00 Room 18　　　　　Commentary by: Zarefsky

F

Strength of Reasons for Moral Dissent

James Freeman (Hunter college, US)

One dissents from acts practiced by asserting they are wrong, a deontic property, supervening on non-deontic properties. The warrant licencing the inference may be validated by moral intuition or by some higher level moral principle. Reasons for the acceptability of the act are rebuttals for the warrant. Rebuttal resistance constitutes warrant strength. One may appraise strength by recognizing the classes of relevant potential rebuttals for a warrant and the plausibility of members of that class.

Tuesday 25 June 16:00 - 17:00 Room 12　　　　　Commentary by: Casey

G

Where are dissent and reasons in epistemic justification?
José Ángel Gascón (Universidad Católica de la Santísma Concepción, CL)

Dissent and reasons are elements that seem to be crucial in order to understand our everyday practices of justification of beliefs and attribution of knowledge. However, the main approaches to epistemic justification tend to disregard discussion and dissent, and some of them even dispense with reasons. I will argue that this can only make the concept of knowledge less intelligible and I will defend some alternatives in current epistemology.

Thursday 27 June 9:30 - 10:30 Room 18   Commentary by: Lumer

Justifying Questions
G.C. Goddu (University of Richmond, US)

In his recent keynote address to the 2018 ISSA, David Hitchcock argues for the claim that there can be arguments with questions as conclusions. I shall argue that his examples do not necessarily support that claim.

Wednesday 26 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 24   Commentary by: Hitchcock

H

The Ethnography of Argumentation
Kati Hannken-Illjes (Philipps Universität Marburg, DE)

In it I foreground methodological issues and propose what could be called an ethnography of argumentation. The central question of this approach is: How is it at all possible to take up something as a reason in argumentation? This question rests on the assumption that validity and reasonableness are not something pre-given, but are accumulated through field-specific practices by the participants. This carries two implications, one methodological, one epistemological. The paper spells out this approach.

Thursday 27 June 9:30 - 10:30 Room 19   Commentary by: Scott

"I Said What I Said" - Black Women and the art of Signifying
Tempest Henning (Vanderbilt University, US)

This paper seeks to complicate two primary norms within argumentation theory: 1- engaging with one's interlocutors in a 'pleasant' tone and 2- speaking directly to one's target audience/interlocutor. Moreover, I urge argumentation theorists to explore various cultures' argumentative norms and practices when attempting to formulate more universal theories regarding argumentation. Ultimately, I aim to show that the two previously mentioned norms within argumentation obscures and misrepresents many argumentative practices within African American Vernacular English – or Ebonics, specifically the art of signifying.

Wednesday 26 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 12   Commentary by: Hundleby

The Argument Assessment Tutor (AAT)
Michael Hoffmann (Georgia Institute of Technology, US)

I plan to present a newly developed online tutoring system, the "Argument Assessment Tutor (AAT)," that provides immediate feedback to a learner's attempts to identify the essential problems in bad arguments. It is a training tool for repeated use and self-directed learning that realizes a strategy of argument assessment which builds on the well-known "ARS criteria" formulated by Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair in Logical Self-Defense (1977)

Thursday 27 June 9:30 - 10:30 Room 30   Commentary by: Grasso

Grice, Machine Head and the problem of overexpressed premises

Michael Hoppmann (Northeastern University, US)

The natural language phenomenon of "unexpressed premises" (UP) – statements that protagonists do not explicitly utter, but to which they are nevertheless committed – is well documented. This paper argues that its contrary opposite "overexpressed premises" (OP) – statements that protagonists explicitly utters, but to which they are nevertheless not committed – frequently occurs in the usage of dialectical irony (as illustrated in Machine Head lyrics), and that reasonable OP interpretations require additional reconstructive tools beyond Gricean Maxims.

Wednesday 26 June 14:00 - 15:00 Room 13   Commentary by: Herman

J

Standpoints and Commitments as Products of Argumentative Work: Micro/Macro-Analysis of an Infamous Press Conference
Sally Jackson (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, US)
Scott Jacobs (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, US)
Xiaoqi Zhang (Sun Yat-sen University,CN)

Conversation analysis and computational methods are combined to analyze the arguments produced in a press conference centered on Donald Trump's views of extreme right-wing groups. Our methods allow exploration of connections between a single conversation and a vast argumentative polylogue in which ordinary citizens interact along with journalists, politicians, and government officials. Within this press conference, standpoints and commitments actually emerge from questioning and answering, and these products of argument extend out into other discussions.

Thursday 27 June 9:30 - 10:30 Room 12   Commentary by: Wohlrapp

L

Arguing in Mexico
Fernando Leal (University of Guadalajara, MX)
Judith Suro (University of Guadalajara, MX)
Dale Hample (University of Maryland, US)

Scholars have for some time been warning that Mexicans labor under argumentative deficits in basic education, in college, and in the professions. Without objecting to the usual recourse to theories of argumentation as a product (including logic), we submit that the problem may also have to do with argumentation as a process, which is culturally bound. Empirical data (as part of a greater international comparison project) are presented, and statistically analyzed, to support that idea.

Tuesday 25 June 16:00 - 17:00 Room 25   Commentary by: Lloyd

Speech act pluralism in argumentative polylogues
Marcin Lewinski (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

This paper addresses the following question: Can one and the same utterance token, in one unique speech situation, intentionally perform a plurality of illocutionary acts? While some of the recent pragmatic literature has defended such a possibility for speech acts in general (Sbisà, 2013; Johnson, 2019), I build a case for argumentative speech acts in particular. This case is based on a critical redefinition of a communicative context in which argumentative speech acts are exchanged.

Tuesday 25 June 16:00 - 17:00 Room 19　　　　　　Commentary by: Hoppmann

Ensuring Relevance in Analogical Arguments Through Warrant-based Reasoning
John Licato (University of South Florida, US)

Arguments by analogy are particularly difficult to teach, assess, and implement computationally, in part because of the requirement of relevance. Our goal in this paper is an algorithm for assessing arguments by analogy, which: (1) lends itself to computational implementation using currently available tools, and (2) can be applicable to the kinds of arguments typically made by minimally trained arguers. We describe such an algorithm, through what we call warrant-based reasoning.

Wednesday 26 June 15:00 – 16:00 Room 13　　Commentary by: Cruz

Arguments from Expert Opinion – An Epistemological Approach
Christoph Lumer (University of Siena, IT)

In times of populist mistrust towards experts, it is important and the aim of the paper to ascertain the rationality of arguments from expert opinion and to reconstruct their rational foundations as well as to determine their limits. The foundational approach chosen is probabilistic. However, there are at least three correct probabilistic reconstructions of such argumentations: statistical inferences, Bayesian updating, and interpretive arguments. To solve this competition problem, the paper proposes a recourse to the arguments' justification strengths achievable in the respective situation.

Tuesday 25 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 24　　　　　　Commentary by: Wagemans

M

ALL-OUT ATTACK
Tshepo Bogosi Mosaka (University of Nottingham, UK)

The central argument of the paper is that to defend one's case in the forensic context in the strict sense is equivalent to doing nothing or being absent from court. Rather, the only option that avails a defendant or accused person, in achieving the legal goal of discharge or absolution, is to attack and that legal proceedings are occasions of all-out attack from both the proponent and opponent

Tuesday 25 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 30　　　　　　Commentary by: Feteris

R

Strategic Maneuvering with Speech Codes: The Rhetorical Use of Cultural Presumptions in Constructing Argumentative Discourse
Menno Reijven (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, US)

In this article, speech codes are introduced as a resource for strategic maneuvering. It is shown that speech codes can inform the design of argumentative moves with regard to determining the topical

potential, adapting to the audience, and including the appropriate presentational devices. In this study, the code of dignity and the code of honor are operationalized and identified in the discourse of then-presidential candidates Clinton and Trump during a debate in the 2016 elections.

Tuesday 25 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 25   Commentary by: Innocenti

S

Disagreement, public reasoning, and non-authoritarian argumentation
Karim Sadek (University College Dublin, IE)

Which kind of disagreement should we promote? I tackle this question via a reflection on the standard for determining which arguments and reasons are allowed into public debates. Drawing on the works of Maeve Cooke and Michael Gilbert I propose non-authoritarian argumentation as a model for the analysis and evaluation of public argumentation in democracies. I argue for, and explicate, the promotion of disagreement that square a dual-commitment to pluralism and solidarity.

Wednesday 26 June 14:00 - 15:00 Room 12   Commentary by: Corredor

Uncovering Hidden Premises to Reveal the Arguer's Implicit Values: Analysing the Public Debate About Funding Prep
Sean Sinclair (University of Leeds, UK)

I analyse a public debate about whether the UK's NHS should fund Prep, a new and expensive HIV prophylactic. I apply a new way of investigating public opinion, dialectic analysis. The analysis reveals a new way of framing the debate which has not been deployed in the academic literature to date. The analysis also shows that opponents of funding for Prep needn't be motivated by illiberal attitudes, such as anti-promiscuity/anti-drug/anti-gay attitudes.

Tuesday 25 June 15:00 - 16:00 Room 18   Commentary by: Jackson

T

Strange Fish: Belief and the Roots of Disagreement
Christopher Tindale (University of Windsor, CA)

I view deep differences as points of departure rather than impenetrable cul-de-sacs. This involves assessing ideas like that of deep diversity, and accounts of what it means to live a life. Differences that characterize the disagreements between communities are like those between members within a community and the diversity of values within individual lives. Such diversities are successfully managed, which can be a lesson extended to deeper differences. This approach recognizes an expanded sense of "reasons."

Thursday 27 June 9:30 - 10:30 Room 24   Commentary by: Farine

V

In the Space of Reasonable Doubt
Marion Vorms (University Paris, FR)
Ulrike Hahn (Birkbeck College London, UK)

The paper explores reasonable doubt as an enlightening notion to think of reasoning and decision-making. Taking the figure of the juror in criminal trial as a model for any agent having to make a

consequential decision on limited evidential grounds, it examines the extent to which 'reasonable doubt' can meaningfully be applied beyond the judicial context. Starting from a decision-theoretic understanding of the notion, the paper finally highlights some of its limits.

Thursday 27 June 11:00 - 12:00 Room 18   Commentary by: Aberdein

Z

Profiling dialogues: Multi-trait mapping of televised argumentative exchanges
Gabor Zemplen (ELTE Institute of Business Economics, Dept. of Argumentation and Marketing Research, HU)

A data gathering and handling model was developed during 6 years of analysis and reanalysis of a televised debate by groups of students. The aim of the research module was to construct a language of redescription of televised debates that expands the targeted range of analysis of (usually linguistic phenomena), and that can provide a topography of a debate with adequate resolution, adding non-verbal, somatic responses, language-related gestures to the data-set.

Thursday 27 June 11:30 - 12:30 Room 19   Commentary by: Üzelgün

Regular papers

A

CRITICAL THINKING DISPOSITIONS AS VIRTUES OF ARGUMENT
Andrew Aberdein (Florida Institute of Technology, US)

Some of the key features of virtue theories of argument (VTA) are anticipated by earlier argumentation theories. This paper explores the dispositional account of critical thinking, and argues that it may be retrospectively assimilated to the VTA programme. A full exploration of this story is not only an independently interesting piece of recent intellectual history, it also serves to ground VTA in the substantial body of empirical research into critical thinking dispositions.

Wednesday 26 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 25

What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement Get Right (and Wrong)
Scott Aikin (Vanderbilt University, US)

The problem of deep disagreement is structurally similar to the problem of the criterion. Two optimistic responses to the deep disagreement problem (Davson-Galle and Memedi) are assessed in light of this parallel. Given the structural features of the problem of deep disagreement, neither optimistic answer survives scrutiny. A form of measured pessimism follows.

Tuesday 25 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 24

Is there a crisis of dissent and disagreement in argument theory?
Mark Alfino (Gonzaga Unversity, US)

Is there a crisis of dissent and disagreement in argument theory? This paper explores this question by considering recent evidence from moral and political psychology, including theories such as social intuitionism, which suggests that our epistemic judgements in moral and political matters are persistently influenced by relatively fixed emotional responses and by stable aspects of personality. This suggests that some cases of political dissent appear to be argumentative when in fact they may be some form of ad hominem or objection to one's opponent's identity. This poses a challenge to our ordinary intuition (supported in social epistemology) that disagreements are in principle resolvable, and it suggests the need for new strategies for interpreting political disagreement and engaging in dissent.

Tuesday 25 June 12:30 - 13:00 Room 24

The Reasoning Behind Compulsory Utterances
Hális Alves Do Nascimento França (Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, New University of Lisbon, BR)

In the legal discourse, compulsory utterances are utterances in which the speaker compels the hearer into accepting a certain obligation and/or into complying with a certain course of action. In this paper, we explore the reasoning processes behind them, addressing how textual structure can lead to the reconstruction of argumentation, how argumentation theory can be employed to improve the understanding of reasons involved in certain linguistic constraints and the potential role of pragma-dialectical strategic maneuvering.

Thursday 27 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 24

Scientific arguments in policy-making

Corina Andone (University of Amsterdam, NL)
José Alfonso Lomelí Hernández (University of Amsterdam, NL)

This paper focuses on the use of scientific insights for justifying decisions in policy-making. We explain the political justificatory process in terms of a combination between scientific and pragmatic argumentation, and we propose criteria for assessing the quality of the justifications. As a case in point, we provide a case-study analysis of the Paris Agreement.

Wednesday 26 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 12

Properties of Argumentation Frameworks: A Proof-Theoretical Study

Ofer Arieli (The Academic College of Tel-Aviv, IL)
Annemarie Borg (Ruhr Universität Bochum, DE)
Christian Strasser (Ruhr-University Bochum, DE)

In this contribution we study proof-theoretical properties of logical argumentation frameworks. More specifically, given some desiderata (e.g., rationality postulates), we consider the conditions that the underlying core logic and/or the argumentation framework should fulfill in order for the desiderata to hold.

Tuesday 25 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 25

B

Epistemic Tolerance

Dominik Balg (University of Cologne, DE)

When it comes to political, religious or ethical issues, many people consider a tolerant "live and let live"-attitude to be the best reaction to disagreement. However, the current debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement within social epistemology gave rise to certain worries about the epistemic rationality of tolerance. Setting aside those already extensively discussed worries, I would like to focus on the instrumental rationality of a tolerant attitude with respect to our epistemic goals.

Tuesday 25 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 18

Structuring Controversy: The Dialectic of Disagreement

Sharon Bailin (Simon Fraser University, CA)
Mark Battersby (Capilano University, CA)

There is considerable evidence that the consideration of alternative views and opposing arguments is crucial for coming to reasoned judgments. Yet disagreement and controversy may result in animosity, adversariality, and polarization. This paper addresses the issue of how to incorporate disagreement into critical thinking instruction in a way that results in productive interaction and robust outcomes.

Wednesday 26 June 15:30 - 16:00 Room 25

The role of reasoning and arguing in youth democratic participation in Canada
Michael Baumtrog (Ryerson University, CA)

In 1970 the voting age in Canada moved from 21 to 18. Since then, there have been calls to lower it further, most commonly to age 16. Against the motion, however, it has been argued that youth may lack "the ability to exercise a mature and informed vote" (Canada, p. 48), which I take to mean a vote exercised on the basis of informed reason. This paper aims at testing the veracity of this worry.

Wednesday 26 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 12

Dissenting with proverbs. Paremiological argumentation in Italian and French public discourses
Marina Bletsas (University of Graz, AT)

Proverbs are often used in argumentation to convey an epistemic or deontic point of view in other words than one's own. Such paremiological argumentation relies on proverbs' endoxical authority and indirectness, which help defuse dissent facilitating persuasion. However, more studies on single idioms and specific discourses are needed. With a view to this gap, and embracing a contrastive perspective, I look into the argumentative and counter-argumentative role of proverbs in Italian and French public discourses.

Wednesday 26 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 24

Pictures and reasoning
Angelina Bobrova (Russian State University for the Humanities, RU)

Visual arguments are an essential part of our argumentation. They are easily treated, presume multiple readings and demonstrate the differences of view. Our reality is visually mediated, but it does not mean that we know what visual argument is. From the perspective of Peirce's Existential Graphs theory, I'll specify the logical background of this concept and provide its definition. Then I'll demonstrate how pictorial reasoning defined in this way visualize reasons for dissent.

Tuesday 25 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 19

Issues leading to argumentative discussions during family mealtime conversations
Antonio Bova (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, IT)

This paper aims to investigate the issues leading parents to engage in argumentative discussions with their children during mealtimes. The analysis is based on the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion. The results show that family argumentative discussions unfold around issues that are generated both by parental prescriptions and children's requests. The parental prescriptions largely concern context-bound activities, while the issues triggered by children's requests refer to a wide range of activities.

Wednesday 26 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 12

'Those are your words, not mine!' Strategic maneuvers with implicatures

Ronny Boogaart (Leiden University, NL)
Henrike Jansen (Leiden University, NL)
Maarten van Leeuwen (Leiden University, NL)

Speakers who are attacked for having said something intolerable (e.g. improper) can defend themselves by exploiting the distinction between literal meaning and implicature. Making use of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation and pragmatics we will regard an appeal to this distinction as a strategic manoeuvre exploiting speaker commitment. We will discuss some strategies by which arguers can deny either a literal or an implicated interpretation and formulate some criteria by which such denials can be evaluated.

Wednesday 26 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 24

Arguing in a post-truth world: appeals to emotion in American political speeches on drug reform

Sarah Bourse (Université Toulouse II Jean Jaurès, FR)

The fairly recent branding of our contemporary era as "a post-truth era" seems to indicate a change of paradigm, the focus shifting onto appeals to emotion. To what extent can this prevalence of emotions be observed in recent political speeches? What are the emotions to which speakers tend to appeal? What are the strategies used by the speakers in order to persuade the audience? Through the study of speeches focusing on the question of drug reform (more specifically, the legalization of marijuana and the opioid crisis), I would like to examine the persuasive strategies used in the American political discourse.

Wednesday 26 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 18

Proximity & Material Starting Points: Insights for Research on Argumentation in Facilitated Conflict Resolution

Emma van Bijnen (Università della Svizzera italiana / Kφbenhavns Universite, CH)

This study presents different communicative activity types within the genre of communicative activity of mediation (van Eemeren 2010). The differences between mediation forms may influence how mediators (re)establish the common ground necessary for a resolution oriented argumentative discussion to take place (van Eemeren 1993). Specifically, the paper shows how proximity (i.e. the 'closeness' of a mediator to the parties, a case, and/or relevant case contexts) may influence material starting point (re)establishment (using a multidisciplinary approach).

Tuesday 25 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 12

Value-based argumentation and the Transition to Low Carbon Economy in Turkey and Portugal: Values, Uncertainty and Actions

Huthaifah Busuulwa (Ibn Haldun University, TR)

This paper goes deeper into the values debate, according greater importance to the role of values in practical reasoning and argumentation. We argue that action on uncertain events, depend profoundly on values of the agents or the values that are incited by circumstances and the desire to achieve a desired goal. In such situations even if value premises are not always made explicit, they are nevertheless present in the decision- making process.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 12

C

Dissent: Considering Culture and Personality
Linda Carozza (York University, CA)

If "argument" and "arguing" (O'Keefe 1977) are both mired in culture and the personal, then how we conceive of argument-making and argument-having can both be influenced by where we come from and who we are. This paper functions as a discussion based on investigations into the factors of culture and personality within critical reasoning classrooms. These findings lend themselves to different conversations. Contrary to what we may believe or want, who you are and where you come from might matter more than we want them to.

Tuesday 25 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 13

Heroic arguers and glorious arguments
John Casey (Northeastern Illinois University, US)
Daniel Cohen (Colby College, US)

Despite objections, the argument-as-war metaphor remains conceptually useful for organizing our thoughts on argumentation into a coherent whole. More significantly, it continues to reveal unattended aspects of argumentation worthy of theorizing. One such aspect is whether it is possible to argue heroically, where difficulty or peril preclude any obligation to argue, but to do so would be meritorious if not indeed glorious.

Wednesday 26 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 18

Relationships between narrative and argumentation. In defence of a functional account
Guillermo Sierra Catalán (University of Granada, ES)

The objective of this investigation is to study the relationships between narrative and argumentation. These are apparently very different objects, but overlaps are frequent in literary works. The proposed classifications are based on the notion of speech-act, and are defined according to two different criteria: one is of a structural nature and generalizes some previous outlooks, while the second one is based on functional accounts. We defend our functional approach over the structural ones.

Wednesday 26 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 25

Dissenting the Past: The Promise and Pitfalls of Legislative Apologies
Martha S. Cheng (Rollins College, US)

This paper offers an initial investigation into legislative apologies through a discourse analytic examination of two U.S. laws. It notes four significant differences between legislative and oral, ceremonial government apologies. It also discusses the less-positive reception of legislative apologies. I suggest that while legislative apologies dissent with previous government practices, alone they fall short of being satisfactory due to their generic constraints. The depersonalized nature of law strips legislative apologies of necessary ingredients in satisfactory apologies.

Thursday 27 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 24

Why devil's advocates are the angels of argumentation
Daniel Cohen (Colby College, US)
Katharina Stevens (University of Lethbridge, CA)

Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The concept of a devil's advocate – a cooperative arguer who assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the argument – serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation's goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be adversarial and the different ways that argumentation can be said to be "essentially" adversarial.

Thursday 27 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 25

Goal framing and practical argumentation
Peter Collins (Goldsmiths, University of London, UK)
Ulrike Hahn (Birkbeck, University of London, UK)

Campaigns often set out to persuade people to adopt a behaviour by stressing the advantages of complying (a positive frame) or the disadvantages of not complying (negative frame). A large literature has mistakenly assumed that such frames convey equivalent information and explored whether types of differ in persuasiveness. We dispense with the assumption of equivalence, advocate treating frames as probabilistic arguments, and give the basis of a new research program grounded in Bayesian argumentation.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 30

Forms of disagreement and reasons to disagree with automation in medical care and life sciences
Ana-Maria Cozma (University of Turku, FI)

This paper focuses on cases of disagreement during participatory democratic consultations. Disagreement will thus be seen as an indispensable feature of a democratic society respectful of the diversity of perspectives. More specifically, the paper analyses disagreement regarding automation in medical care and life sciences. The aim is twofold: 1) to identify predominant and recurrent linguistic expressions of disagreement and 2) to see what are people's representations of automation.

Tuesday 25 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 12

Evidence against negative evidence: A double negation effect in probabilistic arguments?
Nicole Cruz (Birkbeck, University of London, UK)
Ulrike Hahn (Birkbeck, University of London, UK)
David Lagnado (University College London, UK)

When estimating the probability that an event occurred, uncertain positive and uncertain negative evidence for the event usually cancel each other out. But we found that people's responses sometimes go in the opposite direction, suggesting a difficulty in processing evidence against negative evidence. Using a Bayesian network framework, we explore the boundary conditions for this effect, assessing whether it is reduced when evidence relations are made more explicit by reducing their complexity.

Wednesday 26 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 30

Debating arguments: Strategic Maneuvering in the Mercedes vs Jaguar Commercial Battle

Hédi Csordás (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, HU)

Advertisements can be analyzed in pragma-dialectical terms as contributions to discussions but they are not discussed in detail. I will try to make good on that claim discussing the Mercedes vs. Jaguar commercials. This exchange pose the questions how it can be analyzed as a critical discussion? Which rules moderate this special debate? It can be analyzed in the framework of strategic maneuvering and the majority of the PD rules are applicable with slight modifications.

Thursday 27 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 12

D

Reasons for Rational Disagreement from Dialectics

Istvan Danka (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, HU)

This talk will provide reasons for the position called 'the Steadfast View' in the epistemology of disagreement on the ground that it is (pragma-)dialectically reasonable to keep committed to a position in a debate in the lack of decisive counter-arguments. Analysing gradually more complex argumentative situation types will show that with increasing complexity, the explanation for rational disagreement is increasingly simpler.

Tuesday 25 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 18

Argumentative strategies of Erdoğan in constructing his populist discourse: The emphasis on "one nation"

Yeliz Demir (Hacettepe University, TR)

The paper discusses, from an argumentation theoretical perspective, how the central notions of populism figure in Erdoğan's political discourse. Particularly, by using the pragma-dialectical concept 'strategic maneuvering', it addresses how he construes 'one' nation consisting of those who stand by the government during a crisis, as opposed to the 'others' contravening the government. Examples are drawn from Erdoğan's speeches in which he tries to justify Turkey's military operation in Afrin.

Tuesday 25 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 12

Arguing Brexit on Twitter: a corpus linguistic study

Natalie Dykes (Germany Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, DE)
Philipp Heinrich (Germany Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, DE)
Stefan Evert (Germany Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, DE)

We study argumentation on social media by applying discourse and corpus linguistic methods to a corpus of 6 million tweets containing "Brexit". We identify 4 common argument schemes through manual annotation (strawman arguments, arguments from negative consequences, ad hominem, expert opinion) and develop corpus queries to find further instances of those schemes. Methods from discourse linguistics help to identify salient aspects shared by the various argument scheme realisations.

Thursday 27 June 15:00 - 15:30 Room 13

Protagoras' principle and the possibility of error
Michel Dufour (Sorbonne-Nouvelle, FR)

The paper begins with a short discussion of Protagoras' principle that there are always two divergent views on any topic and with various interpretations of his famous thesis that man is the measure of all things. It then makes a connection between Protagoras' theses and contemporary discussions on the nature and management of rational disagreement between experts, and discusses the heuristic value of the possibility of an underlying error, on this management.

Tuesday 25 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 24

Changing minds through argumentation: Black Pete as a case study
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)

Views on the efficacy of argumentation to change people's minds vary widely. In fact, it seems that argumentation has the potential to change minds, but only against the background of specific circumstances. What are then the conditions required for argumentation to change minds? In my talk, I present a conceptualization of argumentation as epistemic exchange, and drawing on findings from social exchange theory, I formulate a number of such conditions. I then apply this conceptualization to a specific case study: the Black Pete controversy in the Netherlands.

Wednesday 26 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 19

E

Making sense of comparison argumentation
Frans van Eemeren (University of Amsterdam, NL)
Bart Garssen (University of Amsterdam, NL)

The pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes consists of three main categories of argument schemes: symptomatic argumentation, comparison argumentation and causal argumentation. The variants and subcategories of these main categories have yet not been distinguished systematically. In this contribution we will make a start of doing so by distinguishing the most important subtypes and variants of comparison argumentation.
In comparison argumentation the inferential step between reason and standpoint is made possible by the pragmatic principle of analogy. We argue that on the main level of the typology two distinct subtypes of comparison argumentation need to be distinguished: descriptive comparison argumentation and normative comparison argumentation.

Wednesday 26 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 30

A Decade of Disregarding the Public? A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Hungarian Nuclear Expansion Controversy
Dorottya Egres (Budapest University of Technology and Economics,HU)

The first section of this paper analyzes the strategic maneuvering of various political, scientific and environmental protectionist actors in the debate about the expansion of Hungary's nuclear power plant and identifies the dialectical and rhetorical constraints of a long-term controversy in which positions, goals and audiences change. In the second section, the public's controversial role in the deliberative process is explored both theoretically and empirically in the nuclear expansion debate.

Tuesday 25 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 24

Experimenting with "emotive metaphors" in argumentation

Francesca Ervas (University of Cagliari, IT)
Maria Grazia Rossi (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)
Amitash Ojha (University of Cagliari, IT)

The paper presents two experimental studies to investigate the effect of metaphors with positive/negative emotional meaning in argumentation. Forty participants were tested using quaternio terminorum with "emotive metaphors" as middle term. In the first study the emotional meanings of vehicle/topic were coherent, while in the second study they were incoherent. The results showed that in the case of negative-valenced "emotive metaphors", the metaphorical framing is intensified, thus leading the participants to commit the quaternio terminorum.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 18

F

Pro/con argumentation: Framing issues in the evaluation of objections to practical proposals

Isabela Fairclough (University of Central Lancashire, UK)

I examine a variety of normative sources underlying arguments against the shale gas industry in deliberation and decision-making activity, using a theory of 'moral foundations' (Haidt 2013) and of pro/con (so-called 'conductive') argumentation (Blair and Johnson 2011, Wohlrapp 2011, Fairclough 2019). I focus on arguments from inviolable human rights (including the 'guinea pig' analogy), whose overriding strength, as decisive (conclusive) objections, has yet to be acknowledged by the supporters of the industry.

Thursday 27 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 12

What types of disagreements are there? A characterization of disagreement based on mental states and their direction of fit

Léa Farine (University of Neuchâtel, CH)

The difference of opinion which constitutes disagreement seems to be implicitly seen as a difference of belief. Nonetheless, this definition does not include other kinds of difference, such as difference of will. Thus, I propose to distinguish cognitive and volitional differences through a typology of mental states and their features, with the insights of three components of the philosophical theory of intentionality: propositional contents of mental states, mental states and directions of fit.

Tuesday 25 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 24

An argumentative analysis of the visual rhetoric in editorial cartoons with iconic photographs as topoi

Eveline Feteris (University of Amsterdam, NL)

I describe how iconic photographs are used in editorial cartoons as topoi in the form of common values that are embodied in such photographs. I give an analysis of the argumentative use of the visual rhetoric by explaining how changes with respect to the original iconic photograph represent a key to the interpretation of the critique that is conveyed indirectly by the cartoonist.

Tuesday 25 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 19

G

Conceptual Analysis of an Argumentation using Argumentation Schemes and the Toulmin Model

Marie Garnier (Cultures Anglo-Saxonnes, Université Toulouse 2 Jean Jaurès, FR)
Sarah Bourse (Cultures Anglo-Saxonnes, Université Toulouse 2 Jean Jaurès, FR)
Patrick Saint-Dizier (CNRS - IRIT, FR)

This investigation explores the correlations that exist between argumentation schemes and the Toulmin model, and how these can be used conjointly to develop a more accurate conceptual representation of an argumentation structure. It is based on a natural language corpus of claims and attacks or supports developed in the social domain. Claims and justifications are annotated using a system of XML-based frames focusing on linguistic and conceptual features.

Thursday 27 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 19

Apples and oranges: Strategic maneuvering with argumentation in support of a choice in Records of Decision

Ingeborg van der Geest (University of Amsterdam, NL)

In Records of Decision on major projects, such as the construction of a highway, the government justifies choices by pointing to the pros and cons of alternative options. The aim of this paper is to show the different ways in which writers of RODs maneuver strategically with argumentation in support of a choice: what strategic choices are made with regard to the process of balancing pros and cons and the application of decision rules?

Tuesday 25 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 24

Representing second-order arguments in argumentative adtrees

Federico Gobbo (University of Amsterdam, NL)
Jean H.M. Wagemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)

Responding to the need for high-precision tools for analyzing argumentation, the linguistic representation framework of Constructive Adpositional Grammars (CxAdGrams) has recently been combined with the argument classification framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA). So far, the method has been proven useful for analyzing first-order arguments. In this paper, it will be made applicable to the linguistically and pragmatically more complicated second-order arguments, such as the 'argument from authority' and the 'argument from disjunction'.

Tuesday 25 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 30

Trust in the institution of argumentation

David Godden (Michigan State University, US)

Dissent places additional demands on trust—changing the calculations involved in decisions to trust and judgements of trustworthiness. Acts of trust undertake a vulnerability in contexts of risk or uncertainty (dependence) accompanied by an expectation that the trusted will be appropriately responsive to the trustor's interests and vulnerabilities (reliance). This presentation explores how dissent in argumentative contexts can result in a lack of trust, or outright distrust, in argumentation as a reasonable dispute resolution mechanism.

Tuesday 25 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 13

Towards and explicit representation of barriers as deeper roots of dissent
Floriana Grasso (University of Liverpool, UK)

In this paper we expand previous work on motivational dialogues, focussing on the notion of barrier as a useful mechanism to understand and make explicit deeper reasons to dissent which are directly related to personal values and preferences. We present different definitions of barrier and the role they play in motivational and negotiation dialogues, but also in general disputes. This is specifically aimed at creating a formal conceptual model of the psychological notion of barriers, by means of an ontology, that can be used for digital interventions to promote behaviour change.

Tuesday 25 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 25

Metaphors in medical argumentation: A corpus-based study
Maria Grazia Rossi (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)
Fabrizio Macagno (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)
Sarah Bigi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, IT)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss a study conducted to analyse the distribution of metaphors within different dialogical contexts. We have analysed transcripts of 39 Italian interviews in the context of diabetes care to determine the communicative purpose behind the use of a metaphor. To understand how and why metaphors are used within our corpus of medical interviews we have used the MEthod for Dialogue Analysis. Quantitative and qualitative findings will be discussed.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 18

(Un)expected arguments? An analysis of children's contributions to argumentative discussions in contexts pre-designed by adults
Sara Greco (Università della Svizzera italiana, CH)
Josephine Convertini (University of Neuchâtel and USI - Università della Svizzera italiana, CH)
AntonioIannaccone (University of Neuchâtel, CH)
Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont (University of Neuchâtel, CH)

This paper intends to advance our understanding of contextualized argumentation by exploring the dynamics of expected arguments versus unexpected arguments in an institutional context. We consider the case of discussions in which adults pre-design issues for children's discussion and observe how children contribute to argumentation. Our findings show that children often understand the issue proposed by adults and advance expected arguments, but they also take unexpected routes and reframe the original issues.

Wednesday 26 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 12

Argumentation, Dissent, and Luck
Job de Grefte (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, NL)

In this paper, I approach the practice of argumentation and the issue of dissent from the perspective of social and anti-luck epistemology. In particular, I show how dissent can exclude veritic luck, and argue that dissent is appropriate in argumentation only if it does so.

Wednesday 26 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 19

Argument Scheme Theory

Hans V Hansen (University of Windsor, CA)

I propose to study what we might call the theory or the meta-theory of argument schemes. Such a study will highlight not only the theoretical problems but also the practical problems of using schemes for matters of understanding and making arguments. The subject is studied under the headings of comparison with formal logic, functionality, comprehensiveness, genesis, normativity and effectiveness. Previous publications by Walton, Garssen, Hitchcock, Blair, Pinto and Prakken, serve as the point of departure.

Wednesday 26 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 24

Dissent and blame avoidance: How government blame games derail policy debates

Sten Hansson (University of Tartu, EE)

Policy makers are often criticised for all kinds of transgressions, failures, and negative outcomes. Therefore, they routinely adopt various strategies of blame avoidance, some of which may distort or derail debates over important policy issues. I analyse concrete textual examples from public statements of British government officeholders to illustrate how they talk and write about issues of blame in relation to Brexit – their contentious policies and actions aimed at the UK's exit from the EU.

Wednesday 26 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 13

What should happen to our beliefs when we disagree?

Leah Henderson (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, NL)

Discussion of disagreement in epistemology has focused on how to suitably update or combine opinions of the disagreeing parties, but has failed to address a further important aspect of disagreement, namely the doubt that it casts on one's own opinion. In order to provide a full account of this, it is necessary to move beyond the Bayesian framework that has been standardly presupposed. A framework based on imprecise probability provides a more suitable model.

Tuesday 25 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 18

Rhetorical effectiveness and argumentative structure of appeals to popularity: the case of 'Everyone knows X'

Thierry Herman (Universities of Neuchâtel and Lausanne, CH)

Argument schemes whose conclusions are 'X is true' seem to be good candidates to be used as subschemes rather than independent schemes. It is the case with the expression "Everyone knows X" used in a kind of ad populum scheme? If so, what are the consequences of this peculiar argument structure? What is the rhetorical effectiveness of arguing with an expression like "Everyone knows X", which is a literally wrong hyperbole?

Thursday 27 June 15:30 - 16:00 Room 19

Towards a Theory of Informal Argument Semantics

Martin Hinton (University of Lodz, PL)

In this paper I set out the framework for a theory of informal argument semantics which is designed to make the assessment of the language of arguments easier and more systematic than is currently the

case. The framework, which attempts to identify arguments suffering from linguistic confusion, is intended to complement existing approaches to argument appraisal and is envisaged as a third stage of assessment after procedural and inferential analyses have been conducted.

Tuesday 25 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 30

Stereotyping
David Hitchcock (McMaster University, CA)

Logic textbooks ignore stereotyping, even though 'stereotyping' is the most commonly used fallacy label. This paper will define the term, and will discuss:
• under what conditions stereotyping is mistaken,
• whether it can be morally objectionable even if epistemically warranted,
• its relationship to similar good and bad forms of reasoning,
• how to recognize and respond to stereotyping, and
• how to avoid committing the fallacy.

Wednesday 26 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 13

People's capacity of distinguishing types of source-based arguments and their critical questions
Jos Hornikx (Radboud University, NL)
Inge Huberts (Radboud University, NL)

If typologies of argumentation schemes have a cognitive representation, people may be expected to distinguish different schemes. This expectation was tested in an experiment. Participants were asked to group arguments that they feel belong to the same class, and to assign critical questions to these arguments. Results show that people may relatively accurately differentiate between different subtypes of source-based arguments. They have, however, much more difficulty of linking these arguments to the critical questions.

Thursday 27 June 14:00 - 14:30 Room 19

Anger and dissent in argumentation: Strategies for achieving epistemic and pragmatic goals
Moira Howes (Trent University, CA)

Anger and dissent are often experienced in relation to each other. Arguers must therefore not only anticipate dissenting viewpoints when formulating their arguments, they must also think about how to engage with a potentially angry audience. Unfortunately, arguers and mediators do not always perform at their best in contexts of anger and dissent. In this presentation, I argue that five rhetorical and argumentation strategies in particular are especially effective for improving the ability to promote epistemic and pragmatic goals in contexts where anger and dissent occur together. These strategies include turning anger into an "object of reflection" (Zagacki and Boleyn-Fitzgerald 2006); "shifting subjectivities" (Olson 2011); world-travelling (Lugones 1987); pairing empathy with dissent; and using non-complementary expressions.

Wednesday 26 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 18

I

Making norms of argumentation normative

Beth Innocenti (University of Kansas, US)

What strategies do social actors use to try to make norms of argumentation normative, and why do they expect those strategies to work? A conceptual approach to the question has not yielded a satisfactory answer. I propose a rhetorical approach. Using normative pragmatic theory, I analyze Audre Lorde's "The Uses of Anger" which attempts to influence how academic colleagues respond to her anger.

Wednesday 26 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 18

"If You Are A Scientist You Cannot Stop Such A Thing": Scientific Assent and Dissent in the Manhattan Project

David Isaksen (University of South-Eastern Norway, NO)

In science dissent is encouraged in the search for truth. Yet when it comes to some of the basic assumptions about science the scientific community is less tolerant. I will show how some of these assumptions about were used by Oppenheimer as basic premises for arguments that had the weight of scientific validity. I will show how they were used to suppress dissent, but also how dissenters learned to craft counterarguments based on the same premises.

Tuesday 25 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 19

J

Formal specifications for dialogue games in multi-party healthcare coaching

Mathilde Janier (Université Grenoble Alpes, FR)
Alison Pease (University of Dundee, UK)
Mark Snaith (University of Dundee, UK)
Dominic De Franco (University of Dundee, UK)

We present our analysis in terms of Inference Anchoring theory of a dataset of patient interviews, in the context of multi-party health coaching. For each dialogue game specification we first provide a general description of the game, followed by descriptions of the participants, and rules for: locutions, commitment, structure, termination, and outcome. We then implement these theoretical dialogue game specifications by taking their subsequent representation in a Dialogue Game Description Language.

Tuesday 25 June 12:30 - 13:00 Room 25

Strategic manoeuvring with the expression 'not for nothing'

Henrike Jansen (Leiden University, NL)
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)

An important characteristic of the expression 'not for nothing' is that it indicates that a reason has been given or will be given. In this paper we aim to present an analysis of this expression's argumentative and rhetorical characteristics by regarding it as a presentational device for strategic manoeuvring. We will investigate when it is part of the standpoint or the argument, which type of argument scheme it yields and what its strategic potential includes.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 24

How courts should respond to the stories defendants tell: A Bayesian account of a Dutch ruling

Hylke Jellema (University of Groningen, NL)

In criminal trials, a defendant sometimes provides an alternative explanation of the evidence. The Dutch Supreme court has set down a framework on how courts should respond to such explanations. Yet this framework is unclear. I offer an interpretation in terms of Bayesian probability theory.

Thursday 27 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 24

The spaces & places of argumentation: Developing argumentative proprioception through mapping argumentation

Steven Johnson (University of Alaska Anchorage, US)

Argument mapping has proved useful in improving students' critical thinking skills but largely is limited to conceiving of arguments as static, isolated phenomena. Building on the successes of argument mapping, this paper proposes a model for mapping argumentation and imagines the use of such a tool in argument pedagogy. The paper further contends that mapping argumentation may contribute to the development of argumentative proprioception, or a sense of the space and place of argument.

Thursday 27 June 15:30 - 16:00 Room 12

K

Aggressiveness as a qualifier of dissent in interpersonal arguing

Iryna Khomenko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, UA)

The purpose is to examine aggressiveness as a qualifier of dissent in interpersonal arguing. This research is based on the results of the cross-cultural project, which empirical part included a nationwide survey conducted in Ukraine. Verbal aggressiveness is one of the characteristics, which is explored in this project.
It will be analyzed the general attitudes of Ukrainians to verbal aggression in interpersonal communication and key features of aggressiveness, concerning arguing motivations, understandings, and reactions.

Wednesday 26 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 18

Auditory Arguments – Importance of Sound in an Argumentative Discourse (An Empirical Study)

Gabrijela Kišiček (University of Zagreb, HR)

This paper presents an empirical experiment with a goal of verifying the influence of prosodic features on the acceptably of an argument. The same argument on a specific topic (the issue of immigrants) was delivered with the variety of prosodic features (voice quality, pitch, intonation, tempo, rhythm, intensity) and the audience of 20 students evaluated the argument (its validity, straight, persuasiveness). This empirical study confirmed extensive research in nonverbal communication and the influence of prosody on speaker evaluation but also confirmed that these results influence argument evaluation. Argument "seems" stronger and more persuasive if it is delivered with specific prosodic sound.

Tuesday 25 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 19

Critical Writing Skills in Legal Education
Bart van Klink (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)
Lyana Francot (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)

In our paper, we want to show how we train critical writing in the legal skills course for first-year law students. We focus on two key issues which we have encountered in teaching critical writing: 1) the discovery and assessment of arguments and 2) the construction of a normative framework. To address these issues, we return to the topological approach developed in classical rhetoric.

Wednesday 26 June 14:00 - 15:00 Room 25

Background Reasons, De Dicto Ends, and Irrationality
John Komdat (University of Rochester, US)

Many prominent theories of rationality excessively flatter agents. Given that agents almost always act and believe in accordance with what they take their reasons to support, they are almost never irrational according to these theories. But this is in tension with the plausible claim that irrationality is quite common. I argue that rationality requires us to act and believe in accordance with reasons and toward ends to which we have no relevant access.

Tuesday 25 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 30

Tracking divergent disagreement in dialectical structures
Felix Kopecky (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, DE)

This paper contributes to understanding why some debates are divergent despite the general tendency of rational debates to converge to agreement. It presents certain features of a debate's macrostructure that contribute to divergence by limiting available argumentation strategies and the number of coherent positions that disputants can take in a debate. The findings are presented within Betz' theory of dialectical structures.

Thursday 27 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 13

Circular reasoning: substituting rephrase for inference
Marcin Koszowy (University of Białystok, PL)
Jacky Visser (University of Dundee, UK)

We continue our exploration of fallacies resulting from misused rephrase relations in argumentative discussions. Previously, we looked at straw man and ignoratio elenchi in the confrontation or concluding stages of a discussion. We now turn to the argumentation stage, characterising circular reasoning (or petitio principii) as the illicit introduction of a rephrase relation where an inference relation was expected in the dialogue procedure. The resulting defence amounts to a restatement masquerading as an argument.

Wednesday 26 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 13

Be reasonable! How to be an optimist in the age of unreason

Erik C. W. Krabbe (University of Groningen, NL)
Jan Albert van Laar (University of Groningen, NL)

Unreasonableness comes in degrees. We give a survey of degrees of being unreasonable, discuss how bad these degrees of unreason are, and suggest some reactions with which to promote the cause of reason, such as: engaging in metadialogue, using tit-for-tat strategies, turning to an alternative type of dialogue, adapting one's arguments so as to entice one's interlocutor to return to the use of reason, and getting a foot in the door by using pressure.

Tuesday 25 June 12:30 - 13:00 Room 12

Common Ground Zero – How Reasonable Can Deep Disagreements Be?

Manfred Kraus (University of Tübingen, DE)

According to Fogelin, in cases of deep disagreements rational argument becomes impossible, since there is no common ground between arguers. Starting from a critique of Richard Feldman's view that reasonable disagreement is impossible between epistemic peers who share all relevant evidence, and based on concepts of "reasonable disagreement" by Friedrich Hayek, John Rawls, and Christopher McMahon, it will be asked to what extent deep disagreements can truly exist and nonetheless be consistent with reasonable argument.

Thursday 27 June 14:00 - 14:30 Room 18

Practical Syntheses: How Conductive Reasoning Helps

Tone Kvernbekk (University Of Oslo, NO)

My paper investigates the potential of conductive reasoning to provide internal epistemic/argumentative structure to a model of professional knowledge called practical syntheses. This model describes professional knowledge as heterogeneous and fragmented, held together by concrete practical demands. But it does not explain how judgments, e.g. diagnoses, are made. I shall argue that conductive reasoning, which yields "therefore, on balance" conclusions can help establish the kind of internal structure practical syntheses need.

Thursday 27 June 14:00 - 14:30 Room 12

L

A Dutch Dose of Dissent: Cross-Cultural Comparisons between Argument Predispositions of Students in the Netherlands and the United States

Nanon Labrie (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)
Aranka Akkermans (Amsterdam UMC, NL)
Dale Hample (University of Maryland, US)

Stereotypically, the Dutch are considered verbally straightforward – aggressive, even – and highly argumentative by comparison to other cultures. Yet, this stereotype is not supported by scientific evidence. The present study seeks to identify argumentative behaviors in the Netherlands. Are the Dutch indeed significantly more oriented towards conflict and argumentation than others? Providing a comparison between Dutch and U.S. undergraduate students' predisposed argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness, this study adds new evidence to cross-cultural argumentation.

Tuesday 25 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 13

How Epistemic Injustice can Deepen Disagreement

Thirza Lagewaard (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)

I want to contribute to a better understanding of 'deep disagreement' by arguing that sometimes, disagreements are deepened due to epistemic injustice. I explore a case of deep disagreement: the debate in the Netherlands about racism. This dispute should be understood as a deeper disagreement, because there is disagreement about what counts as evidence for the claim that racism is an significant issue in the Netherlands, due to both testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.

Tuesday 25 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 24

Argumentative Patterns of Populism: Logical Coherence and Disregard for Truth

David Lanius (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, DE)

Populism has become one of the most intensely discussed topics in both public debate and the social sciences. So far there has been no systematic argumentation theoretic analysis of populism, however. This paper is intended to fill in this gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of modern populist argumentation and giving an argumentation theoretically informed answer to the question of whether populist dissent should be discouraged.

Tuesday 25 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 12

A decision tree for annotating argumentation scheme corpora

John Lawrence (University of Dundee, UK)
Jacky Visser (University of Dundee, UK)
Douglas Walton (University of Windsor, CA)
Chris Reed (University of Dundee, UK)

Quantitative approaches, necessary for e.g. computational-linguistic methods such as argument mining, require large annotated corpora of argumentative discourse. Publicly available corpora of argumentation schemes often only cover a small selection of example schemes and suffer from low inter-annotator agreement. To address this, we present a heuristic decision tree for the classification of Walton's top-level taxonomy of 60 schemes. An annotation study on 505 arguments resulted in a 97% classification covering 38 schemes (Cohen's κ 0.723)

Thursday 27 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 19

Dissociation and Its Philosophical Foundation in Mencius's Argumentation

Yan Linqiong (Sun Yat-sen University; Jiangsu University, CN)
Xiong Minghui (Sun Yat-sen University; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, CN)

Dissociation is employed by Mencius (372 - 289 BC), a prominent Confucian skillful at argumentation in the Warring States period of ancient China. The philosophical foundation of dissociation in Mencius's argumentation is reflected in the pair "utilitarian/deontic". Mencius prefers the deontic dimension over the utilitarian one, but he manages to maneuver strategically between them. This hints not just Mencius's skills in balancing dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, but also the rational ground of his argumentation.

Tuesday 25 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 24

Using Bridging Rhetoric for Deliberative Dissent: Some Insights from India
Keith Lloyd (Kent State University, US)

This presentation adapts John Dryzek's notion of bridging rhetoric to the Ancient Hindu approach to reasoning called Nyaya, which combines a claim, reason, and analogy. This formulation, which helped people of various creeds and languages to coexist for centuries, creates a bridge across political divides between dissidents and respondents. The presentation offers modern Indian examples of Nyaya bridging reasoning to outline an approach to democratic deliberation that provides an alternative to Western confrontational reasoning.

Thursday 27 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 13

"We all know that": Strategically introducing arguments
Matthijs Looij (Leiden University/University of Amsterdam, NL)
Bertijn van der Steenhoven (Leiden University/University of Amsterdam, NL)

The construction [we] – [perspective indicating verb] – [that] – [argument] can be used by discussants to strategically introduce an argument. Through the combination of inclusive 'we', serving as an identity cue, and an perspective indicating verb that expresses certainty, the argument is presented as a common starting point. The inclusion made by using this construction should be both correct and clear. If one (or both) of these conditions is not met, the strategic manoeuvre derails.

Wednesday 26 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 24

Argument, justification and inquiry: a pragmatist approach
Federico Ezequiel López (National University of La Plata, AR)

In this paper, John Dewey's pragmatist conception of logic is revisited in order to defend the relevance of inquiry for argumentation theory. It is argued that by changing the focus from reasoning to inference, and from the act of justifying ready-made conclusions to the act of solving problems through reflective thought, we reach a useful conception of rationality that can serve as a more fruitful model in the teaching of logic.

Wednesday 26 June 15:00 - 15:30 Room 25

Strategic maneuvering in political debates
Natalia Luna Luna (Leiden Universiteit & Autonomous University of Mexico City, NL)
Mauricio Sáez de Nanclares Lemus (Autonomous University of Mexico City, MX)

In this paper we will characterize argumentatively the communicative activity type of political presidential debate to show how arguers have constraints in the strategic maneuvering in presidential debates, and how these determine their outcome. We will illustrate our point with examples of presidential debates of the Mexican election of 2018. We also want to make a contribution to Zarefski's important list of common strategic maneuvering types within political argumentation by adding some more of them.

Tuesday 25 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 25

M

Diaspora and Dissent in the Romanian Mainstream and Diasporic Media: The Formation of Transnational Counterpublics

Irina Diana Madroane (West University of Timisoara, RO)

The study examines the formation of a transnational counterpublic in the Romanian mainstream and diasporic media, in the context of recent protests, including protests of the diaspora in the home country. It looks at the claims, values and identities that provided a common ground for migrant and non-migrant action and at the (de-)legitimation of these stances in public discourses, within the frame of the construction of Romanian migration as a public problem.

Thursday 27 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 13

Dissent as a Voice of Support: The Influence of Argument Types in Providing Support to Those Who have Experienced Racial Discrimination

Uttara Manohar (University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse, US)
Susan Kline (The Ohio State University, US)

This study verifies the effectiveness of dissent and two types of arguments for coping with everyday discrimination: arguments for the victim's worth, and arguments affirming social identity. Two mediators, reappraisal and reattribution, serve as pathways through which these two types of message arguments influence perceptions of support effectiveness.

Tuesday 25 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 25

Communism, Dissent and Public Arguments of Resistance: 30 years after 1989

Noemi Marin (Florida Atlantic University, US)

The paper argues that thirty years after the fall of Ceausescu's regime, arguments of political resistance call for a more in-depth articulation of dissent in the public sphere. The definition of dissent and its public actions against political power in post-communist Romania provide rhetorical actions that separate discourse of power over the masses and discourse of power within a democratic framework of civic action. In addition, social media in post-communist Romania engage dissent as a novel venue for political action, and yet, rhetorical space for political interaction remains under a fragmented dialectic of public dialogue.

Thursday 27 June 15:30 - 16:00 Room 13

Holism of reasons and its consequences for argumentation theory

Hubert Marraud (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, ES)

I will explore the importance of the holistic approach in the theory of normative reasons for the theory of argument analysis. In the theory of reasons holism is the claim that contexts differ in terms of whether a certain consideration constitutes a reason at all, as well as in terms of the weight and (possibly even) polarity of the reason. I claim that holism throws new light on the distinction between coordinate and multiple argumentation.

Thursday 27 June 16:00 - 16:30 Room 12

"Why did not your correspondent make an honest inquiry before so writing?": The discourse structure of disagreement in Irish letters to the editor

Davide Mazzi (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, IT)

This paper looks at disagreement in letters to the editor published by national newspapers in late-nineteenth/early-twentieth-century Ireland. The research was conducted in the form of a qualitative analysis of argumentative discourse in letters, in many of which disagreement was expressed. Overall, findings provide evidence of recurrent discourse sequences of disagreement in news settings from a period where an Irish public opinion was to gradually shape up and legitimise ordinary people's right to dissent.

Wednesday 26 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 19

Discursive strategies for disabling dissent

Dima Mohammed (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)

In this paper, I examine how disagreement is handled, at the initial stages of disputation, in order to either foster or hinder the emergence of argumentation. Starting from the view that argumentation emerges to manage disagreements as part of a complex network, I focus on practices that dismiss or delegitimise dissent (e.g. depoliticisation, populism). I explore the similarities and differences between practices, their implications and I reflect on the theoretical tools available to examine them.

Tuesday 25 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 13

Learning Consistency Via Argumentation

Elisabetta Montanari (Ca' Foscari University of Venice, IT)

In this work, an argumentative intervention addressing high-school students and focusing on consistency, namely the important argumentative requirement to be non-contradictory, is presented and some of the results of its latest two implementations at school are explored.

Wednesday 26 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 25

N

How do Chilean seniors people think about arguing?

Cristian Noemi (Universidad de La Serena, CL)
Cristian Santibanez (Universidad Catolica de Concepción, CL)
Dale Hample (University of Maryland, US)

This work reports some of the results of a three-year project that seeks to characterize, both from a cognitive and linguistic point of view, the argumentative competence of the elderly in Chile. We found that a key culture-related measure, tolerance for power distance, was important in predicting elders' views of interpersonal arguing. Some statistical results show that there were not crucial differences between senior Chilean males and females.

Tuesday 25 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 13

Fallacies of multimodality in legal argumentation
Marko Novak (New University, SI)

Fallacies of multi-modality or, more precisely, those stemming from the use of non-logical modes such as intuitive, sensory, and emotional modes in the context of legal argumentation may be formal or informal. There have been a few studies on that concerning the logical mode, being the dominant one in law, but not about the non-logical modes. The analysis of such can be based on the Acceptability-Relevance-Sufficiency model as suggested by Groarke & Tindale.

Tuesday 25 June 12:30 - 13:00 Room 19

O

An Argumentative Approach to the Justification of Abduction
Paula Olmos (Autonomous University of Madrid, ES)

The philosophical debate over the justification of abduction can be modelled as the critical assessment a warrant-establishing argument allowing "H explains D" to be used as a reason for "H can be inferred from D". Philosophers discuss conditions under which such kind of generic argument could be accepted. Five kinds of conditions are identified and commented on: a) dialectical-procedural restriction; b) claim restriction; c) restriction over acceptable explanatory principles; d) epistemic restriction; e) balancing restriction.

Thursday 27 June 15:00 - 15:30 Room 19

Immunizations as Rules Violations
Tomáš Ondráček (Masaryk University, CZ)

Boudry and Braeckman (2011) regard immunizing strategies as arguments. I will argue against and show that (A) immunizing strategies are not arguments and (B) they are instead violations of rules of (critical) discussion. I will (A) show problems with analyses of examples using the Toulmin model of argument, and I will (B) show that each type of immunizations can be explained by the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation as violations of particular rules of critical discussion.

Wednesday 26 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 13

P

Arguing against online misinformation: pitfalls and prospects
Fabio Paglieri (ISTC-CNR Rome, IT)

Given growing concerns for online misinformation and its alleged impact, in this paper I discuss four different ways in which argumentation may be relevant in addressing these concerns: (i) argument analysis for fake news debunking, (ii) argument theory for designing better dialogical interactions, (iii) argument theory for policy making, and (iv) critical thinking education for honing users' skills. I argue that the first option is a non-starter, and provide suggestions to implement the other alternatives.

Thursday 27 June 16:00 - 16:30 Room 13

Argumentative strategies in crowdfunding narratives. A comparison of successful and unsuccessful project proposals on Kickstarter
Rudi Palmieri (University of Liverpool, UK)
Chiara Mercuri (University of Liverpool, UK)

This paper examines argumentation strategies in crowdfunding narratives published on the platform Kickstarter. We investigate (1) what types of argumentative strategies are used by project founders in crowdfunding pitches and (2) to what extent argumentative strategies differ in successful and unsuccessful crowdfunding campaigns. Overall, the argumentative-relevant differences that we found between successful and unsuccessful campaigns offer some interesting recommendations for improving the effectiveness of crowdfunding communication strategies.

Thursday 27 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 18

Reasons for (dis-) trust standpoints: towards an argumentative approach to crisis communication
Rudi Palmieri (University of Liverpool, UK)
Elena Musi (University of Liverpool, UK)

This paper examines the relation between argumentation and (dis-)trust dynamics in the context of crisis communication. Trust repair has been investigated in management and in corporate communication studies. Both have emphasised the relevance of some argumentation-related aspects without however recognising explicitly the role argumentation plays in (re)building trust after a crisis. The paper fills this gap by proposing an argumentative reconceptualization of trust repair strategies based on the analysis of different genres of trust-related discourse.

Tuesday 25 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 13

When You Can't Trust What You Don't Know: organ and tissue donation, public trust, the voice of dissent and informed consent
Harmony Peach (University of Windsor, CA)

This paper examines the apparently good reasons for becoming an organ and tissue donor (OTD) in "opt-in" recruitment and registration discourse (RRD). It explores how public trust is employed to encourage assent to the notion that donating is the right thing to do, and it considers whether expert ethical concerns for OTDs omitted from RRD may offer good reason for public dissent. It also examines how persuasion in RRD contravenes the tenets of informed consent.

Tuesday 25 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 13

"The worst ever conceived by a man of genius. " Hume's probability argument in *A Treatise of Human Nature*
Jeanne Peijnenburg (University of Groningen, NL)

The probability argument in Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Section 1.4.1) has been widely criticized, with David Stove (1965) calling it "the worst [argument] ever conceived by a man of genius". We explain that the argument is open to two interpretations: one that is in accordance with probability theory and one that is not. We surmise that Hume failed to distinguish between the two, and that this contributed to the confusion surrounding the argument.

Wednesday 26 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 30

Are we talking about cultural objects or historical figures? Ethos in the debates on cultural heritage

Martín Pereira-Fariña (University of Santiago de Compostela, ES)
Marcin Koszowy (Polish Academy of Sciences, PL)
Katarzyna Budzynska (Polish Academy of Sciences and University of Dundee, PL)

In this paper we study a communication phenomenon of appealing to what we call the ``historical ethos''. It has been developed by means of the empirical study of different debates, in Poland and in Spain, about controversial cultural objects, where ethotic attacks and supports to historical figures play an essential role.

Wednesday 26 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 19

Character, Warrant, and Dog Whistles
Kathryn Phillips (University of Rochester, US)

Both the principle of charity and responsibility condition are thought to be central elements of argument reconstruction and productive discourse. These conditions are problematic in arguments that contain various forms of deception. In this paper, I will focus on multivocal appeals (popularly known as dog whistles,) which are meant to be heard by only certain audience members. I will argue that arguments containing dog whistles require more nuanced tools to reconstruct the argument.

Wednesday 26 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 24

Thich Nhat Hanh and the rhetoric of nonviolent dissent
Michael Phillips-Anderson (Monmouth University, US)
Rachel Phillips-Anderson (Independent Scholar, US)

How can we dissent from the argument of another while maintaining both persuasiveness and compassion? We argue for a nonviolent rhetoric of dissent articulated through the writings of the monk and peace activist Thich Nhat Hanh. He offers concepts useful to argumentation including interbeing and non-attachment to views. If the goal of dissent is to persuade that another approach is preferable, we must take into account the humanity and needs of the other.

Thursday 27 June 16:00 - 16:30 Room 25

Deliberation, Dissent and Rhetorical Argumentation: the Aristotelian Framework
Francesca Piazza (University of Palermo, IT)

The aim of this paper is to show that Aristotle's Rhetoric can give us a theoretical framework to bring out the inherently agonistic nature of the argumentative practices in the public sphere. I will focus on the link between human deliberation, dissent and rhetorical discourses.

Thursday 27 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 25

The rhetorical potential of metaphor: An experimental study on the effect of metaphors in argumentation
Roosmaryn Pilgram (University of Amsterdam & Leiden University, NL)

Metaphors are deemed to have rhetorical potential. In what way and to what extent they affect argumentation is, however, not entirely clear. How exactly does metaphor presence influence argument evaluation? To answer this question, we conducted an experiment in which respondents had to evaluate dialogue fragments in which novel, direct metaphors were used to present a premise of the argumentation. The results show that metaphor presence negatively affects the reasonableness evaluation of argumentation.

Thursday 27 June 14:00 - 14:30 Room 30

Separate opinions as an argumentative activity type: strategic choices by judges referring to literary sources
H. José Plug (University of Amsterdam, NL)

In separate opinions, judges do not only make use of legal sources in order to justify their standpoints. They may also bring forward arguments that refer to literary sources, i.e. fiction. In this paper, I will analyse how references to literature may be part of the complex argumentation by which the decision of the majority is criticised. I will start with defining separate opinions as a distinct argumentative activity type in the domain of legal discourse. In view of the characteristics of this activity type it will be examined how strategic choices made by the judge concerning the use of references to literature may be analysed.

Wednesday 26 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 25

Can Literary Fiction be Suppositional Reasoning?
Gilbert Plumer (Law School Admission Council, US)

Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) "extract knowledge from the sheer workings of their own minds" (Rosa), even where the knowledge is synthetic a posteriori. Can literary fiction pull such a rabbit out of its hat? Where P is a work's fictional 'premise', some hold that some works reason declaratively (supposing P, Q), imperatively (supposing P, do Q), or interrogatively (supposing P, Q?). True, I will argue, although only with much qualification.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 25

Identifying Enthymematic Conflict in Logos and Ethos Structures through Conventional Implicatures
Brian Plüss (Centre for Argument Technology, University of Dundee, UK)
Annette Hautli-Janisz (Universität Konstanz, DE)
Katarzyna Budzynska (Academy of Sciences and University of Dundee, PL)
Valentin Gold (University of Goettingen, DE)
Chris Reed (University of Dundee, UK)

Conflicts in dialogue appear normally as explicit disagreements and ethotic attacks. However, argumentation in real, naturally occurring communication is often implicit, with speakers expecting arguments to be decoded by the hearer without necessarily asserting all relevant information. We present examples from public debates in which participants' conflicts happen via conventional implicatures, which expose implicated content. We also discuss Inference Anchoring Theory, an analytical framework that can handle this type of dissent in dialogical data.

Tuesday 25 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 25

Multimodal strategies to dissent to hate and prejudice in an online anti-racist Swiss campaign

Chiara Pollaroli (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
Laura Bonelli (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
Dimitris Serafis (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

The present study attempts to unravel the multimodal strategies that are employed in a Swiss advertising campaign against racism. The campaign dissents to racism both multimodally – that is, by an integration of moving images, written and spoken language, montage and layout – and interactively – that is, by requiring and constraining the active participation of the viewers and listeners. Arguments are advanced in order to support anti-racist positions.

Tuesday 25 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 19

Types of resistance to metaphor
Lotte Van Poppel (University of Amsterdam, NL)

This paper introduces a typology of resistance to metaphor, based on insights from metaphor theory and the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Types of resistances will be distinguished based on the criteria for reasonable metaphor use that can be inferred from evaluation criteria for figurative analogies and criteria for metaphor use which have been developed in metaphor research, such as aptness.

Thursday 27 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 30

Towards the heart of rhetorics (moving from legal philosophy): a dialogue with Christopher Tindale
Federico Puppo (CERMEG, IT)

Tindale argues for "encounter rhetorics" and "an anthropology of argument": a possible way to search for a concept of rhetoric and argumentation able to count for non-Western cultures too.
This paper would like to contribute to this research by proposing a comparison with a similar approach developed in legal anthropology, where we need to search for something that can be defined as "law" – a typical Western concept, as rhetoric is – for non-Western cultures too.

Tuesday 25 June 12:30 - 13:00 Room 13

R

Disagreement as a crucial element of argumentation analysis in Critical Discourse Studies – A Discourse-Historical Perspective
Martin Reisigl (University of Vienna, AT)

Disagreement expressed by argumentation analysts with respect to the object of analysis underlies the obligation to give reasons. Thus, the critical dissent has to be justified by reference to an adequate normative basis. I will specify this basis for the Discourse-Historical Approach. It relies on Pragma-Dialectics and a philosophical deliberative model of argumentation. I will propose a set of second order rules of deliberation in addition to the Pragma-Dialectical rules for critical discussion.

Thursday 27 June 14:00 - 14:30 Room 25

Countering metaphors expressing arguments in parliamentary debates
Kiki Renardel de Lavalette (University of Amsterdam, NL)

This paper aims to investigate the argumentative role of metaphors in British legislative debates, and the resistance against these metaphors. To this end, we present cases of resistance to metaphorically expressed arguments found in British Public Bill Committee debates. To account for the linguistic, conceptual and communicative properties of the metaphorically expressed arguments and the resistance against them, we combine insights from the three-dimensional model of metaphor with insights from the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation.

Thursday 27 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 30

Conspiracy Theories and reasonable disagreement
Juho Ritola (University of Turku, FI)

This essay discusses the epistemological problems conspiracy theories present.

Wednesday 26 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 19

S

Inference to the best Metaphor
Cristian Santibanez (Universidad Catolica de Concepción, CL)

I propose that we produce some of the most important inferences in a deliberative context, when we reason metaphorically. Just as we select a particular hypothesis because it covers certain facts in the best way and then explains the events, we select a particular conceptual metaphor because it allows us to mediate the social or cultural differences between the interlocutors and in this way the framing of part of the future exchanges.

Thursday 27 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 30

On Various Efforts of Enhancing Real World Online Discussions
Alexander Schneider (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, DE)
Christian Meter (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, DE)

In this work we present a suite of software which enables gathering of natural language arguments from non-expert users of argumentation software without the use of NLP or other argument mining techniques. This is achieved by presenting the user with interfaces that prompt them to enter the data in a way in which it can be correctly added to an argument graph.

Thursday 27 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 13

Beyond Randomized Clinical Trials: Emerging Innovations in Reasoning About Health
Jodi Schneider (University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, US)
Sally Jackson (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, US)

In medicine, since the 1950's, the Randomized Clinical Trial (RCT) has been widely regarded as the gold standard for making inferences about causal relationships between medical treatments and patient outcomes. We examine new approaches, including "pragmatic trials" and "N-of-1 trials", that seek to go beyond the RCT. We expore the arguments that have helped to re-open debate over the acceptability of the RCT and the tensions that arise from the competing perspectives of scientists, clinicians, and patients.

Tuesday 25 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 12

Empirical evidence for the role of information structure on the acceptability of straw man fallacies

Jennifer Schumann (University of Bern, CH)
Sandrine Zufferey (University of Bern, CH)
Steve Oswald (University of Fribourg, CH)

This paper investigates the role of French causal connectives that convey an attributive meaning for the acceptability of straw man fallacies. In three experiments, we assess the roles of: (1) linking the arguments with a connective vs. simply juxtaposing them; (2) using one causal connective over another (namely puisque vs. comme); (3) inserting the connective in sentence-initial or sentence-medial position. Our results indicate that using both attributive connectives decreases the acceptability of straw man fallacies.

Wednesday 26 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 13

Multimodal argumentation and dissent – a perspective of multimodal critical discourse analysis

Andrea Sabine Sedlaczek (University of Vienna, AT)

This paper explores dissent in audio-visual texts from a multimodal perspective on argumentation. This perspective combines aspects from critical discourse analysis, multimodal studies and the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce. A comprehensive analytical framework is proposed that investigates the material, referential and interpretative aspects of multimodal argumentative practices. The focus will lie on the way documentary film texts on environmental issues create dissent through music and sound in addition to language and images.

Tuesday 25 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 19

Analogical argumentation in philosophical thought experiments

Stefan Sleeuw (University of Groningen, NL)

Thought experiments in philosophy often contain analogical arguments. Such arguments are typically tentative attempts at persuasion: they are aimed at inviting the opponent into taking a certain controversial standpoint seriously, rather than at convincing him of its truth. In this paper, I specify a criterion for evaluating this type of argument and subsequently apply it to three well-known case studies.

Wednesday 26 June 12:00 - 12:30 Room 30

Detecting and handling disagreement in multi-party health coaching

Mark Snaith (University of Dundee, UK)
Alison Pease (University of Dundee, UK)
Dominic De Franco (University of Dundee, UK)

We describe an empirical study of disagreement in multi-party healthcare coaching. We analyse a patient interview dataset for dissent, including both highly explicit examples using well-established conflict keywords and actions, and more subtle dissent in terms of language and gestures. We use our analysis to address questions such as: "What types of conflict occur in this context?", and "Can we identify different types of disagreement and corresponding resolution strategies?"

Tuesday 25 June 9:30 - 10:00 Room 12

Justifying Aggression, Hostility, and Emotional Outbreaks: The Defeasibility of the Duty to Argue Cooperatively
Katharina Stevens (University of Lethbridge, CA)

The arguments from fairness and justice are arguments from political philosophy that justify the duty to obey the law. Parallel arguments can be used to justify a duty to argue according to the rules of cooperation. But in both cases, the duty these arguments can support is only defeasible. Under conditions of injustice, these duties cease to apply. In the political sphere, disobedience is now justified. In argument, aggression, hostility and emotional outbreaks become legitimate.

Thursday 27 June 15:30 - 16:00 Room 25

How do people argue in their personal diaries?
Iva Svacinova (University of Hradec Králové, CZ)

The paper deals with the practice of writing personal diaries from the point of view of the theory of argumentation. Diary-writing is understood as a textual record of internal dialogues in which the diarist may speak from different I-positions and solve internal conflicts about intimate topics. I use extended pragma-dialectics to characterize the communicative activity type of diary-writing argumentatively. The theoretical results are illustrated by a case study of persuasion in Anne Frank's diary.

Wednesday 26 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 25

T

Explaining away: the case of probability interpretations
Marko Tesic (Birkbeck, University of London, UK)
Alice Liefgreen (University College London, UK)

Explaining away is a pattern of inference that occurs in situations where independent causes compete to account for an effect. Empirical studies have found that people 'insufficiently' explain away. In this paper we consider the possibility that this insufficiency could be partly due to people's different interpretations of probabilities. In particular, we hypothesise that some people may interpret probabilities as propensities, which would then drive the insufficiency effect of explaining away. This hypothesis is empirically tested.

Wednesday 26 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 30

Limits of dissent: balancing cooperation and competition in trial
Serena Tomasi (University of Trento, IT)

The most widespread image of trial is a kind of battle-between-the-parties. This paper introduces the question of modelling legal reasoning as a cooperative system, focusing on the limits of dissent in trial. First, I will try to reflect on why we might want litigators to be pretty adversarial; secondly, I will focus on some statutes which provide benefits for stopping disagreement; finally, I will present a normative model of legal reasoning based on cooperation.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 13

Fair, transparent and responsible agent deliberation

Alice Toniolo (University of St Andrews, UK)
Doug Walton (University of Windsor, CA)

Our question is whether by adhering to the designed rules of today's deliberation dialogue protocols, agents will behave fairly, transparently and responsibly. In this paper, we propose some reflections and guidelines on how deliberation dialogue should be held to these principles using norms to define protocols. Our initial observations show that the turn-taking function may cause unfair behaviour and that this characteristic is not typical of deliberation, but rather characterises persuasion dialogue.

Thursday 27 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 25

U

Objection from conscience: ethical appeal in parrhesiastic speech

Mehmet Ali Üzelgün (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)

The roles of loaded language and the person of the speaker are discussed with regard to the construction of the parrhesiastic ethical appeal.

Wednesday 26 June 11:30 - 12:00 Room 25

V

Quantitative rhetorical profiling

Jacky Visser (University of Dundee, UK)
John Lawrence (University of Dundee, UK)
Chris Reed (University of Dundee, UK)

The increasing availability of argumentatively annotated text corpora opens up new possibilities for applying quantitative empirical methods in argumentation studies. Exploring the use of corpus-based metrics to model the rhetorical profile of a speaker, we characterise their style of arguing in terms of argument scheme selection, standpoint types, and speech acts. We illustrate these data-driven characterisations by comparing the styles of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in their first 2016 US presidential election debate.

Tuesday 25 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 25

Audience response to visual argumentation of clickbait headlines and illustrations

Ana Vlah (Zagreb, HR)

Clickbait headlines attract users to click on them in order to make a profit. Its reach among readers and news publishers is problematic, since incomplete headlines with incongruent photos lead to false reasoning. In this paper we carry out an argument analysis of clickbait headlines and illustrations published in online news media outlets, to see the connection words and visuals have and how they stand together, and how critical audience is towards that practice.

Tuesday 25 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 19

Dissent in Aristotle's Dialectics and its Medieval Interpretation
Gustavo Fernandez Walker (University of Gothenburg, SE)
Ana Maria Mora Marquez (University of Gothenburg, SE)

This presentation aims to shed light on the epistemic aspect of the Aristotelian notion of dissent and its understanding in the medieval reception of Aristotle's dialectics. Dissent is fundamental in Aristotle's Topics, although its exact nature is not clear. Specifically, it is unclear whether dissent is essentially related to an epistemic quality of the premises involved, or whether it simply amounts to social disagreement about them, regardless of their epistemic quality.

Wednesday 26 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 19

A Paroxysm of Dissent: Partisan Political Advertising During the Brexit Campaign
Simon Wells (Edinburgh Napier University, UK)

This paper presents the results of a reconstruction and analysis of a dataset of partisan political campaign adverts that were deployed by leave supporting campaign groups during the Brexit referendum. These adverts were targeted towards British social media users. We identify a number of rhetorical devices and argumentative strategies that have been deployed to persuasive effect in this most divisive of events.

Thursday 27 June 14:00 - 14:30 Room 13

Expansion and Contraction of Argumentative Space for Dissent in Russia
David Williams (Florida Atlantic University, US)
Marilyn Young (Florida State University, US)
Michael Launer (RussTech Language Services, Inc., US)

This presentation chronicles changes in Russian public argumentation as evidenced in presidential speeches over the past three decades, with a focus on the President's annual addresses to the Federal Assembly. We track definitional shifts in ideographs of liberalism (democracy, freedom, independence) and in related dialectical constructions of key terms (unity, dissent) in the speeches of Russian Federation presidents since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Such references have virtually disappeared over the past five years.

Tuesday 25 June 9:00 - 9:30 Room 25

How reasonable is the dissent about "Conductive Arguments"?
Harald R. Wohlrapp (University of Hamburg, DE)

The paper holds that the seemingly wide-ranging dissent about various questions about the "conductive" type of arguments is not really necessary but mainly due to ignoring, inattentive reading and/or misunderstanding of insights that have already been exposed in the course of the debate.

Thursday 27 June 15:00 - 15:30 Room 12

Y

A Ludological Perspective on the Shape of Argument: Collaborative Assent to Dissenting Opposition

Michael Yong-Set (University of Windsor, CA)

This paper attempts to extend Yong-Set's ludological approach to give a better philosophical articulation of the nebulous tension found in the activity of argumentation. By harnessing the resources of ludology – the academic and critical study of games qua games – we can use the framework of 'Player-Opposition Shapes' to help understand the appropriate forms of opposition an antagonist's dissent should take to accomplish the collaborative goals embraced when assenting to participate in various types of argumentation.

Thursday 27 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 25

The inference from 'backing' to 'warrant' in legal justification of hard cases

Shiyang Yu (Institute of Logic and Cognition, Sun Yat-sen University, CN)
Xi Chen (Law School of Shenzhen University, CN)

Toulmin model is a heated topic in argumentation theory. However, on one hand, there is no unified understanding of its components; on the other hand, scholars usually focus on Toulmin model in general sense, rather than in particular fields. This paper simultaneously response to both problems by situating Toulmin model in legal field. We refine 'warrant' and 'backing', and articulate the inference from backing to warrant in legal justification of hard cases.

Thursday 27 June 14:00 - 14:30 Room 24

Z

Neuro-Cognitive Argumentation and (the Problem of) Other Minds

Igor Ž. Žagar (Educational Research Institute & U. of Primorska, SI)

Can smell, touch and taste therefore be arguments (play argumentative roles, assume argumentative functions)? How wide can the scope of what is an argument be, and what are the criteria for something to be an argument?
These are the questions I will be concerned with in my paper, but I would like to take a step further and examine, what are the neuro-cognitive bases of argumentation. Especially, what are the neuro-cognitive limitations of argumentation.

Thursday 27 June 11:00 - 11:30 Room 12

How should we classify argument schemes?

David Zarefsky (Northwestern University, US)

How do we classify argument schemes? Some, such as Walton, propose a large number of categories of schemes. Others, such as van Eemeren, propose very few. The former approach is better for describing actual arguments; the latter, for establishing a normative standard. But van Eemeren goes too far; not all arguments can be encompassed within his set of three schemes. I will conclude by defending a set of six schemes as proposed in a forthcoming book.

Tuesday 25 June 14:30 - 15:00 Room 18

What a traceable account is not

Frank Zenker (Lund University, SE)

Climate scientists must give a traceable account of their probability judgments regarding a climate-model outcome, explaining their overall probability judgment given alternative models and research lines. To demonstrate the focal challenge, we analyze parts of the 2013 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), treating the likelihood that anthropogenic factors drive climate change. By reconstructing its (covert) argumentative structure, we show the difference between the actual report and what a traceable account requires.

Wednesday 26 June 10:00 - 10:30 Room 12

Panels

INVITED PANEL: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC DISCOURSE: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR ARGUMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS (APPLY)
Fabio Paglieri (ISTC-CNR Rome, IT)

Providing and criticizing reasons is indispensable to achieve sound public policy that commands the support of both citizens and stakeholders. This need is now widely acknowledged in the recent literature and key EU documents, which highlight the perils of populist discourse and policies – all too apparent in current political events. This panel will present a new scientific initiative to understand public debate from an argumentative perspective: the European network for Argumentation and Public PoLicY analysis (APPLY), an EU-funded COST action aimed at improving the way citizens understand, evaluate and contribute to public decision-making on such matters of common concern as climate change or energy policies. In line with the APPLY multidisciplinary perspective on argumentation, which combines descriptive, normative and prescriptive research, this panel will include an introduction by Marcin Lewiński (the Action's Chair) and showcase contributions by Isabela Fairclough, Gregor Betz, and Mark Aakhus, with commentaries by, respectively, Andrea Rocci, Fabio Paglieri, and Sara Greco.

INVITED PANEL: MANIPULATION PUBLIC OPINION: ANALYZING THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT IMMIGRATION.
Jan Albert van laar (University of Groningen, NL)
Else de Jonge (Foundation for Empirical Logic and Analytical Philosophy, NL)
Allard Tamminga (Foundation for Empirical Logic and Analytical Philosophy, NL)
Jacob Bouwman (Foundation for Empirical Logic and Analytical Philosophy, NL)

Do we have a problem with the manipulation of public opinion, and if so, what exactly is the problem? What can or should be done about this? How can we apply insights about these issues to the case of immigration? In this invited panel, journalists and academics discuss these issues with the audience, under the guidance of Marc Pauly.

Panel members: James Ball – Journalist *BuzzFeed* and *The Guardian*; Lilian Bermejo-Luque – Researcher *Universidad de Granada* & General Secretary *Podemos Granada*; David Lanius – Researcher *DebateLab* at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology & *Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society*; Steven de Winter - *Mediation Regio Noord* & *Foundation Media Ombudsman The Netherlands* (Stichting Media Ombudsman Nederland). Chair: Marc Pauly – *Knowledge Center Philosophy*, University of Groningen.

MULTIMODAL DISSENT: ARGUMENT SCHEMES AND CRITICAL QUESTIONS

Leo Groarke (Trent University, CA)
Jean H.M. Wagemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)
Assimakis Tseronis (Örebro University, SE)

It would be a mistake to think that dissent is a phenomenon which is exclusively verbal. Many of the most powerful forms of dissent (most notably, but not only, in social and political debate) contain key non-verbal elements: pictures, photographs, audio recordings, physical demonstrations, virtual reality productions, etc. These "multimodal" means of dissent, argument and objection play a decisive role in argument. Their powerful emotional and/or cognitive impact makes them popular tools in attempts to mobilize support for instances of dissent.

But multimodal dissent, like verbal dissent, can be misleading and errant in many ways. In dealing with it, this means that we need normative criteria that can help us distinguish between multimodal dissent which merits and does not merit our attention and agreement. This panel will consider argument schemes and the critical questions that accompany them as one way to achieve this goal.

Thursday 27 June 14:30 - 16:30 Room 18

Visual and Auditory Schemes of Argument

Leo Groarke (Trent University, CA)

In the context of the discussion of schemes and their relationship to multimodal arguments, I attempt to further our understanding of dissent in a number of ways: by elaborating suggested visual and auditory schemes in more detail; by identifying critical questions that can accompany such schemes; by providing ways to include such schemes in Wagemans' Periodic Table of Arguments (Wagemans 2016, 2017); and by considering historical and contemporary examples of dissent that can be analyzed from this point of view.

Accounting for multimodal argument schemes in the Periodic Table of Arguments

Jean H.M. Wagemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)

A fully comprehensive typology of argument schemes will have to include a response to the issues raised by visual and multimodal schemes. How can arguments that contain multimodal elements be conceived in terms of argument schemes? Should an extra premise be added, or can we do with verbal placeholders? This talk discusses a number of proposals for representing visual and multimodal argument schemes within the theoretical framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments.

The prospects for multimodal schemes of argument: Assessing Adbusters' spoofing strategies

Assimakis Tseronis (Örebro Univerity, SE)

Recourse to argument schemes and their accompanying critical questions can provide a fruitful way of assessing visual and multimodal arguments. The prospects of such an approach are discussed based on analyses of spoof ads. Their spoofing strategy amounts to raising critical questions about the argument scheme employed in the original ad. How can the various aspects of the verbal and the visual mode cue critical questions and what is their overall contribution to the evaluation of multimodal arguments?

(Mis)framing photographs as an obstacle to fair dissent

Marta Zampa (University of Applied Sciences, CH)
Chiara Pollaroli (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

In this presentation, we consider the consequences for public argumentation of misframing photographs. When photographs are altered, misframed by the textual component that accompanies them or used improperly to stand for something they actually do not portray, they activate the wrong premises in the audience and lead it to the wrong conclusion. We explore this topic by analyzing famously misframed photographs of children in crisis situations.

SOCIAL JUSTICE, DISSENT, AND ARGUMENTATION

Catherine Hundleby (University of Windsor, CA)
Tracy Bowell (University of Waikato, NZ)
Maureen Linker (University of Michigan, US)
Harmony Peach (University of Windsor, CA)

Movement towards social justice regularly entails dissent because it involves criticisms of perceived injustice and regular disagreement with the status quo. However, prioritizing the articulation of dissent does not always serve social justice, and deciding whether and how when dissent arises argumentation can serve social justice involves complex considerations explored by the panelists.

Thursday 27 June 14:30 - 16:30 Room 30

Dissent, Disadvantage, Testimony and the Ideological 'Truth' of Presumptions
Harmony Peach (University of Windsor, CA)

This paper takes up Trudy Govier's account of how people who are marginalized in socioeconomic terms can also be rhetorically disadvantaged. It argues that the rhetorical disadvantage of people who are socially marginalized entails that they carry a higher burden of proof in the context of presumptions than those less marginalized, which is regularly compounded by their dissent regarding the status quo, and draws on work in cognitive psychology along with Nicholas Rescher's philosophical epistemology.

The Critical Thinking Classroom: Solving the Proximity Paradox for Reasonable Dissent
Maureen Linker (University of Michigan, US)

Affective reasoning requires humanizing the other through inter-subjective dialogue and fellow feeling, while at the same time taking a position of ontological distance so as not to further oppress the experiences of the 'other.' I will refer to this dual set of requirements as the proximity paradox. I argue that the proximity paradox should not lead us to abandon affect as a feature of reasoning through social dissent.

With All Due Respect: Controversial Beliefs and the Limits of Responsible Argumentation
Tracy Bowell (University of Waikato, NZ)

This paper considers whether there are limits to responsible argumentation when confronting positions that are a manifestation of bigotry, are racist, misogynistic, homophobic, or highly offensive in other ways. Can responsible arguing become irresponsible in such contexts? And do we become irresponsible as teachers if we encourage responsible engagement with positions such as these? And are there situations in which a refusal to engage is the most responsible way to deal with particular position?

Argument Repair: Moving beyond the Adversary Paradigm
Catherine Hundleby (University of Windsor, CA)

Textbooks in argumentation address the possibility of argument repair (e.g. Bailin & Battersby, Epstein, and Gilbert) offer a simple and fundamental means to resist the problematic dominance of the Adversary Method. Neglecting argument repair presents a false picture that negative evaluations are definitive whereas they are always subject to reinterpretation (Massey 1975). Such neglect also contributes to social injustice by way of fostering the dominance of Adversary Method identified by Janice Moulton (1983).

LOOKING AT THE EXPRESSION OF DISAGREEMENT THROUGH EVIDENTIAL AND EPISTEMIC MARKERS

Jérôme Jacquin (University of Lausanne, CH)
Johanna Miecznikowski (Università della Svizzera italiana, CH)

The panel explores the relation between epistemicity (evidentiality and epistemic modality) and the expression of disagreement. It suggests that the latter interacts with the management of knowledge in several ways (e.g. associating statements to the protagonist's or the antagonist's argumentation, hedging the face-threatening expression of disagreement). The contributions to the panel are based on data documenting a variety of contexts (conference calls, political debates, management meetings, online reviews and editorials) and languages (English, Italian, French).

Tuesday 25 June 11:00 – 13:00 Room 30

Evidentiality and disagreement in question design. A quantitative corpus study of earnings conference calls of listed companies.

Andrea Rocci (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
Carlo Raimondo (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

Does the French quotative "tu dis / vous dites [P]" [you say [P]] project the expression of a disagreement regarding P?

Jérôme Jacquin (University of Lausanne, CH)

This panel contribution examines the relationship between the expression of disagreement and a specific indirect evidential marker – the French quotative "tu dis / vous dites [P]" [you say [P]] – in a corpus documenting Swiss-French public and TV debates as well as management meetings. It addresses the following question: to what extent and in what linguistic, discursive, and/or interactional context "you say [P]" projects the expression of a disagreement regarding [P]?

Italian 'non vedo' / 'non si vede' + interrogative clause ('I don't see why/what/who') as a marker of counterargumentation

Johanna Miecznikowski (Università della Svizzera italiana, CH)

A corpus-based exploratory study of this negated perception verb construction intends to show that it combines epistemic functions (the speaker asserts a strong negative belief) and evidential functions (the information source is inference) with argumentative functions: the speaker disagrees with an antagonist's position and projects certain counterarguments. The construction's semantic properties suggest that the latter might be based mainly on syntagmatic loci. Argumentative reconstruction of moves and inferential procedures is used to substantiate these hypotheses.

Do JE PENSE and its reduced form J'PENSE perform different stance actions in situations of disagreement in political debates ?

Sabrina Roh (Université de Lausanne, CH)

This contribution examines the role of the epistemic marker JE PENSE in situations of disagreement. This study is motivated by two research questions: (1) How JE PENSE and J'PENSE are used in an argumentative context? (2) And does the morphophonological variation of the clitic JE help us to define the type of stance action performed by the epistemic marker? Occurrences of JE/J'PENSE will be compared in light of conversational analysis, syntax, and phonology.

SYMPOSIUM PROPOSAL: ARGUMENT STRENGTH
Frank Zenker (Lund University, SE)

The purpose of this symposium is to provide a systematic overview of extant approaches to determining argument strength, and to inquire into the possibility of relating them with a view to achieving theoretical unification. Conversely, we inquire into the features (if any) that make an approach distinct.

Thursday 27 June 14:30 - 16:30 Room 24

Dialectical approaches to argument strength
David Godden (Michigan State University, US)

The panel on Argument Strength analyses Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse's "Epicureans on Squandering Life" (3 Quarks Daily, 25 February, 2019), in order to provide a comparative overview of existing approaches to argument strength, inquiring into the possibility of their theoretical unification. This contribution provides the dialectical analysis, according to which rational argumentative norms are modeled as procedural constraints on conversational moves, and argument strength depends on the (un)availability of non-losing future moves.

The structural approach to argument strength
Marcin Selinger (University of Wrocław, PL)

We present a framework for evaluating the strength of structured arguments and counterarguments, based on the kinds of diagrams used in informal logic. The evaluation in this structural approach is bottom up, general and abstract, making it easier to compare specific models of evaluation. The generalized model abstracts from the particular set of values that represent argument strength, and also from particular algorithms that transform the acceptability of premises into the acceptability of conclusions.

The Computational Approach to Argument Strength
Simon Wells (Edinburgh Napier University, UK)

This contribution to the symposium on Argument strength covers computational approaches and maintains a broad focus upon the extant range of abstract computational techniques. We survey the variety of ways in which argument strength has (not) been characterised, and suggest directions for extending computational approaches to bridge (real and perceived) gaps between computational and philosophical practises of argumentation.

The empirical approach to argument strength
Kamila Debowska-Kozlowska (University in Poznan, PL)

Rather than define argument strength, the empirical branch of communication studies operationalizes this concept. Experimental persuasion research regularly manipulates

argument strength as a variable relevant to message content. In constructing this variable, attention is paid to questions such as: How to properly pre-test strong/weak argument-stimuli, and how to operationalize the focal concept reliably? An operational approach to argument strength, however, leaves open whether a pretest must standardize norming features or consider them case-by-case.

DIALOGUE TYPES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
Fabrizio Macagno (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)
Chrysi Rapanta (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)

Although the notion of dialogue types has been thoroughly explored from a normative (e.g. pragma-dialectics) and an artificial intelligence point of view (e.g. agents' deliberative model), there is still much to say regarding how different types of dialogue are enacted in different contexts. This panel aims at offering an overview of recent advances and applications in the study of argumentation dialogue types, and how these may inform future research, both theoretical and empirical, in the field. It draws on contributions from three contexts, namely: patient-doctor, teacher-students and peer-to-peer interactions.

Tuesday 25 June 11:00 - 13:00 Room 18

Arguing to learn: Capturing deliberative argument in educational settings
Mark Felton (San Jose State University, US)
Amanda Crowell (United States Hunter College, US)
Merce Garcia-Mila (University of Barcelona, ES)
Constanza Villarroel (University of Barcelona, ES)

This paper presents a coding scheme designed to capture deliberative argument in educational settings. Analyses of adolescent and adult dialogues have validated a theoretical model of deliberative argument at the level of discourse goals, purposes and moves. The identification of productive and counter-productive discourse using the coding scheme provides a deeper understanding of how different discourse types might influence learning. The nature of these differences and their implications for educational research are discussed.

Introduction to Dialogue Types
Douglas Walton (CRRAR, CA)

This paper gives a brief summary of the basic types of dialogue in the standard typology and offers some clues on how to apply them to instances of real dialogue and other short spans of argumentation in natural language texts.

From dialogue types to dialogue moves
Fabrizio Macagno (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)
Sarah Bigi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, IT)

The purpose of this paper is to show how the theory of 7 types of dialogue proposed by Walton can be developed in a model aimed at capturing and describing smaller units of analysis (dialogue moves) based on the dialogical goal that they propose. Dialogue moves will be adapted and applied to a corpus of 40 medical interviews, detecting shifts from and breaks between different dialogical goals based on the criterion of relevance.

From dialogic to argument-based teaching: Significant teacher moves in framing classroom-based argumentation dialogues
Chrysi Rapanta (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)

Dilar Cascalheira (Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, PT)

Argument-based teaching, broadly defined as the use of argumentation as part of the teacher's everyday pedagogical kit, implies dialogic teaching, meaning a shift in teacher's attitude from being authoritative to being more open to student's talk and agency. Nonetheless, the limits between allowing students to talk and enabling them to think argumentatively are still not well-defined. This empirical work addresses this gap through looking at an extended corpus of teacher-students interactions.

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Maps and other information

Conference secretariat and emergencies

For all conference-related inquiries please call Jan Albert van Laar: +31-6-10591739

Medical: 112
Police: 112
Fire department: 112

Wifi

You will receive a wifi password at the registration desk

Excursions

Guided city walk

On Wednesday June 26, there are guided city walks that start at the conference venue and bring you to the restaurant for the conference dinner. Each walk takes about 90 minutes. Please, let us know whether you wish to join, and if so, please select your favorite theme – by filling out this google form on http://ecargument.org/?page_id=1207 before June 14.

Places that we happen to like

Within the canals:

Bars

Café Mulder (best bar)	Grote Kromme Elleboog 22, 9712 BK Groningen
Café Wolthoorn (prize winning)	Turftorenstraat 6, 9712 BP Groningen
Café Pintelier (many beers)	Kleine Kromme Elleboog 9, 9712 BS Groningen
Der Witz (few seats)	Grote Markt 47, 9711 LX Groningen
Mofongo (just focus on your cocktail)	Oude Boteringestraat 26, 9712 GJ Groningen
Huis De Beurs (with piano)	A-Kerkhof Zuid Zijde 4, 9711 JB Groningen

Restaurants

WEEVA (Dutch)	Gedempte Zuiderdiep 8 - 10, 9711 HG Groningen
Da Vinci (Italian)	Turfsingel 33-1, 9712 KJ Groningen
Da Carlo (Italian)	Gedempte Zuiderdiep 36, 9711 HH Groningen
De Sleutel (cheap)	Noorderhaven 72, 9712 VM Groningen
Louis XV (quality)	Oude Kijk in Het Jatstraat 47, 9712 EC Groningen
Thai Jasmine (Thai)	Gedempte Zuiderdiep 19, 9711 HA Groningen
Roezemoes (cheap)	Gedempte Zuiderdiep 15, 9711 HA Groningen
Gustatio (make reservation early)	Oosterstraat 3, 9711 NN Groningen
Brussels Lof (fancy veggie)	Akerkstraat 24, 9712 BG Groningen

Coffee, tea

Prinsentuin (old garden)	43, Turfsingel, 9712 KJ Groningen
Spaak (bicycle racing)	Oude Boteringestraat 66, 9712 GN Groningen
Op z'n Kop (for feline enthusiasts)	Oude Ebbingestraat 57, 9712 HC Groningen

Taking a strol

Noorderplantsoen	Kruissingel 1, 9712 XN Groningen

Just outside the canals:

Bars

|	
Smederij (Tuesday jazz)	Tuinstraat 2, 9711 VD Groningen
Kroeg van Klaas	Oosterweg 26, 9724 CJ Groningen
De Bres	Grachtstraat 71, 9717 HL Groningen
De Koffer	Nieuwe Blekerstraat 1, 9718 ED Groningen

Restaurants

Eetcafé Michel (Italian, cheap)	Meeuwerderweg 28, 9724 ET Groningen
De Grote Frederik Bistro	Frederiksplein 7, 9724 NH Groningen
De Omhelzing (Indonesian)	Jacob van Ruysdaelstraat 2, 9718 SG Groningen
De Kleine Moghul (Indian, cheap)	Nieuwe Boteringestraat 62, 9712 PP Groningen
Bla Bla (vegetarian)	Nieuwe Boteringestraat 9, 9712 PE Groningen
Smederij	Tuinstraat 2, 9711 VD Groningen

Tourism: https://www.visitgroningen.nl/en

Conference venue

Walking from the train station:

The map below shows the walking route from the train station "Hoofdstation" to the Academy Building (Academiegebouw) which is where we will start on Monday:

By public transport:

Use the following website: https://9292.nl/en

Alternatively you can take a bus from the train station; in order to know which busses to take you put "hoofdstation, Groningen" as your departure location on the above mentioned website, and "Grote Markt, Groningen" as the destination. You will then see the following page with a number of options:

The map on the following page shows the walking route from the bus stop to the conference venue the "Harmony Complex" and the "Academiegebouw":

Conference venue "Academy Building"

Conference venue "Harmonie Complex"

Bus stop "Grote Markt"

67

ECA 2019

(CHECK THE FINAL PROGRAM IN THE CONFERENCE BAG)

Monday, 24 June, Academy building

16:00 – 17:00	Registration; Coffee & tea. Location: Academy Building, 1st floor, Bruinszaal
17:00 – 18:15	Opening & Key note lecture Deanna Kuhn. Location: Academy Building, 3rd floor, Geertsemazaal
Reception	This reception is offered to you by the Municipality of Groningen, the Province of Groningen and the University of Groningen. Location: Academy Building, 1st floor, Bruinszaal

Chairing:

- As a rule, each session has a **chair** (c), whose presentation is chaired by a *vice-chair* (v). Exceptions are marked in the schedule. Please, try to find a replacement yourself if needed, or contact the organization.
- The organizer of a panel chairs the panel sessions, and appoints a substitute whenever presenting him/herself.

Tuesday, 25 June, parallel sessions in the Harmony Complex

	Room 18	Room 30	Room 24	Room 12	Room 25	Room 13	Room 19
9:00 – 9:30	*Henderson* (v)	*Hinton* (v)	*Egres* (v)	Rossi, *Macagno* (v), Bigi	*Williams* (v), Young, Launer	*Peach* ("When ...") (v)	*Vlah* (v)
9:30 – 10:00	**Danka** (c)	**Komdat** (c)	**Van der Geest** (c)	**Snaith** (c), Pease and De Franco	**Luna Luna** (c), Sáez de Nanclares Lemus	**Godden** ("Trust...") (c)	**Sedlaczek** (c)
10:00 – 10:30	Balg		Linqiong and Xiong Minghui	Cozma	Visser, Lawrence, Reed	Palmieri, Musi	Bobrova
Coffee break	Harmony Complex, Restaurant, Upper room						
11:00 – 11:30	*Panel:* Dialogue types and their applications	*Panel:* Looking at the expression of disagreement through evidential and epistemic markers	Lagewaard	Schneider, Jackson	Plüss, Hautli-Janisz, Budzynska, Gold, Reed	Noemi, Santibanez, Hample	Pollaroli, Bonelli, Serafis
11:30 – 12:00			*Farine* (v)	*Lanius* (v)	*Grasso* (v)	*Labrie* (v), Akkermans, Hample	*Feteris* (v)
12:00 – 12:30			**Aikin** (c)	**Demir** (c)	Arieli, **Borg** (c), Strasser	**Carozza** (c)	*Kisicek* (c)
12:30 – 13:00			Alfino	Krabbe, van Laar	Janier, Pease, Snaith, De Franco	Puppo	Novak
Lunch break	Harmony Complex, Restaurant, Upper room						
14:30 – 15:00	*Zarefsky* (v)	*Gobbo* (v), Wagemans	*Dufour* (v)	*Van Bijnen* (v)	*Manohar* (v), Kline	*Mohammed* (v)	*Isaksen* (v)
15:00 – 16:00	Sinclair (commentary Jackson)	Mosaka (commentary Feteris)	**Lumer** (c) (commentary Wagemans)	Castro (commentary Godden)	Reijven (commentary Innocenti)	Magdalena (commentary Aikin)	Cacean (commentary Pilgram)
16:00 – 17:00	**Corredor** (c) (commentary Zarefsky)	**Aakhus** (c) (commentary Reisigl)		**Freeman** (c) (commentary Casey)	Leal, Suro, **Hample** (c) (commentary Lloyd)	**Blair** (c) (commentary Olmos)	**Lewinski** (c) (commentary Hoppmann)
Tea break	Harmony Complex, Weberfoyer						
17:45 – 18:45	**Key note lecture Ruth Amossy. Location: Academy Building, 3rd floor, Offerhauszaal (10 minutes' walk)**						
	Reception. Location: Academy Building, ground floor, Restaurant Academia						

Wednesday, 26 June, parallel sessions in the Harmony Complex

	Room 18	Room 30	Room 24	Room 12	Room 25	Room 13	Room 19
9:00 – 9:30	*Ervas* (v), Grazia Rossi, Ojha	Collins, *Hahn* (v)	Jansen*, Snoeck Henkemans* (v)	*Busuulwa* (v)	*Plumer* (v)	Tomasi	Fernandez Walker, *Mora Marquez* (v)
9:30 – 10:00	**Innocenti** (c)	**Peijnenburg** (c)	**Bletsas** (c)	**Andone** (c), Hernández	**Catalán** (c)	**Hitchcock** (c)	**Dutilh Novaes** (c)
10:00 – 10:30	Khomenko	Tesic, Liefgreen, Lagnado	Looij, van der Steenhoven	Zenker	Plug	*Schumann* (v), Zufferey, Oswald	Ritola
Coffee break	Harmony Complex, Restaurant, Upper room						
11:00 – 11:30	*Howes* (v)	*Cruz* (v), Hahn, Lagnado	*Boogaart* (v), Jansen, van Leeuwen	*Greco* (v), Convertini, Iannaccone, Perret-Clermont	*Svacinova* (v)	*Koszowy* (v), Visser	*De Grefte* (v)
11:30 – 12:00	**Bourse** (c)	Van Eemeren, **Garssen** (c)	**Hansen** (c)	**Bova** (c)	**Üzelgün** (c)	**Hansson** (c)	**Mazzi** (c)
12:00 – 12:30	Casey, Cohen	Sleeuw	K. Phillips	Baumtrog	Aberdein	Ondráček	Pereira-Fariña, Koszowy, Budzynska
Lunch break	Harmony Complex, Restaurant, Upper room						
14:00 – 14:30	Invited panel: Manipulating public opinion: Analysing the controversies about immigration. TBA, Ball, Bermejo-Luque, Lanius	Invited panel: Cost Action European Network for Argumentation and Public Policy Analysis. Aakhus, Betz, Fairclough, Greco, Lewinski, Paglieri, Rocci	*Bodlović* (v) (commentary Freeman)	*Sadek* (v) (commentary Corredor)	*Van Klink* (v), Francot	*Hoppmann* (v) (commentary Herman)	
14:30 – 15:00					Montanari		
15:00 – 15:30			**Goddu** (c) (commentary Hitchcock)	**Henning** (c) (commentary Hundleby)	López	**Licato** (c) (commentary Cruz)	
15:30 – 16:00					**Bailin** (c), Battersby		
Tea break	Harmony Complex, Weberfoyer						
16:30 – 17:30	**Key note lecture Katie Atkinson. Location: Academy Building, 3rd floor, Geertsemazaal (10 minutes' walk)**						
17:30 – 19:30	Guided city walk						
19:30 – 22:30	**Conference dinner at Prinsenhof**						

Thursday, 27 June, parallel sessions in the [Harmony Complex](#)

	Room 18	Room 30	Room 24	Room 12	Room 25	Room 13	Room 19
9:30 – 10:30	*Gascón* (vice-chair to lunch) (commentary Lumer)	*Hoffmann* (vice-chair to lunch) (commentary Grasso)	*Tindale* (vice-chair to lunch) (commentary Farine)	*Jackson* (vice-chair to lunch), Jacobs, Zhang (commentary Wohlrapp)		Bermejo-Luque (vice-chair to lunch) (commentary Hansen)	*Hannken-Illjes* (vice-chair to lunch) (commentary Scott)
Coffee break	Harmony Complex, Restaurant, Upper room						
11:00 – 11:30	Vorms, Hahn (commentary Aberdein)	Santibanez	Alves Do Nascimento França	Žagar	Piazza	Lloyd	*Garnier* (v), Bourse, Saint-Dizier
11:30 – 12:00		Renardel de Lavalette	Jellema	**Csordás** (chair from 9:30)	Toniolo, Walton	Kopecky	**Zemplen** (chair from 9:30) (commentary Üzelgün)
12:00 – 12:30	**Palmieri** (chair from 9:30), Mercuri	**Van Poppel** (chair from 9:30)	**Cheng** (chair from 9:30)		Cohen, **Stevens** (chair from 9:30)	Schneider, **Meter** (chair from 9:30)	
Lunch break	Harmony Complex, Restaurant, Upper room Lunch meeting: "Online tools for deliberation in education and beyond." (location TBA)						
14:00 – 14:30	Kraus (chair: Groarke)	Pilgram (chair: Hundleby)	Yu, Chen (chair: Zenker)	*Kvernbekk* (v)	Reisigl	Wells ("A Paroxysm")	*Hornikx* (v), Huberts
14:30 – 15:00	Panel: Multimodal dissent: Argument schemes and critical questions	Panel: Social justice, dissent, and argumentation	Panel: Argument strength	**Fairclough** (c)	**Yong-Set** (c)	**Madroane** (c)	**Lawrence** (c), Visser, Walton, Reed
15:00 – 15:30				Wohlrapp		Dykes, Heinrich, Evert	Olmos
15:30 – 16:00				Johnson	Stevens	Marin	Herman
16:00 – 16:30				Marraud	*Phillips-Anderson* (v), Phillips-Anderson	*Paglieri* (v)	
Reception	Harmony Complex, Restaurant, Upper room						