BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

2nd European Conference on Argumentation
Argumentation and inference

20-23 June 2017
University of Fribourg, Switzerland
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While the 1st edition of ECA was devoted to exploring the relationship between argumentation and the decisions that follow from it, the 2017 Fribourg edition focuses on the cognitive processes involved in argumentation, with a clear focus on inference as one of the key features of the argumentative process. Argumentation studies have increasingly expanded over the last decades with a clear opening towards cognitive science, and we accordingly believe that the time is ripe to ground a discussion in the community around the notion of inference, along its formal, social and cognitive dimensions. The overarching questions the conference theme will be concerned with are therefore the following: How does the study of argumentation connect with the notion of inference and how, as a discipline, does it connect with the disciplines involved in the study of the cognitive features of inference? Granting, of course, that we take argumentation to be the verbal and social manifestation of inferential processes, the event has welcomed contributions focusing on the ins and outs of (i) how reasoning, but more generally inference, influences and constrains argument production and (ii) which (and how) inferential processes are involved in argument reception, thus covering cognitive tasks such as understanding and accepting.

To foster this discussion, the conference attracts scholars in argumentation coming from a range of different traditions, including (but not limited to) philosophy, psychology, linguistics, informal logic, speech communication, pragma-dialectics, epistemic approaches, rhetoric, dialectics, logic, and computational approaches.

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The European Conference on Argumentation (ECA) is a pan-European initiative launched in 2013 aiming to consolidate and advance various streaks of research into argumentation and reasoning. ECA’s chief goal is to organise on a biannual basis a major conference that provides an opportunity for exchanging research results and networking in all areas related to the study of argumentation: philosophy, communication, linguistics, discourse analysis, computer science, psychology, cognitive studies, legal theory, etc. We are dedicated to work in synergy with other major events – such as the conferences organised by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation and the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation – by following their interdisciplinary spirit and avoiding schedule overlaps. As a distinguishing feature, ECA events offer a mix of plenary keynote sessions, thematic symposia, long papers with assigned commentators, and regular papers.

ECA is organised every other year at a different European location. The 1st edition was hosted in 2015 in Lisbon by the ArgLab, Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA), Universidade Nova de Lisboa (New University of Lisbon). This 2nd edition is hosted by Pragmatics Lab of the English Department at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. While based in Europe, ECA involves and encourages participation from argumentation scholars all over the world.

Each meeting results in the publication of conference proceedings and may in addition lead to a dedicated selection of papers as a special journal issue or a collective volume.

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Keynotes
Keynote 1. Tuesday June 20th, 17:30, G140

Dan Sperber

Departments of Cognitive Science and of Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest

Dan Sperber has devoted his research to the study of cultural, social and cognitive features of human nature. He is the co-author of one of the most influential theories in pragmatics, Relevance Theory, and the main initiator of the study of epistemic vigilance, which are both key theoretical explorations of the relationship between understanding and believing. His latest work has yielded the argumentative theory of reasoning, which articulates the fundamentally social dimension of human reasoning.

Inference, Reasons, and Argumentation

In The Enigma of Reason (2017), Hugo Mercier and I have argued that reason is a mechanism of intuitive inference about reasons and that reasons are tools for two main types of social interaction: justification and argumentation. This contrasts (1) with dual system approaches where intuition and reason are contrasted as two quite different types of inference, (2) with the standard idea that reason is first and foremost an enhancement of individual cognition, and (3) with the practice of treating reasons in justification and reasons in reasoning and argumentation as different types of objects. The talk will outline our approach and consider some of its implications for research on argumentation.
Keynote 2. Wednesday June 21st, 17:45, G140

Sally Jackson
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA*

Sally Jackson has developed her research programme as a systematic investigation of communicative design. She has greatly contributed to the study of normative pragmatics by focusing on the role of interaction and conversational features of argumentative exchanges in her account of argumentation as design.

**Naturally Occurring Argumentation**

Across disciplines, an argument is commonly understood to consist of claims supported by reasons for believing the claims, and argumentation is commonly understood to consist of a presentation, or sequence of presentations, of these arguments. But close examination of naturally occurring argumentation draws attention instead to the exchange of reasons for disagreeing. When a fully elaborated claim + reason structure is found in natural interaction, it is usually a recap of selected material from a prior exchange (keeping reasons that succeeded and discarding those that did not). And a claim + reason structure that is accepted as good enough for the purpose at hand is typically just that: good enough to manage disagreement and get on with the business of the interaction. Naturally occurring argumentation is a set of possibilities for repairing or otherwise managing targeted disagreements that appear against a background of mostly tacit agreement. This “set of possibilities” is open-ended, not finite. It can be extended indefinitely through intentional design of new strategies and devices, and this process of design (though often quite technical) is also a feature of naturally occurring argumentation.
Ulrike Hahn covers a range of cognitive phenomena such as judgement and decision making, language acquisition, concept acquisition and similarity. She is a leading specialist in the field of experimental approaches to argumentation with extensive expertise on Bayesian models of argument and the cognitive features of convincing arguments.

Norms for Real World Argumentation

Normative standards for evaluating argument quality are central to a number of theoretical and practical endeavours: not just to attempts to evaluate, and if possible improve, standards of argument, but also to the descriptive project of trying to understand the processes by which humans evaluate arguments. Ideally, our normative standards would encompass all types of argument that can be found in everyday and specialist discourse. The talk reflects on the scope of normative standards achieved so far, illustrating how their expansion facilitates not just normative but also descriptive research, and seeks to clarify the challenges that remain.
Johan van Benthem’s work has decisively influenced the international landscape of the study of logic for nearly 40 years. His research, broadly conducted as a systematic study of human reason, has covered all areas of logic and has many times extended its scope to explore issues in neighbouring disciplines such as mathematics, linguistics, game theory and cognitive science. His latest projects have been devoted to logic and information dynamics.

**Argumentation, Inference, and Social Agency**

While relations between logic and argumentation theory have been a bit strained over the past century, there is actually a lot of common ground -- especially now that logic has started diversifying into the study of different styles of inference, and beyond that, even a broader spectrum of themes in the functioning of information-driven agency. I will present a brief anecdotal perspective on the relation between logic and argumentation theory, and then quickly move on to what I see as major directions worth pursuing. These are:

- The Bolzano Program: the logical study of our natural repertoire of different inference styles. In a modern guise, this program will also pay systematic attention to creating and updating the representations that we infer with. This second aspect makes many of the usual discussions about failure or validity of logical laws in actual reasoning obsolete.

But a proper perspective on diversity requires a further step.

- The Agent Perspective: adding the "who" is doing the inferring to the "what" of what is being concluded. This involves different attitudes of agents (knowledge, belief, preferences), the dynamics of information flow and its many triggers, and crucially also, the social interaction between reasoning agents. Many of these phenomena are being explored in current dynamic-epistemic logics.
- Argumentation is clearly more than a set of inference moves, whether 'good' or 'bad'. It also involves responses to others, and longer-term strategies. These dimensions become particularly clear in game-theoretic models, which have flourishing interfaces with contemporary logic and computer science. Argumentation in this broad sense is a rich empirical practice that can be analysed as a game at different levels of structure, from bare argumentation networks to rich games for deliberation or decision.

I will end with a few comments on how all this relates to cognitive science, and to argumentation in practice.
Abstracts
The Appraisal of Conductions
Lilian Bermejo Luque (University of Granada, ES)

In this paper I take for granted that conductive arguments have idiosyncratic rhetorical features, but I argue that their specificity is better understood in logical terms. Conductions are a type of inference; but it is not necessary to develop novel standards of inference goodness or specific argument schemes in order to assess them: deductions, inductions and conductions have the same inferential structure, the only difference being that in conductive arguments warrants are merely plausible.

Wed. 8:30-9:30, A140 Commentator: Paula Olmos

In Defence of Conduction: Two Neglected Features of Argumentation
J. Anthony Blair (University of Windsor, CA)

Xie and Wohlrapp criticize some claims made about conductive arguments. I argue that their criticisms overlook two important features of argumentation. By following the pragma-dialectical definition of argumentation by which arguments are used exclusively for advocacy, Xie’s criticism overlooks the use of argument for inquiry. By foregrounding the dynamic character of argumentation, Wohlrapp misses the static character of individual component arguments. Once these oversights are corrected, the criticisms evaporate.

Wed. 9:30-10:30, A140 Commentator: Jean Wagemans

French Interpersonal Argument: Fundamental Understandings
Michel Dufour (University of Paris, FR)
Dale Hample (University of Maryland, USA)

Our aim here is to provide what we believe to be the first general survey of fundamental French understandings about interpersonal arguing. We consider how arguing fits into French language and culture. In parallel with recent projects done in other nations, we report French people’s argumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, argument frames, and tendency to take conflicts personally. These results are compared to those of other nations.

Wed. 11:00-12:00, A140 Commentator: Marta Zampa
Valid Arguments. Truth, Content, and how the Content is Reached
Giulia Felappi (University of Southampton, UK)

The notion of validity is usually spelled out in terms of necessary preservation of truth. But not everybody agrees that truth is the central and unique notion when it comes to defining validity. In this paper, I will discuss the prima facie threats to the thesis that truth is all that matters put forward by Kit Fine and David Kaplan.

Wed. 9:30-10:30, B130 Commentator: Geoff Goddu

Inferences, Inference Rules, Generalized Conditionals, Adequate Connections
James Freeman (Hunter College/City University of New York, USA)

Peirce’s “biological” theory of inference links inference with argumentation. His leading principles connect with Toulmin’s warrants, generalized conditionals, Rescher’s defeasible provisoed assertions. Defeasibility raises the issue of premise/conclusion connection adequacy. Cohen's method of relevant variables, supplemented with plausibility considerations, in particular Rescher’s, addresses strength of support for inference rules and their corresponding generalizations, how strongly they connect premises with conclusions, permitting assessment of connection adequacy and argument cogency for a principle class of defeasible arguments.

Wed. 11:00-12:00, G230 Commentator: Juho Ritola

Virtuous Arguers: Responsible and Reliable
José Angel Gascón (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, ES)

Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer.

Wed. 8:30-9:30, G140 Commentator: Andrew Aberdein

Emotional Inference: Making, Using and Transparency in Argumentative Contexts
Michael Gilbert (York University, CA)

Emotion plays a role in arguing, and a good argument must use emotion in order to proceed to a fair and virtuous conclusion. Thus the importance of inferring emotions, which depends on the rhetorical
skill of the arguers, the kind of argument, and the goals of the arguers. So, emotional inferences are not always possible, accurate, expected. Rather, emotions are inferred from non-verbal expressions, tonality, and context, and are useful in the process of argumentation.

Wed. 9:30-10:30, G140

**Analysing Implicit Premises within Children’s Argumentative Inferences**

*Sara Greco (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)*

*Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont (University of Neuchâtel, CH)*

*Antonio Iannaccone (University of Neuchâtel, CH)*

*Andrea Rocci (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)*

*Josephine Convertini (University of Neuchâtel, CH)*

*Rebecca Schaer (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)*

This paper presents preliminary findings of the project “Analysing children’s implicit argumentation”. We propose to reconstruct implicit premises of children’s arguments within adult-children discussions in different settings, using the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT) for the reconstruction of the inferential configuration of arguments. We show that sources of misunderstandings are more often than not due to misalignments of implicit premises between adults and children; these misalignments concern material premises rather than the inferential-procedural level.

Wed. 11:00-12:00, B130

**Auditory Inferences as ‘Sound’ Reasoning**

*Leo Groarke (Trent University, CA)*

*Gabrijela Kišiček (University of Zagreb, HR)*

Traditionally, logic defines a sound argument as a (deductively) valid argument with true premises. We discuss sound inferences of a different sort, i.e. inferences based, not on the meaning of words or sentences, but on non-verbal sounds. The study of visual argument and multimodality is pushing argumentation theory in a broader direction. We push in the same direction by offering an account of inferences which are based on sounds other than words.

Wed. 8:30-9:30, G230

**On Arguments from Testimony**

*Martin Hinton (University of Łódź, PL)*

Whilst the argument from expert opinion is considered the successor to Locke’s argumentum ad verecundiam, this paper points out the important structural differences between them and questions the wisdom of concentrating on expert opinion at the expense of other forms of testimony. The form of all arguments from testimony is the same and the task of disputants is deciding whom they will accept as authorities in their debates, not whom they will nominate an expert.
Fostering Reflection and Self-Correcting Reasoning with Deliberation and Argument Visualization System

*Michael Hoffmann (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA)*

How can people be trained to be more open to changes in their reasoning? The talk discusses the design of the Reflect! platform, an educational online tool for problem-based learning projects in which small teams of students work for a semester on a wicked problem. The software will realize scripted user guidance that is designed to foster reflection and self-correction through deliberation and argument visualization.

On How to Do without the Opening Stage: Arguers and Argumentation Theorists Can Get Along Without It

*Scott Jacobs (University of Illinois, USA)*

Some state of “prior agreement” is commonly posited as a necessary preliminary argumentation proper. It is not. People are able to get along perfectly well with local, on-the-spot, right now management of commitments and disagreements. Prior agreements are conveniences and not evidence for a normative or empirical ideal. Such an ideal is a conceptual impossibility. Even if possible, it couldn’t do its supposed job: provide the grounding framework for the rationality or reasonableness of argument.

In the Quagmire of Quibbles

*Erik Krabbe (University of Groningen, NL)*

*Jan Albert van Laar (University of Groningen, NL)*

Criticism may degenerate into quibbling or nitpicking. How can discussants keep quibblers under control? In the paper we investigate cases in which a battle about words replaces a discussion of the matters that are actually at issue as well as cases in which a battle about minor objections replaces a discussion of the major issues. We survey some lines of discussion dealing with these situations in profiles of dialogue.
Strength of Justification – The Degree of Certainty Approach

Christoph Lumer (University of Siena, IT)

In this contribution, a new theory of the strength of justification is developed, in addition to a critique of present theories of argument strength (subjective Bayesianism, Gordon & Walton). This new theory distinguishes between the (possibly probabilistic) content of a proposition and the degree of certainty of belief in this proposition. Possible contradictions between statements exist at the content level; the strength of justification, on the other hand, is the belief’s rational degree of certainty.

Wed. 8:30-9:30, B130                 Commentator: Niki Pfeifer

When Reasoning Errors Are Not Errors of Reasoning

Fabio Paglieri (ISTC-CNR Rome, IT)

Current debates on reasoning errors, in philosophy and psychology, focus on whether these are certifiable mistakes or harmless shortcuts, to be considered legitimate under adequate circumstances. In contrast, this paper discusses the cognitive underpinnings of such mistakes, even when they lead to sub-optimal outcomes. It is argued that most well-documented mistakes people make do not reveal inferential deficits, but rather attentional biases and inhibition problems. This, in turn, has important implications for critical thinking education.

Wed. 11:00-12:00, G140             Commentator: Didier Maillat

Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “Le comique du discours”: Humor and Argument as Rhetorical

Michael Phillips-Anderson (Monmouth University, USA)

Noemi Marin (Florida Atlantic University, USA)

This paper explores Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s contributions to the New Rhetoric Project and to humor studies. Le comique du discours extends several important concepts of Traité de l’argumentation while explaining the value of the comic perspective in understanding the role of argument in reasoned discourse. We will discuss the comic of rhetoric, the communion created by the comic, and the limits of comic argument. We will also explore the challenges of translating this work into English.

Wed. 11:00-12:00, E140              Commentator: Christopher Tindale

Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference through a Looking-Glass

Gilbert Plumer (Law School Admission Council, USA)

I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “ALL theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of
the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.

Wed. 12:00-13:00, G230
Commentator: Daniel Cohen

V

On Coherent Arguments and Their Inferential Roles
Bart Verheij (University of Groningen, NL)

In this paper, we address coherent arguments and their inferential roles, in particular, the explanatory, predictive, and decisive roles. We take a perspective on the coherence of arguments grounded in cases. Our cases are a kind of coherent clusters of information, as they are encountered in the cognitive sciences (scripts, frames, cases, scenarios). We explain how cases can provide a semantics for three kinds of argument validity: coherence, presumptive validity and conclusiveness, and show how these can be used to distinguish three versions of the inferential roles explanation, prediction and decision. The findings are connected to the triplet of inference types deduction, induction and abduction.

Wed. 12:00-13:00, C130
Commentator: Mathieu Beirlaen

W

Strategic Maneuvering in the Background: How Candidates Encourage Audience Inference Making Through Silent Derogation in the Background
Harry Weger (University of Central Florida, USA)
Dima Mohammed (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

It is common for televised political debates to include split-screen shots which give the non-speaking opponent an opportunity to engage in nonverbal argumentation during an opponent’s turn. In this paper we reconstruct this communicative move as a case of strategic maneuvering. We address three questions about this behavior. Given 1) dialectical obligations, 2) rhetorical possibilities, and 3) preconditions of the activity type, what counts as reasonable and effective instances of this strategic maneuver in televised political debates?

Wed. 8:30-9:30, E140
Commentator: Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
Perception, Inference and Understanding in Visual Argumentation (and Beyond)
Igor Žagar (Educational Research Institute, SI)

This paper tentatively proposes a sketch, a scheme, maybe even a model (in the making!), of how (and why) interpretations of visuals (but not just visuals; elaborated "verbal" arguments function in the same way, and simplified "everyday" arguments aren't much different) function, what triggers these interpretations (and why), what they depend on, and what their restrictions and limitations may be. In short: what inferential processes may be involved in argument reception, processing and understanding.

Wed. 9:30-10:30, G230
Commentator: Assimakis Tseronis

Linguistic Markers of Legal Reasoning in ECHR Summaries of Judgments
Lejla Zejnilović (Mediterranean University, ME)

This paper looks at the ways in which the argumentation of the European Court of Human Right’s judgments is constructed around certain lexical markers of modality and evidentiality, which have their role in modifying argumentative force, simultaneously affecting argument reception. Our results reveal that the variations in the strength of Court’s inferences can be interpreted as part of the rhetorical strategy aimed at directing potential readership towards the ‘right’ interpretation.

Wed. 9:30-10:30, C130
Commentator: Paul van den Hoven

Can Bayesian Models Have “Normative Pull” on Human Reasoners?
Frank Zenker (Lund University, SE)

While human reasoning cannot generally approximate NP-hard Bayesian models (in the sense that the mind’s “computations” come close to, or be like, inferences such models dictate), for Bayesian models to exercise “normative pull” on human agents in special cases, a well-defined and empirically supported approximation relation is required—but broadly absent—between actual human reasoning and a non-NP-hard model. We point to complexities that arise in specifying a suitable sense of approximation.

Wed. 12:00-13:00, G140
Commentator: Hans Hansen
Regular papers

A

Inferring Argumentative Patterns in Polylogues about Energy Issues

Mark Aakhus (Rutgers University, USA)
Elena Musi (Columbia University, USA)

This paper proposes a scalable methodology for the study of argumentative patterns in online polylogues. Our linguistically informed corpus-based procedure is based on the annotation of the three dimensions of argument structure, argumentation schemes and lexical features. The devised methodology is applied to the analysis of discussion threads from the subreddit Changemyview pertaining to oil drilling and fracking issues. Merging the three analytic levels we discuss recurrent argumentative patterns in the energy context.

Wed. 17:00-17:30, B130

Inference and Virtue

Andrew Aberdein (Florida Institute of Technology, USA)

What are the prospects (if any) for a virtue-theoretic account of inference? This paper compares three options. Firstly, assess each argument individually in terms of the virtues of the participants. Secondly, make the capacity for cogent inference itself a virtue. Thirdly, recapture a standard treatment of cogency by accounting for each of its components in terms of more familiar virtues. The three approaches are contrasted and their strengths and weaknesses assessed.

Wed. 15:00-15:30, A140

Why the Dialectical Tier is an Epistemic Animal

Scott Aikin (Vanderbilt University, USA)

Ralph Johnson (2000 and 2003) has proposed a “two tiered” conception of argument, comprising of the illative core and the dialectical tier. This paper’s two-thesis is that (i) the dialectical tier is best understood as an epistemic requirement for argument, and (ii) once understood epistemically, the dialectical tier requirement can be defended against the leading objections.

Wed. 16:30-17:00, G140
Digital and Material Representations of the European Green Belt: Juxtaposing Nature and Technology in our Collective Memory of the Cold War
Marcia Allison (University of Southern California, USA)
Emma Bloomfield (University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA)

We analyze the visual, verbal, and material arguments present at the European Green Belt (EGB), a contemporary conservation project in the former Iron Curtain. The EGB argues for unity and presents itself as a “living memorial,” that fuses together former warring countries. In this project, we compare digital representations and physical manifestations of the EGB’s arguments about history and memory, nature and technology, peace and war, memorial and tourism, and preservation and restoration.

Wed. 15:30-16:00, C130

Argumentative Content and Design in European Union Recommendations
Corina Andone (University of Amsterdam, NL)

This paper concentrates on the argumentative patterns which are functional in European Union recommendations, particularly those enacted by the Council of the European Union. Such recommendations allow the Council to make its political positions known and suggest a line of action without imposing any legal obligation on the addressees. If the recommendations are not legally binding on the Member States, how does the Council present its arguments optimally to obtain compliance by the Member States?

Thu. 8:30-9:30, D130

Why Every Theory of Arguments Needs a Theory of Arguing. Contribution to Epistemological Theories of Argumentation
Gabriela Bašić (University of Split, HR)

It is argued that Pragmadialectics should be treated as theory of rational argumentation (activity) in a social setting, complementing epistemological theories of arguments as basis upon which theory of argumentative activity is to be built. Since both arguments and arguing are proper objects of study of argumentation, epistemological theories need an analogue to Critical Discussion Procedure. Separating theory-neutral core of the Procedure made possible to enrich it with elements of epistemological theories' ones.

Wed. 17:00-17:30, G140
Reasoning Together: Fostering Rationality through Group Deliberation
Mark Battersby (Capilano University, USA)
Sharon Bailin (Simon Fraser University, USA)

This paper, which focuses on rational decision-making, has a threefold purpose: to argue for a view of rational decision making that includes the evaluation of ends as well as means; to argue that properly structured group deliberation can be an effective way to foster this kind of rationality; and to offer guidelines for achieving group decision-making rationality.
Fri. 8:30-9:00, C130

Reasoning by Cases in Structured Argumentation
Mathieu Beirlaen (Ruhr University Bochum, DE)
Jesse Heyninck (Ruhr University Bochum, DE)
Christian Strasser (Ruhr University Bochum, DE)

We study and formalize the scheme of reasoning by cases within structured argumentation frameworks. Our approach is sufficiently general to include the assignment of priorities to arguments as well as nested applications of the reasoning by cases scheme. We show how our framework often leads to more desirable outcomes than other approaches in non-monotonic logic for dealing with disjunctive information.
Thu. 11:30-12:00, G230

Assessing the Process of Deliberation in Chronic Care Medical Interviews
Sarah Bigi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, IT)
Fabrizio Macagno (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

This paper addresses the problem of describing and assessing joint decisions in medical consultations. The dialogical structure of medical interviews will be described using an argumentative framework grounded on the notion of ‘dialogue move’. Based on the analysis of 40 doctor-patient interviews, we show that there are positive correlations between the quality of the clinical recommendation and dialogues characterized by moves aimed at 1) sharing personal information and 2) providing reasons and arguments.
Thu. 9:00-9:30, C130
Dialog profiles somehow organize our dealing with argumentation schemes. I will present dialog profiles as tree-shaped structures displaying ways a speaker follows and his listener could follow in the same context. The idea should be treated as a development of Walton’s normative approach. It is based on (1) Sperber’s & Wilson’s relevance understanding; (2) credulous and sceptical reasoning distinction (Mental model theory); (3) and the dialogical core of logic (Dutilh Novaes).

Thu. 10:00-10:30, G140

Believing, Inferring, and Basing
Patrick Bondy (Brandon University, CA)

This paper addresses inference and the epistemic basing relation. It articulates accounts of the basing relation that incorporate casual conditions, and meta-belief conditions, and mixtures of the two. It then explains the distinction between occurrent beliefs, dispositional beliefs, and dispositions to form beliefs, and it considers explicit and implicit inference, and how the meta-beliefs required by some accounts of the basing relation bear on these sorts of inferences.

Thu. 11:00-11:30, C130

The Argumentative Orientation of Scalar ‘Implicatures’
Ronny Boogaart (Leiden University, NL)

An argumentative approach to language use (Ducrot, Verhagen), in which utterances are treated as arguments for conclusions, has a significant contribution to make to discussions in theoretical pragmatics about different types of inferences (Ariel). This talk will take a look at scalar implicatures from this perspective. It will be argued that a scalar implicature does not represent speaker intended meaning but rather, in fact, the very opposite of ‘what is meant’.

Thu. 8:30-9:00, G230
Be Committed to Your Premises, or Face the Consequences: A Pragmatic Analysis of Commitment Inferences
Kira Boulat (University of Fribourg, CH)
Didier Maillat (University of Fribourg, CH)
We look at the cognitive underpinnings of commitment. Commitment captures the idea that communicators constantly assess and infer the degree to which they - and other people - are committed to the information conveyed by an argument. We posit that the epistemic strength of an argument corresponds to a form of cognitive strength. We define the scope of a pragmatic approach of commitment within Relevance Theory. We then identify a series of linguistic features that are used by the hearer to infer the cognitive strength of the utterance. In two experiments we show that performance is significantly affected by commitment markers confirming the cognitive underpinnings of commitment.
Thu. 10:00-10:30, A140

The Role of Argumentative Discussions in the Transmission of Implicit Norms and Values in Families with Young Children
Antonio Bova (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
In this study I set out to show how the transmission of parental norms and values can lead parents and children to engage in argumentative discussions. The research design implies a corpus of 30 video-recorded separate meals of 10 middle to upper-middle-class Swiss and Italian families. The results of this study indicate that implicits in argumentation are particularly effective in transmitting what is taken for granted during family interactions at mealtime.
Fri. 8:30-9:00, G230

Argumentative Patterns across Contexts: Analyzing Debates on the Romanian Diaspora’s Right to Vote Abroad
Alexandru Cârlan (NUPSPA – Bucharest, RO)
The analysis of argumentative patterns, in pragma-dialectics, is undertaken within a particular communicative activity type or a cluster of communicative activity types. This paper makes a case for investigating the occurrence of argumentative patterns across contexts and activity types. As a case study, occurrences of a prototypical argument for restricting the right to vote of Romanian citizens in diaspora in presidential and parliamentary elections, and critical reactions to it, are analyzed in various contexts.
Thu. 9:30-10:00, D130
A Conflict Index for Arguments in an Argumentation Graph

Giulia Cesari (Politecnico di Milano, IT)
Francesca Fossati (Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Univ Paris 06, LIP6, FR)
Stefano Moretti (PSL Research University, CNRS, UMR [7243], LAMSADE, FR)

In this work, given a measure of the disagreement for argumentation graphs, we introduce a property driven approach aimed at defining a conflict index representing the controversy of arguments. The index can be interpreted as a ranking of arguments based on their potential of development inside a debate. Merging the abstract argumentation framework into a game theoretical cooperative setting, this index is reinterpreted as the Shapley value of a specific coalitional game.

Wed. 16:30-17:00, D130

Emotional Argumentation: Analytical Models

Eduardo Chávez Herrera (University of Warwick, UK)
Julieta Haidar (Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia, MX)

This paper has two main objectives. Firstly, it analyzes several models for the study of emotional argumentation. Secondly, it links emotional argumentation to the concepts of inference and persuasion. The need to reflect on emotional argumentation lies in the fact that such operation is found in every single discourse. Thus, we present a transdisciplinary viewpoint, connected to an epistemology of complexity, to stress the analysis of the emotional component as integrated on inference and persuasion.

Thu. 11:00-11:30, E140

Argumentation Traits, Frames, and Dialogue Orientations

Ioana Cionea (University of Oklahoma, USA)
Dale Hample (University of Maryland, USA)
Stacie Wilson Mumpower (University of Oklahoma, USA)
Eryn Bostwick (University of Oklahoma, USA)
Cameron Piercy (University of Central Missouri, USA)
Candace Foutch (University of Oklahoma, USA)

This paper investigates dialogue orientations in conjunction with argumentation traits and argument frames in dyads (friends or strangers). Respondents participated in a laboratory experiment and indicated the dialogue orientations they intended to use in an argument with the other person. Findings reveal some correlations between friends’ dialogue orientations and their traits and frames. Differences also emerged depending on whether the dyads were male or female. Some traits and frames modestly predicted some of the dialogues.

Thu. 8:30-9:00, A140
The Attraction of the Ideal Has No Traction on the Real: On Choices and Roles in Arguments
Daniel Cohen (Colby College, USA)
Katharina Stevens (New York University, USA)

If arguers were exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so the default is adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable, even mandatory – and also when it is not.

Wed. 14:30-15:00, A140

From Semi-Abstract Argumentation to Logical Consequence
Esther Anna Corsi (TU Wien, AT)
Christian Fermüller (TU Wien, AT)

We consider Dung’s abstract argumentation frames and discuss plausible "attack principles" that put logical constraints on the attack relation of such frames. Interpreting counter-arguments as a form of counter-model yields a notion of "argumentative consequence". We show that certain collections of attack principles lead to a new logic of argumentation. A corresponding soundness and completeness result with respect to non-deterministic matrix semantics is obtained via an appropriate fragment of Gentzen’s classical sequent calculus.

Wed. 14:30-15:00, D130

Visual Argumentation in the Hungarian Competition Authority’s Proceedings
Hédi Csordás (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, HU)

Argumentation theory primarily analyzes verbal content, but in recent years, visual argumentation has become a new research field. Analyzing advertisements, including the process of persuasion and argumentation, verbal and visual elements are both important. Acting in accordance with regulations pertaining to the Hungarian market, Hungarian Competition Authority scrutinizes the content of verbal communication only. My aim is to analyze visual arguments in the legally controversial case of the Dove vs. Nivea comparative advertisement.

Thu. 11:00-11:30, G140

Rhetorical Inferences for Divine Authority: The Case of Classical Greek Divination
Julie Dainville (Université libre de Bruxelles, BE)

In classical Greece, concomitantly with the democratisation of the society, one can also observe a democratisation of the divinatory process. Concretely speaking, it means that the classical seers and
prophets must prove their value to acquire authority. Their reliability relies on different kinds of clues allowing to infer their divine inspiration. The aim of this lecture is to show how rhetoric can be useful to describe this status change of divination.

Fri. 10:00-10:30, A140

“Neoliberalism”: A Rhetorical Tool?

Giovanni Damele¹ (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

The use, in public discourse, of the term “neoliberalism” can be understood by resorting to the concepts of “rhetorical” or “persuasive definition”. Instead of stating or advancing a definition, the speaker takes it for granted by classifying a fragment of reality, treating it as part of the interlocutors’ common ground. This classification can carry a value judgment, with the aim of securing, by the interplay between emotive and descriptive meaning, a redirection of people’s attitude.

Fri. 8:30-9:00, E140

The Appeal to 'Common Sense' as Naturalistic Argument

Giovanni Damele² (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

The argument from the nature of things is common in legal argumentation. Often, the meaning of “nature” is expressed through the reference to popular opinion or popular practice. For this reason, the “naturalistic argument” and the “argument from popular opinion” are frequently associated. However, it cannot be simply reduced to a kind of “appeal to authority” and there are cases in which the “appeal to common opinion” constitutes a species of the genus “naturalistic argument”.

Thu. 11:00-11:30, D130

Irresolvable Rational Disputes

Istvan Danka (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, HU)

Resolving a dispute, a central aim of a rational debate, is irrational in cases when no decisive arguments can be given on either side. Distinguishing rhetorical and dialectical senses of rationality (see ‘strategic maneuvering’), the reason for that will be taken to be dialectical: if it is rational to keep committed to both views in a conflict, it is dialectically irrational to resolve the dispute. Philosophical debates, in particular, are examples for that kind.

Wed. 17:00-17:30, E140

Processing Persuasion: Message Discrepancy as a Key Variable in Implicit Evaluations

Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska (Adam Mickiewicz University, PL)

This presentation discusses modulation of implicit evaluations by expertise, argument strength and discrepancy effects. 265 students of the Faculty of English at Adam Mickiewicz University took part in the study. Each person participated in one of eight experimental conditions. A modified version of the
Implicit Association Test programmed in E-Prime software was used. The study offers initial evidence that negative valence of the message influences its persuasive effect.

Thu. 9:00-9:30, A140

**Derailment of Strategic Maneuvering in a Multi-Participant TV Debate: The Fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchi**  
*Yeliz Demir (Hacettepe University, TR)*

Demir (2014) has observed that ignoratio elenchi is the most typically committed fallacy by the participants of a multi-participant TV debate (MPTD). The aim of this study is to introduce the institutional constraints of an MPTD which provide evidence for regarding irrelevant argumentation fallacious in this communicative activity type and investigate the reasons of derailment which lead to ignoratio elenchi. The study draws its data from two episodes of the Turkish debate program Siyaset Meydanı.

Fri. 8:30-9:00, D130

**Questioning the Explicit Cancelability of Scalar Implicatures**  
*Laura Devlesschouwer (Université Libre de Bruxelles, BE & University of Antwerp, BE)*

The dominant view of scalar implicatures (e.g. the “Not all...”-implicature associated with “Some...”) is that they are pragmatically inferred rather than conventional and encoded. One of the main arguments for this view is the fact that implicatures are explicitly ‘cancellable’ (e.g. by saying “Some, but not all,...”). However, when taking into account Anscombe and Ducrot’s (1983) theory of argumentative scales, ‘cancellability’ is no longer an obstacle to a conventionalist theory of scalar implicatures.

Thu. 9:00-9:30, G230

**Reasoning Via Dialogue**  
*Stéphane Dias (Farroupilha Federal Institute of Education, Science, and Technology, BR)*  
*Jane Silveira (The Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, BR)*

We will explore the relation between reasoning aiming at a practical goal (decision-making and ultimately action) and reasoning aiming at a proper evaluation of the evidence to reach a consensual truth. This will be accomplished by an illustrative analysis of *12 Angry Men*, considering the reasoning process at the levels of (1) the institutional group itself (we, the jury), (2) internal to the group (as members, jurors), and of (3) the individuals.

Fri. 8:30-9:00, A140
Are humans poor to argue? From the ‘argumentative theory of reasoning’ back to a rhetorical theory of arguing
Salvatore Di Piazza (University di Palermo, IT)
Francesca Piazza (University di Palermo, IT)
Mauro Serra (University di Palermo, IT)

Starting from Sperber and Mercier’s theory (2011) on the relationship between reasoning and arguing, we will try to rethink in a different manner the link between rhetoric and argumentation. Using Aristotelian rhetoric as a theoretical framework, we will focus on two related features: 1) the nature and the role of argumentation inferences in classical models of rhetoric; 2) the role of normativity in assessing a naturalistic description of what we make when we argue.

Thu. 9:30-10:00, G140

The Critical Question Model of Argument
Ian Dove (University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA)
E. Michael Nussbaum (University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA)

We propose a Critical Question Model of Argument (CQMA). It developed from research with argumentation schemes for teaching critical thinking. We combine critical questions with a graphical organization device to make this model. We discuss our research findings: The CQMA approach has many virtues of full argumentation schemes, without the vices. As CQMA is easy to apply in practice, it can be a preliminary, if not a competitor, to argumentation schemes.

Fri. 9:00-9:30, C130

Topoi and Refutations in Aristotle
Iovan Drehe (University of Cluj-Napoca, RO)

The main presupposition of the present paper is that a discussion on the relation between refutation (elenchus) and common-place (topos) in Aristotle can bring about relevant clarifications in relation to the usage mechanics of the topoi. For this, I will discuss the way in which a Questioner should make use of topoi in order to obtain a refutation in a dialectical encounter and provide illustrations from Plato’s earlier dialogues.

Fri. 9:00-9:30, B130
Gender, Argumentation and Inference in Media Discourse: The Case of a Mexican Congresswoman (2015)

Olga Nelly Estrada (Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, MX)  
Griselda Zárate (Universidad Regiomontana, MX)

This paper aims to identify the inferential processes in argument production in media and political discourse from a theoretical interdisciplinary perspective including gender studies, argumentation theory and cognitive linguistics. In September 2015, congresswoman Benvenutti protested against governor Medina of Nuevo Leon, Mexico, during his last speech before the state congress with accusations of corruption. Two questions arise: What are the inferential processes regarding gender construction in Mexican politics? What are the assumptions behind those inferences?

Fri. 10:00-10:30, D130

Institutional Constraints and Risk Pluralism in Conductive Argumentation and Argumentation from Consequence in the UK Fracking Debate

Isabela Fairclough (University of Central Lancashire, UK)

From a critical rationalist perspective, I analyze the argumentation from negative consequence and the conductive argumentation used in the debate on fracking that took place in June 2015 in the Lancashire County Council, in order to: (1) understand the nature of ‘conductive’ argumentation (arguing it should not be viewed as a single argument but in relation to deliberation as genre); (2) elucidate the impact of the institutional context and of risk pluralism on rational decision-making.

Thu. 10:00-10:30, D130

Prototypical Patterns of Weighing and Balancing in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

Eveline Feteris (University of Amsterdam, NL)

The paper investigates weighing and balancing in legal decision-making as a particular argumentative pattern. It analyzes the different kinds of arguments that are relevant in a justification that is based on weighing and balancing in terms of the burden of proof of a judge who takes a decision that is based on weighing and balancing.

Thu. 9:00-9:30, B130
“Metaphors Are No Arguments, My Pretty Maiden” The Reconstruction of Figurative Analogies
Bart Garssen (University of Amsterdam, NL)

While in literal analogies the concrete characteristics of two items from the same domain are compared, in figurative analogies a comparison is made between the relations of elements in one domain mentioned in the standpoint and the relation between two elements in a completely different domain mentioned in the argument. Figurative analogy should not be seen as analogy argumentation but as a way of expressing a different type of argument scheme.

Thu. 8:30-9:00, E140

On The Uses of Testimony in Argumentative Contexts
David Godden (Michigan State University, USA)

Standardly testimonial acceptance is analyzed as some subject, S, accepting some claim, p, on the basis of another’s say-so. While emerging work in social epistemology offers developed but competing theories of testimonial acceptance, it has largely neglected consideration of testimony’s operation in argumentative contexts of disagreement. Yet, I argue, the probative demands on testimony can vary from non-argumentative to argumentative contexts. These contextual differences favor some accounts of the epistemic operation of testimony over others.

Thu. 12:00-12:30, D130

Against the Intentional Definition of Argument
Geoff Goddu (University of Richmond, USA)

Intentional definitions of argument, i.e. the conclusion being intended to follow from the premises makes an argument, abound. Yet, there are numerous problem cases in which we appear to have arguments, but no intention. One way to try to avoid these problem cases is to appeal to acts, in which case one has to give up on the repeatability of arguments. One can keep repeatability and intentions if one resorts to act types, but then it appears that the problem cases re-emerge.

Wed. 14:30-15:00, G140
**Strategic Manoeuvring with Hypothetical Questions in Negotiation**

*Diyan Grigorov (University of Amsterdam, NL)*

*Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)*

This article analyses the use of hypothetical questions as a means for strategic manoeuvring in integrative negotiation. It argues that by advancing implicit proposals via hypothetical questions, parties can solve some of the rhetorical predicaments imposed by the negotiator’s dilemma. The study illustrates that hypothetical questions can be used not only as strategic devices for maintaining flexibility in negotiation, but also as tools for advancing implicit argumentation for a particular solution.

Wed. 14:30-15:00, E140

**Bounded Rationality and Inference in Argumentation Games**

*Ákos Gyarmathy (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, HU)*

I argue that defining inference within the scope of bounded rationality and placing it between system 1 and system 2 cognition by identifying it with intuition, blind rule following or sub-personal motivations obscures the difference between inference and association. I aim to draw a clear line between psychological persuasion and dialectics based on cognitive grounds entailing that dialectics is clearly rational in the cognitive sense while persuasion often exploits the limited rationality of agents.

Wed. 17:00-17:30, G230

**Narratives as Arguments**

*Hans V. Hansen (University of Windsor, CA)*

A narrative, like an explanation, tells what happened over a stretch of time. Narrative arguments are explanation-like, but not just explanations: they can have an additional purpose. I take an actual narrative that was used to influence the perception of events and attempt to reconstruct it as an argument. This involves distinguishing the narrative from its constituent events and comparing the evidential value of the different ways the narrative content can be put into arguments.

Thu. 10:00-10:30, E140
Others’ Images and Ethos: A Question of Inference
Thierry Herman (University of Neuchâtel, CH & University of Lausanne, CH)

Some peculiar cases of ethos are not I-centered but built by inference: 1. Community ethos: the speaker is talking about a community to which she belongs; 2. Confronted ethos: the speaker is talking about the audience from which s/he dissociates; 3. Positioning ethos: the speaker is talking about an absent actor, either an opponent or a support. What are the rhetorical and theoretical consequences of an ethos inferentially built by other actors’ depiction?

Thu. 11:30-12:00, A140

The Concept of Argument
David Hitchcock (McMaster University, CA)

I revise my (2006) definition of argument in response to criticisms by G. C. Goddu and James Freeman. I retain the claims that the ultimate constituents of arguments are illocutionary acts and that complex arguments may be formed either by chaining or by embedding. But I now count attacks as well as supports as arguments, and I rest the unity of an expressed argument on its author’s second-order illocutionary act of adducing.

Wed. 15:00-15:30, G140

Does Culture Shape Norms for Argument Quality?
Jos Hornikx (Radboud University Nijmegen, NL)

The dominant approach to studying argument evaluation is normative, downplaying the potential role of the cultural background of the receiver of the argument. This paper reviews work on culture and argument evaluation. It presents the views on culture and cognition, and summarizes experimental work on the way in which people from different cultures reason with arguments. Finally, it presents a framework for determining the extent to which reasoning with arguments is universal or cross-culturally different.

Thu. 9:30-10:00, A140

Anger, Argumentation, and Inference
Moira Howes (Trent University, CA)
Catherine Hundleby (University of Windsor, CA)

While anger has many disruptive effects on inference, anger can also help arguers and audiences make appropriate inferences. Anger can support inference by providing information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that might otherwise remain implicit or be prematurely dismissed. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences.

Thu. 12:00-12:30, E140
Metaphors as Arguments: Perspectives from Psycholinguistics

Curtis Hyra (University of Windsor, CA)
Hamad Al-Azary (University of Western Ontario, CA)
Catherine Hundleby (University of Windsor, CA)
Lori Buchanan (University of Windsor, CA)

Given the resemblance of metaphor to literal language, we argue that metaphor can be viewed as an argument; an attempt to persuade that one thing is another. Certainly this is a compressed argument, and how that compression might be unpacked and related to more explicit arguments raises a number of questions. To consider how metaphors might scale up and unpack as fully fledged arguments, we consider empirical psychological work about the processing of metaphors.

Thu. 9:00-9:30, E140

Justifying a Bill before Parliament: Beyond Instrumental Rationality?

Constanza Ihnen (University of Chile, CL)

Is it possible to justify the ends pursued by a bill by means of argument schemes other than the pragmatic argument scheme? This paper will discuss the results of an empirical research aimed at identifying and comparing the types of argument schemes used by the Chilean governments lead by Sebastian Piñera (2010-14) and Michelle Bachelet (2014-18) to justify the ends pursued by their proposed reforms to the country’s education system.

Fri. 9:00-9:30, D130

Ethos and Inference. Insights from a Multimodal Perspective

Jérôme Jacquin (University of Lausanne, CH)

Tackling ethos from a linguistic, semiotic and multimodal perspective on argumentative talk-in-interaction (e.g. Doury, 1997; Jacquin 2014; Plantin, 1996), the paper addresses two questions: (i) how do verbal and non-verbal indexes combine in a way to be inferentially interpreted as one ethos? (ii) how can a multimodal perspective on ethos tackle situations where indexes diverge, i.e. when multimodally produced indexes are not oriented towards one sole and consistent ethos?

Thu. 11:00-11:30, A140
Ad Populum Argumentation in Disguise: Strategic Manoeuvring with Arguments from Popularity in a Political Context
Henrike Jansen (Leiden University, NL)

An appeal to the opinion of a lot of people or even to the majority of people – also known as ad populum argumentation – is often regarded as argumentation being inherently fallacious. Nevertheless, politicians today often refer to ‘the will of the people’ and present this will as a relevant factor for decision making in a democratic society. This talk addresses the issue of this type of argument’s rationality.
Thu. 11:30-12:00, D130

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View on Inference from Argumentation Tiers Perspective
Iryna Khomenko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, UA)

The aim is to present an approach to differentiating types of inferential processes in argumentation based on studies in informal logic and using the game theory tools. I consider argumentation as a type of interaction, which is similar to the social contract. In this regard I analyze “The Stag Hunt” game from Rousseau’s “A Discourse on Inequality” as a prototype of such contract and investigate hunter’s inferential processes from argumentation tiers standpoint.
Thu. 8:30-9:00, G140

Virtue Argumentation Theory Reconsidered: Towards a Complete Account of Good Argument
Justine Kingsbury (University of Waikato, NZ)
Tracy Bowell (University of Waikato, NZ)

According to virtue argumentation theorists, virtues displayed by the arguer are constitutive of good argument. In earlier work we raise some problems for this approach, but as Paglieri points out, our objections presuppose a view of what argument is, and what good argument is, not accepted by virtue theorists. Here we first clarify our position. Then, prompted by Paglieri and Aberdein, we step back from this particular debate to consider more general questions it raises.
Wed. 15:30-16:00, A140

Studying the Process of Interpretation on a School Task: Crossing Perspectives
Alaric Kohler (University of Neuchâtel, CH)
Teuta Mehmeti (University of Neuchâtel, CH)

In this paper we analyze situations of misunderstanding, by the mean of two analytical models: the pragma-dialectical and Grize’s logico-discursive operations. The first analysis is on students’ answers to an item of mathematics from PISA survey, the second on peer argumentation in mechanics. These
examples call for an investigation of the process of interpretation about specific tasks and in specific educational contexts, which may be approached as situated and socially negotiated inference process.

Fri. 9:00-9:30, G230

Modes of Inference in Aristotle’s Concept of the Enthymeme

Manfred Kraus (University of Tübingen, DE)

Based on a comparative analysis of the descriptions of the enthymeme in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Prior Analytics respectively, it will be demonstrated that the Aristotelian concept of the enthymeme incorporates a number of different modes of reasoning, including deductive, inductive and abductive, valid and defeasible modes, and that an integrative theory of the Aristotelian enthymeme can be developed that covers the accounts of the Topics and Rhetoric just as well as that of the Analytics.

Fri. 8:30-9:30, B130

Journalists’ Consideration of Foregone Alternatives in the Evaluation of Past Items and Paradigmatic Loci: Which Relationship?

Margherita Luciani (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

This study sets out to explore which types of paradigmatic loci occur in journalists’ counterfactual thoughts both a) in the consideration of hypothetical better unrealized courses of action and b) in the consideration of hypothetical worse unrealized courses of action. The effects of counterfactual thinking on journalists’ argumentative discussion will also be observed; is counterfactual thinking in the newsroom constructive or detrimental? Furthermore, I will give evidence of the argumentative foundations of counterfactual thinking.

Fri. 10:00-10:30, C130

Arguementation and the Socially Shared Regulation of Thinking Practices: Pedagogical Design and Cognitive Development

Gabriel Macedo (Federal University of Pernambuco, BR & University of Neuchâtel, CH)
Selma Leitão (Federal University of Pernambuco, BR)

This paper draws on the intersection between argumentation, educational and cognitive psychology. We investigated the impact of an argumentative pedagogical design in how university students think and discuss. This design is inspired in three main points: pragma-dialectical theory, sociocultural psychology and dialogical understanding of human cognition. We discuss the role of group division,
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argumentative activities and structured debates as crucial upgrades in how classroom thinking processes are regulated in both individual and group level.

Fri. 9:00-9:30, A140

What Do We Talk about When We Talk about Judicial Reasoning? Some Remarks on the Practical Nature of Legal Syllogism

Maurizio Manzin (University of Trento, IT)

If we look at the Aristotle’s account on “practical syllogisms” in Nicomachean ethics we should admit that the legal syllogism is not a practical one. Orexis (desire) is the core of Aristotle’s definition: the practical syllogism links what we are aiming at with the means required to achieve it. But in judicial reasoning judges should not desire anything: they should only check if their interpretation of the statutes could reasonably deal with the specific case.

Thu. 8:30-9:00, B130

“I Think Any Reasonable Person Will Agree…”: A Corpus and Text Study of Keywords in Irish Political Argumentation

Davide Mazzi (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, IT)

This paper brings a corpus and discourse perspective to bear on the investigation of the broader argumentative implications of keywords in the context of 20th-century Irish politics. On the basis of two corpora including Michael Collins’ papers and Eamon de Valera’s speeches and statements, a keyword-in-context analysis was performed. Results provide evidence of the persuasive power of keywords as signposts leading to a better understanding of culturally shared rules of inference in political discourse.

Fri. 9:30-10:00, D130

Arguing inter-issue: Inferences and commitments in a public political argument

Dima Mohammed (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

In this paper, I focus on a particular aspect of the open-ended character of public political arguments, namely the multiple issues that are usually simultaneously addressed when people argue in the public sphere. At any point in time in a public political argument, there are countless controversies roaming and issues being addressed. It is not uncommon that when one makes an argument addressing one issue the same argument may be a contribution to another issue too. A vigilant political actor would craft her arguments carefully trying to keep under control the contributions these arguments make to the different issues present. In this paper, I will examine the strategic shape as well as rational quality of such arguments.

Thu. 9:00-9:30, D130
Inference and Argument: Normative and Descriptive Dimensions
Andrei Moldovan (University of Salamanca, ES)

Arguing that p differs from inferring that p on various dimensions: one of them is that the former is a mental act while the latter is, I submit, a speech act. Another is that, as Boghossian (2014) argues, inferring is better analyzed normatively, as an act characterized by the rule the agent is following. Arguing, on the other hand, is better characterized descriptively, in a Gricean fashion, broadly conceived, as, e.g., in Pinto (2006).

Wed. 15:00-15:30, G230

Reputation Management Strategies in Argumentative Political Exchanges
Nona Naderi (University of Toronto, CA)
Graeme Hirst (University of Toronto, CA)

In argumentative political exchanges, politicians employ various strategies to defend and protect their reputation. We examine whether and how reputation management strategies are used in Canadian parliamentary debates. We created a corpus of parliamentary questions and answers, manually annotated with four most agreed-upon strategies, namely denial, excuse, justification, and concession. We computationally detect and analyze these strategies using rich linguistic features. Our approaches yield promising results and contribute to a deeper understanding of political exchanges.

Wed. 15:00-15:30, B130

The Strategic Use of Examples in Supporting a Positive Evaluation of a Political Group
Ahmed Omar (Ain Shams University, EG)

With the help of the extended pragma-dialectical theory, this paper aims to analyze and evaluate how Egyptian political columnists, arguing in favor of the feasibility of political change before the Arab Spring, maneuvered strategically by argumentation from examples in supporting a positive evaluation of the Egyptian people as a whole, in view of the institutional preconditions of political columns and the specific rhetorical predicament a columnist may face in this type of situations.

Wed. 16:30-17:00, E140
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It Ought To Be Therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of So-Called Moralistic Fallacy
Tomáš Ondráček (Masaryk University, CZ)
Iva Svačinová (Masaryk University, CZ)

The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of some practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where ought-is relation argumentatively as relation between propositions in reason and standpoint.

Wed. 17:00-17:30, A140

Pragmatic Inference and Argumentative Inference
Steve Oswald (University of Fribourg, CH)

I offer a theoretical discussion of the relationship between pragmatic inference (inference about meaning) and argumentative inference (inference about the acceptability of a premise/conclusion relationship). The discussion (i) compares an argumentative view on meaning construction and an interpretative view on argument evaluation, (ii) argues that pragmatic inference can constrain argumentative inference, and (iii) assesses the complexity of an account of argumentative exchanges seen through the lens of the inferential tasks they involve.

Wed. 14:30-15:00, G230

Against The Possibility of Bridge Principles between Logic and Reasoning
Stipe Pandžić (University of Groningen, NL)

We defend weak psychologism: the claim that logical rules are normative for human reasoning. We offer a default logic perspective on the normativity of logic. We adapt default logic for ordinary reasoning to show that Gilbert Harman’s counterexamples fail to reject the normative role of logic. Harman’s crucial point is that a nondefeasible bridge principle expressing the normative role of logic in reasoning is impossible. However, we argue that the bridge principle format is inadequate.

Wed. 15:00-15:30, D130

Probabilistic Argumentation: Towards a Unified Theory of Argumentation
Niki Pfeifer (Münich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, DE)

I propose "coherence-based probability logic" as a unified rationality framework for investigating reasoning fallacies (i), measuring "fallaciousness" of arguments (ii), justifying perceived common-sense (in)validity of argument forms (iii), handling uncertainty and defeasibility properly (iv), modeling argument strength (v), and finally for applying the proposed measure of argument strength to obtain a
new solution to the Ellsberg paradox (vi). I justify my approach theoretically by philosophical arguments and empirically by psychological experiments.

Wed. 15:30-16:00, D130

**Argumentation and Group Decisions**  
*Gabriella Pigozzi (Université Paris-Dauphine, FR)*

Voting procedures have become the aggregation paradigm of collective decisions. An alternative view is the deliberative model of group decision-making. But deliberation does not need to be an alternative to voting. Instead, it can prepare the ground for voting. Unlike voting mechanisms, a satisfactory formal model of deliberation does not yet exist. What is needed is a procedure to analyze, understand and summarize such debates.

Fri. 9:30-10:00, A140

**Doctors’ Ethos in Medical Consultation: Experimental Research on Acquiring Authority in Argumentative Discourse**  
*Roosmaryn Pilgram (University of Amsterdam, NL & Leiden University, NL)*  
*Nanon Labrie (Academic Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, NL)*

In this paper, we examine to what extent ordinary language users ascribe ethos to a doctor in general practice consultations and how such acquired ethos affects the perceived reasonableness of the doctor’s discussion contributions in such consultations, as well as how this perceived reasonableness affects the doctor’s ethos. We will present an experimental study that indicates that there is a positive correlation between doctors’ acquired ethos and the perceived reasonableness of their discussion contributions.

Thu. 9:30-10:00, C130

**Inference and Argumentative Value Scheme within different Social Practices**  
*Rosalice Pinto (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)*

Based on the concept of inference adopted by Charaudeau (2002), the purpose of this paper is to show, at first, some inferential interpretative processes materialized by various multimodal aspects in a specific kind of argument: the argument from values (Macagno and Walton, 2014 a), inserted within various social practices. Secondly, it will demonstrate the relationship between the multimodal aspects and the inferential processes that can be depicted from the arguments from values. Preliminary results show that the inferential procedures in political and advertising texts are strongly constrained by contextual and interdiscursive aspects. We consider that our proposal can be used for developing a textual approach to argument schemes.

Wed. 17:00-17:30, C130
REGULAR PAPERS

Challenging Judicial Impartiality: When Accusations of Derailments of Strategic Manoeuvring Derail
José Plug (University of Amsterdam, NL)

Impartiality is one of the core values underlying the administration of justice. A complaint about the lack of impartiality of a judge may be filed on the grounds of the judge’s behaviour or his verbal behaviour. In this paper I will analyse complaints that concern the verbal and rhetorical behaviour of the judge. I will explore what role these complaints can play in the strategic manoeuvring of a party who seeks the judge’s disqualification.

Thu. 9:30-10:00, B130

May Endoxa Be True? A (Possible) Realistic Account of Truth for Legal Argumentation
Federico Puppo (University of Trento, IT)

I will discuss an account of truth for legal argumentation based on the correspondence theory of truth proposed by Aristotle in connection with the principle of non contradiction and by assuming a broader conception of reality. To assume such account of truth as valid would make possible to answer the question whether it should be possible to admit the relevance of truth in discursive domains in which arguments have the nature of endoxa.

Thu. 10:00-10:30, B130

Request of Confirmation of Inference (ROCOI) in Earning Conference Calls
Carlo Raimondo (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
Andrea Rocci (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

We explore the strategic usage of a special dialogical move: the request of confirmation of inference (ROCOI) in the context of earning conference calls. A ROCOI is a proposed argumentation used by the financial analysts expose to corporate executives asking them for a confirmation or a denial. Basing on corpus analysis, the appearing of ROCOI will be put in evidence and put in relation with the other features of this financial communication dialogical game.

Wed. 14:30-15:00, C130

The “neoliberal agenda”: how Portuguese parties use the “neoliberalism” concept to argue against austerity
Vera Ramalhete (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)
Marco Lisi (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

To fully understand the recent economic crisis, it is necessary to observe how political actors have framed the narratives and the political discourse. This paper focuses on the Portuguese case by analysing the use of “neoliberalism” in argumentation, namely in the discourse against austerity. Drawing on parliamentary debates between 2009 and 2015, this study aims to examine the frame in
which “neoliberalism” is used, particularly by left-wing parties, unveiling the strategic component behind this rhetoric tool.

Fri. 9:00-9:30, E140

**Effect of Intuitiveness of Teachers’ Arguments on Quality of Adolescent Students’ Inferences in Social and Natural Sciences**

*Chrysi Rapanta (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)*

The study has a double focus: a) the dialogical quality of classroom natural discourse; and b) the argumentative structure of inferences hidden in such dialogues. The analysis proposed combines Walton’s dialogue types, to distinguish between different pedagogical goals, and Toulmin’s Argument Pattern, for the identification of argument elements. The study concludes with considerations regarding how teachers’ reasoning preferences for certain dialogue moves influence the manifestation of data, backings, warrants, and rebuttals in young adolescents’ inferences.

Fri. 9:30-10:00, G230

**On The Epistemic Basing Relation**

*Juho Ritola (University of Turku, FI)*

The standard way to introduce the notion of epistemic basing relation is to note that it is the relation that can, when appropriate, turn the propositional justification that an agent S has into doxastic justification, that is, justified belief of S. However, as noted by Evans (2013), before we can decide what epistemically proper basing is, we should be clear about what belief basing as such is. In my view, the causal conception of belief basing (as such) seems to provide the most tenable view. The objective of my talk is to assess just what this means in terms of proper basing. I will defend the view that a necessary condition of proper basing is that the agent is justified in believing that the basing in question is justifying against the arguments of James B. Freeman (2005), among others.

Thu. 11:30-12:00, C130

**Argumentation in Health-Related Policy Making: A Health System Perspective**

*Sara Rubinelli (University of Lucerne, CH)*

This paper illustrates how argumentation theory, specifically pragma-dialectics, can be used as a framework to implement deliberative dialogue for knowledge translation in healthcare. It focuses on the value of deliberation in healthcare and on the challenges of empowering healthcare stakeholders on reaching agreement over a certain course of action. Analytical and normative aspects highlighted by pragma-dialectics will be addressed through evidence from pilot stakeholder dialogues conducted as part of the Swiss Learning Health System (SLHS) project.

Thu. 8:30-9:00, C130
**REGULAR PAPERS**

**Ironic Argumentative Discourse in Swift’s Irish Tracts: A Relevance-Theoretical Perspective**  
*María Angeles Ruiz-Moneva (University of Zaragoza, ES)*

Certain pragmatic studies on irony have tended to focus on Swift’s A Modest Proposal (1729). This paper seeks to broaden the study of the work in two ways: first, as regards the work, its context will be expanded by coping with Swift’s most representative Irish Tracts, which can contribute substantially to the interpretation of the work; and second, from the perspective of the most recent relevance-theoretical and related contributions to irony as echoic interpretive use. It will be argued that the addressee’s coping with meaning necessarily calls for inferential interpretive processes.

Thu. 10:00-10:30, G230

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**Politeness Norms and Inference: The Case of The Nuovo Galateo (1802)**  
*Francesca Saltamacchia (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)*  
*Annick Paternoster (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)*

This intervention explores the interface between politeness and argumentation. Firstly, we give an overview of the importance of argumentation in the context of politeness theory. Secondly, we illustrate the importance of argumentation in a historical politeness meta-source: the Nuovo Galateo by Melchiorre Gioja (1802) in which politeness is based on a reasoning process that is aimed at obtaining social happiness on the basis of inferences from a general rule.

Thu. 11:30-12:00, E140

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**How to Create Rhetorical Exercises?**  
*Benoit Sans (Université libre de Bruxelles, BE)*

It is well-known that the Ancients taught rhetoric and argumentation thanks to various exercises (progymnasmata cycle, declamations, etc.) and it is tempting to use them to train contemporary students or pupils. However, ancient exercises take place in a very different reality, not always relevant to nowadays teenagers. In this lecture, I will show how, respecting the Ancient principles, we can adapt the Ancient pedagogical material and create new problems and exercises to train specific techniques.

Fri. 9:30-10:00, C130
Filling in the Gaps: The Role of Audience Inference in Exigence and Ethos
Blake Scott (University of Windsor, CA)

I argue that the audience’s active role in argumentation can be understood in terms of inferential contributions to the argumentative situation. I discuss two aspects of the argumentative situation that I claim must be inferentially established by the audience: exigence and ethos. I also examine how certain features of argument context, such as the medium of argumentation, constrain the audience’s inferential contributions in ways that can either help or hinder constructive argumentation.

Thu. 12:00-12:30, A140

Multimodal Argumentation in Factual Television
Andrea Sabine Sedlaczek (University of Vienna, AT)

This paper contributes to the growing discussions about visual and multimodal argumentation in argumentation theory with a perspective of critical discourse analysis as well as approaches to semiotics and multimodality. Looking at the context of factual television programmes, I will explore the relationship between the semiotic manifestation of argumentation at the macro and micro level of complex multimodal texts and the cognitive inferential processes entailed in the interpretation of the argumentation by the recipients.

Thu. 11:30-12:00, G140

Reasonable Disagreement, Pluralism and Argumentation’s Purpose
Paul Simard Smith (University of Regina, CA)

Some recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement holds that agents can rationally endorse irreconcilable points of view even after complete deliberation. This paper has two goals. First, I argue that this literature on disagreement presents a challenge to the view that argumentation’s purpose is to achieve a rational consensus; fruitful argumentation can occur even within contexts in which no reasonable agreement is forthcoming. Second, I discuss some alternative accounts of argumentation’s purpose.

Wed. 15:30-16:00, G140

Bakhtin at the White House: The Argumentative Dimension of the Direct Address In The TV Series House Of Cards
Carmen Spano (University of Auckland, NZ)
Carlo Galimberti (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, IT)
Antonio Bova (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
Daniela Tacchi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, IT)

In the field of the media studies, the articulation between diegetic and extra-diegetic has become a privileged place for the exploration of textual phenomena that characterize media objects. The direct address can be considered an ideal ‘border place’ for the articulation of the diegetic and extra-diegetic
dimensions. This paper will analyze the use of the direct address in the TV series House of Cards (first season) from textual, argumentative and interlocutory points of view.

Thu. 12:00-12:30, G140

Arguments from Other Cases
Katharina Stevens (New York University, USA)

Arguers sometimes cite a decision made in an earlier situation as a reason for making the equivalent decision in a latter situation. I argue for two kinds of "arguments from other cases": those from precedent and those from parallel argument. They differ in their structures and conditions of cogency, even though they often look the same in presentation. Their similar appearance poses a risk of mis-evaluation and fallacious use, making a clearly theorized distinction important.

Thu. 11:00-11:30, G230

Cultural Disagreements and Legal Argumentation: An Educational Program in Middle Schools
Serena Tomasi (University of Trento, IT)

This paper reports a project on training young students in legal argumentation. The model of teaching is focused on the normative model of judicial debate called C.A.L.S., according to which argumentation is “a work of my hands”. The logical checks used by the courts in cross-cultural disputes can contribute to the settlement of the cultural conflicts in schools, or help students to move from conflict or indifference to consent.

Fri. 10:00-10:30, G230

The Explicit/Implicit Distinction in Multimodal Argumentation: Accounting for the Argumentative Use of Nano-Images in Scientific Journals and Science Magazines
Assimakis Tseronis (University of Amsterdam, NL)

The degrees of explicitness and implicitness as well as the different sets of explicatures distinguished within Relevance Theory can capture the complex meaning-making processes that guide the interpretation of multimodal texts as instances of argumentation. These pragmatic insights will be used to compare the ways in which arguments about the revolutionary character and societal impact of nanotechnology are constructed by computer-generated images of the nanoscale on the covers of scientific journals and science magazines.

Wed. 16:30-17:00, C130
Social Costs of Epistemic Vigilance and Premises in Arguments
Christoph Unger (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NO)

Implicit premises that are mutually manifest often escape the audience's epistemic vigilance. It has been suggested that such premises are discursive presuppositions functioning as backgrounds for the evaluation of relevance and that this is the reason that they escape veracity checking. I argue instead that this is due to the fact that the rejection of mutually manifest premises incurs social costs, because this would narrow, rather than enhance, the mutual cognitive environment between communicator and audience.

Wed. 15:30-16:00, G230

Sets of Situations, Topics, and Question Relevance
Mariusz Urbanski (Adam Mickiewicz University, PL)
Natalia Żyluk (Adam Mickiewicz University, PL)

Our research provides formal tools for analyses of inferential question processing involved in solutions to a specific class of abductive problems. We model this processing in terms of relations of sifting and funnelling. Definitions of these relations employ logic of questions, situational semantics, and topic relevance. As we show on the basis of 'Mind Maze' gameplays, these relations account well for empirical data and allow for a comparative analysis of styles of such problem solving.

Thu. 9:00-9:30, G140

Argumentation in Support of a Choice in Records of Decision
Ingeborg van der Geest (University of Amsterdam, NL)

In Records of Decision the government justifies choices by pointing to the pros and cons of alternative options. This paper focuses on the analysis of the argumentation in this particular type of text. The pragma-dialectical instrumentation of analysis is refined by incorporating into it the institutional preconditions of the decision-making context as well as insights into systematic decision-making. I will show how this instrumentation can be used to reconstruct the argumentation in a justified way.

Thu. 11:30-12:00, B130
Arguing About Norms

Leon van der Torre (University of Luxembourg, LU)
Gabriella Pigozzi (Université Paris-Dauphine, FR)

Formal arguments are often represented by (support, conclusion) pairs, but we consider normative arguments represented by (brute, institutional, deontic) triples. The institutional facts may be seen as the reasons explaining or warranting the deontic obligations and permissions, and therefore they can be attacked by other normative arguments too. We introduce various requirements for arguing about norms concerning violations, contrary-to-duty obligations, dilemmas, conflicts resolution, and we introduce a formal argumentation theory satisfying the requirements.

Thu. 11:00-11:30, B130

Populism on Trial: The Wilders Case

Bart van Klink (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)

Populist discourse can be conceived as a specific style or mode of politics that challenges ordinary political discourse in fundamental respects. In my presentation, I will address the following questions: how can populist discourse be characterized, how does it differ from mainstream liberal-democratic discourse, and how could or should it be contested? Building on the Wilders case, I will discuss to what extent the law can serve to preserve a civil conversation.

Fri. 9:30-10:00, E140

Criticism and Justification of Negotiated Compromises

Jan Albert van Laar (University of Groningen, NL)
Erik C. W. Krabbe (University of Groningen, NL)

The paper focuses on conflicts about an already negotiated compromise, taking as its example a debate in Dutch parliament about the approval of the Paris Agreement on climate change of 2015. It deals with a variety of worries that opponents of approval may advance and the arguments in its defense thus invited. We conclude with a profile of dialogue providing reasonable options for those involved in such a conflict.

Thu. 12:00-12:30, B130

Strategic Maneuvering with Presentational Devices: A Systematic Stylistic Approach

Maarten van Leeuwen (Leiden University, NL)
Ton van Haaften (Leiden University, NL)

The aim of this paper is to show how a systematic stylistic analysis of presentational devices can be integrated in a pragma-dialectical analysis of strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. It will be argued that the key to such a systematic stylistic analysis is the use of a linguistic checklist. This approach and its added value is illustrated by applying it to a case study: the pleadings that were delivered in a Dutch civil law case.

Wed. 15:30-16:00, E140
The Functions of Metaphor in Argumentative Discourse

Lotte van Poppel (University of Amsterdam, NL & Leiden University, NL)

This paper addresses the question of what functions metaphors can have in argumentation, using the pragma-dialectical theory and Steen’s (2008) distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors. An inventory is made of the theoretically possible uses of deliberate metaphor in different types of argumentation. By using case studies, it is argued that deliberate metaphors can not only function as analogy arguments (as is often assumed), but also as causal, pragmatic, and symptomatic arguments.

Thu. 9:30-10:00, E140

Argument Structures and Frame Semantics as Tools of Linguistic Discourse Analysis

Simon Varga (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, DE & Université de Bourgogne, FR)

Frame semantics has been a popular field of linguistic research for almost five decades. Yet, so far only little attention has been paid to the frame structures underlying argumentation in discourse. Given their quintessential role in our making sense of and dealing with the world that surrounds us, however, the importance of frames for argumentation is obvious, providing an ideal starting point for working towards a wider integration of both disciplines.

Thu. 9:30-10:00, G230

Straw Man and Ignoratio Elenchi as Misuses of Rephrase

Jacky Visser (University of Dundee, UK)
Marcin Koszowy (Polish Academy of Sciences, PL)
Barbara Konat (Polish Academy of Sciences, PL)
Katarzyna Budzyńska (Polish Academy of Sciences, PL)
Chris Reed (University of Dundee, UK)

The ‘rephrase’ relation between propositions is introduced in Inference Anchoring Theory to facilitate argument mining (the automated analysis of argumentative discourse). Using examples from a corpus (65000 words) of annotated 2016 presidential election debates in the US, we explore the relation between such rephrases and the fallacies of straw man and ignoratio elenchi. Our aim is to develop the automated identification of rephrase and reasoning structures as a tool in identifying instances of these fallacies.

Wed. 16:30-17:00, B130
Inferences Across Normative Domains  
**Sheldon Wein (Saint Mary’s University, CA)**

Most societies have several normative social institutions—etiquette, morality, religion(s), and a legal system—which establish and order social cooperation. Argumentation theorists should provide guidance on what arguments are appropriate when norms from different systems give divergent advice. I argue that even if morality is properly characterized as what one should do all things considered one should not accept the argument that morality necessarily overrides other norms. Doubts are raised about using the metaphor of weighting reasons to deal with issues of conflicting norms.

Wed. 16:30-17:00, A140

How to Argue with Quotes  
**Daniel Weiss (University of Zurich, CH)**

Intertextual references are used for argumentative purposes when the current speaker wants to buttress his argument by quoting an utterance stating or implying an analogous thought. The analogy as such may be marked explicitly or not. If the analogy is evident and the source authoritative enough, the speaker might succeed in proving the validity of their point. However, the whole procedure is vulnerable in two respects: argument recoverability and counter-quotations.

Fri. 9:30-10:00, B130

The Role of Faulty Inferences in Interrogation Dialogues  
**Simon Wells (Edinburgh Napier University, UK)**

Interrogation is used in law enforcement and security contexts, ostensibly to 'get to the truth' via confession. However contemporary accounts report cases in which interrogation has led to confession, but failed to discover the truth. We report on the construction of formal dialectical models of interrogation dialogue and the valid and invalid inferences that follow from the application of these models.

Wed. 17:00-17:30, D130

Combining Argumentation Analysis and Corpus Linguistics: A New Approach to Researching Big Data  
**Rachel Wyman (King’s College London, UK)**

This presentation discusses the results of a mixed methods study combining argumentation analysis and corpus linguistics to investigate how Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential election.

Wed. 15:30-16:00, B130
Mencius’ Strategies of Political Argumentation
Minghui Xiong (Sun Yat-sen University, CN)

As one of the two funders of Confucianism, Mencius is known as the second sage after Confucius. Mencius is well known not only for his enthusiasm about argumentation, but also for his skills in argumentation. This paper systematically present from the perspective of the Strategic Maneuvering how Mencius strategically maneuvers in his political argumentation, intending to elucidate where the Mencian argumentation theory could meet contemporary argumentation theories, particularly the Pragma-Dialectics.

Wed. 15:00-15:30, E140

Conspiracy Arguments and Bias: An Example from the Health Debate
Roberta Martina Zagarella (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, IT)
Marco Annoni (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, IT)

This presentation will investigate the relationship between conspiracy claims and their persuasive effects from a rhetorical perspective. The focus of our research is on the impact and the potential damages of conspiracy-based beliefs for the trust that citizens have in institutions and science, especially with regard to medical issues. In our talk we will describe, first, the argumentative structures of conspiracy thinking and, second, we will discuss some cognitive factors and biases that incline people towards a conspiratorial mindset.

Wed. 16:30-17:00, G230

Of Inference and Argumentation in Financial Discourse: The Crisis of 2007-2008
Griselda Zárate (Universidad Regiomontana, MX)
Homero Zambrano (Tecnológico de Monterrey, MX)

Financial markets are particularly sensitive to information, in which good or bad news have a strong impact, as well as declarations by key economic, financial or political figures, in the form of bull markets or bear markets. This research paper approaches the role of inference and argumentation in financial discourse in the crisis of 2007-2008, and specifically to the concept of jumps in newspaper articles of specific dates published in The Wall Street Journal.

Wed. 15:00-15:30, C130
Inferences not entailed must be authorized as acceptable despite uncertainty. Toulmin calls the authorizing agent the Warrant, but what authorizes the Warrant? It is the Claim of a supporting argument, and its own Warrant is what Toulmin calls Backing. Disputes would continue in infinite regress were there not a point when a Warrant is accepted as given -- a gift to the arguers from their culture. Disputes turn on which arguer can make best use of the gift.
Thematic Panels

Panel 1

P.1.1. Innovations about Reasoning and Arguing about Health
Jodi Schneider (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, USA)
Sally Jackson (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, USA)

Human health is a high-stakes context for reasoning and argumentation, both for individual citizens and for the health care profession. A complex system of actors give rise to an equally complex set of inference practices and justificatory strategies. This panel draws together three papers and a response considering how these practices and strategies are changing as people discover better ways to arrive at conclusions about health and to persuade others to accept these conclusions.

Thu. 14:00-16:00, A140

P.1.2. Rhetorical Moves and Audience Considerations in the Discussion Sections of Randomized Controlled Trials of Health Interventions
Jodi Schneider (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, USA)
Graciela Rosemblat (National Library of Medicine, USA)
Shabnam Tafreshi (The George Washington University, USA)
Halil Kilicoglu (National Library of Medicine, USA)

Clinicians and medical researchers are taught to consider Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) as one of the strongest forms of medical evidence. We will document and classify rhetorical moves in the discussion sections of 37 RCT reports about health interventions. We will use these moves in order to determine which higher-level argumentative goals and audiences seem salient in RCT discussion sections. Our results could be used in teaching authors to write effective RCT reports, to reach their intended audiences, and in the future, for automation such as argumentation mining.

P.1.3. Devising a Toolkit for Chronic Care Providers: Argumentation Skills for ‘Therapeutic Persuasion’
Sarah Bigi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, IT)

The aim of this paper is to introduce the idea of a communication ‘toolkit’ for clinicians, equipped with indications for the effective use of argumentation to reach specific communication goals of medical encounters. The toolkit is being developed within the framework of the project ‘Healthy Reasoning’. The underlying idea is that argumentation can play a therapeutic role in medical interactions, especially for the achievement of proximal outcomes such as understanding, clinician-patient agreement, trust, engagement, motivation.

P.1.4. Symptomatic Argumentation in Prototypical Argumentative Patterns in Over-The-Counter-Medicine Advertisements
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)
In this paper it will be investigated what types of argument are prototypically used in the activity type of over-the-counter-medicine advertisements to support the (sub)claims that the medicine advertised is safe and that there is no better alternative for it. A detailed analysis will be given of the argumentative patterns resulting from advertisers’ strategic choices in selecting and presenting their arguments for these claims within the institutional constraints of the activity type.

P.1.5. Respondent’s comments

Sally Jackson (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, USA)

Panel 2: Polylogue: Argumentation and Complex Communication

Marcin Lewiński (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)
Mark Aakhus (Rutgers University, USA)

The goal of this panel is to investigate the relations between argumentation and complex forms of organizational and mass communication. Rather than assuming a neat but largely serendipitous fit between dialectical argumentation and one-on-one communication, we develop a notion of argumentative polylogue: a form of interaction where argumentative inferences are made to support many conflicting positions, among multiple parties, for a variety of purposes, by multiple means, and across a variety of venues or settings.

Thu. 14:00-17:00, E140

P.2.1. Introducing Argumentative Polylogue

Marcin Lewiński (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)
Mark Aakhus (Rutgers University, USA)

We introduce the model of argumentative polylogue. We present the theoretical rationale for studying polylogues and discuss their chief components: contrary positions and cases, argumentative parties / audiences, multiple goals, venues and designs of argumentation. We argue that with a well-elaborated notion of a polylogue, argumentation theory is better positioned to adequately study forms of group, organisational, and mass communication than with the standard model of interpersonal dialogue.

P.2.2. Polyphonic Argumentation and Digital Media. A Text Stakeholder Analysis of Open Letters to CEOs

Rudi Palmieri (University of Liverpool, UK)
Sabrina Mazzali-Lurati (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

We analyze an open letter to CEO published on a digital platform as an instance of a manifestly polyphonic argumentative genre. We discuss how the recently elaborated model of text stakeholders can contribute to the understanding of its polyphony. These letters formally address the CEO, but target various ratified audiences implicitly raising different issues. Moreover, the digital context of publication urges to reconcile different audience demands from various corporate stakeholders and the expectations from the typical platform users.
P.2.3. Apologia in Networked Society: The Case of VW’s Polylogical Challenge
Cassandra Oliveras (Rutgers University, USA)
Mark Aakhus (Rutgers University, USA)
Marcin Lewiński (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)
Prompted by an emissions crisis of epic proportion, this study focuses on Volkswagen’s early performances of apologia in strategic online venues including the company’s web portals and social media. VW’s responses across multiple venues for multiple audiences reveal strategies for structuring places for argument to happen. We develop an account of polylogical disagreement management by reformulating classic notions of apologia and stasis to explain VWs performance of crisis management under the conditions of networked society.

P.2.4. With the Best Intentions, and the Worst Arguments: The “Fertility Day” Campaign in Italy
Marta Zampa (Zurich University of Applied Sciences, CH)
Chiara Pollaroli (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
We analyze the argumentative and rhetorical features of the multimodal “Fertility Day” campaign, instituted by the Italian Ministry of Health in 2016. The campaign did not take into account the actual situation of the country and the reasons for its exceptionally low birth rate. This caused heated reactions, expressed in a multimodal online polylogue where the discrepancy between the inferences activated by the campaign in the public and those planned by its authors becomes evident.

P.2.5. Polylogue Argumentation & the University: Recoupling Product, Process, and Point of View
Tom Goodnight (University of Southern California, USA)
David Hingstman (University of Iowa, USA)
Sandy Green (California State University, USA)
Presently, polylogue coalitions construct a neo-liberal network university in ways that automate critical thinking at the expense of practical reason. We envision the university as a biome of disagreement spaces that grow discourse ecologies through networks of inquiry. We take up Elinor Ostrom’s work on polycentric governance to organize knowledge critique, processes, and products.

Panel 3: Narratives and Arguments
Christopher Tindale (University of Windsor, CA)
Paula Olmos (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, ES)
The characteristics, structure and assessment possibilities of narrative arguments; the factors supporting the credibility of narratives and their evidential role; or the relationship between narrative discourse and particular argumentative fields are topics which have recently become of the utmost interest for the interdisciplinary community of argumentation scholars. The papers in this panel show a variety of approaches related to a coherent cluster of problems posed by the evidently operative presence of narratives in argumentation.

Thu. 14:00-17:00, G140
PANELS

P.3.1. Narrative Reasons in Scientific Argument
Paula Olmos (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, ES)

Although narrative modes of arguing have been mainly associated with practical argumentation, narrative reasons may also be found in the kind of epistemic, theoretical contexts of scientific debate. As some philosophers of science have highlighted, narrative patterns of explanation are considered legitimate modes for elucidating acknowledged phenomena in certain sciences, and this implies that we may find, at least, abductive (meta-explanatory) narrative arguments using as grounds the alleged explanatory virtues of a narrative explanation.

P.3.2. Revolution of the Interpreters
Paul van Den Hoven (Utrecht University, NL)

This lecture addresses the question why in modern Western societies an appeal to reason is ideologically more associated with verbal argumentative discourse formats than with narrative discourse formats. Presenting syllogisms is considered more rational than telling coherent stories to explain a situation. According to Legendre, the format of (quasi-) formal demonstration reflects emblematically an established order of formally acknowledged sources of knowledge and a hierarchy of interpreters.

P.3.3. Narratives and Analogies
Tone Kvernbekk (University Of Oslo, NO)

I explore the relation between narratives and analogies by discussing Miss Marple’s analogical reasoning. She compares target to source and constructs an analogy, which inevitably solves the problem at hand. In order to bring out the relevant similarities between the cases, she tells stories of the target and matches them to known information about the source. I shall use the example of Uncle Henry to trace out and examine her thought processes.

P.3.4. Two Epistemic Issues for a Narrative Argument Structure
Gilbert Plumer (Law School Admission Council, USA)

The transcendental approach to understanding narrative argument derives from the idea that for any believable fictional narrative, we can ask—what principles or generalizations would have to be true of human nature in order for the narrative to be believable? I address two key issues: whether only realistic or realist fictional narratives are believable, and how could it be established that we have an intuitive, mostly veridical grasp of human nature that grounds believability?

P.3.5. Mythical Arguments
Christopher Tindale (University of Windsor, CA)

One condition governing narrative arguments is that the narratives correspond to reality. But this involves an underlying understanding of what counts as ‘reality’. Viewed seriously myths, for example, challenge assumptions about the correspondence between narrative and reality. In this paper, I ask how myths work argumentatively. Because that is how they are intended by some authors, sometimes to supplement other forms of discourse; other times to be persuasive on their own.
Panel 4: Taxonomic Approaches to Argument and Inference Types

Michael Hoppmann (Northeastern University, USA)
Jean Wagemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)

Argumentation theorists have proposed a wide variety of classifications (taxonomies, typologies) of arguments and inferences. Some of them take an empirical approach, describing argument types as observed in natural language. Others take a more theoretical approach, using a framework with a limited number of basic distinctions between the types of argument. The aim of this panel is to bring together and discuss the different classifications, with a focus on their rationales and possible applications.

Thu. 14:00-17:00, G230

P.4.1. Twenty Years After: Towards a Typology of Argument Schemes
Manfred Kienpointner (University of Innsbruck, AT)

In 1987, an article "Towards a Typology of Argumentative Schemes" was published. In the following years, considerable progress has been made as far as standards of explicitness, demarcation and comprehensiveness of typologies of argument schemes are concerned. However, a lot remains to be done. I will argue for a multi-level typology of argument schemes according to a set of principles, taken from logic and philosophy on the one hand, and rhetoric, linguistics and argumentation theory on the other hand.

P.4.2. Classifying and Combining Argumentation Schemes for Representing Real Arguments
Fabrizio Macagno (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, PT)

To use the argumentation schemes provided in (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008) for analytical purposes, a classification is needed addressing two fundamental questions, namely how to choose a scheme and how to analyze and represent complex arguments. A dichotomous criterion of classification is proposed, representing how an argument is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means criterion. The interconnection among the schemes is represented using the notion of net of schemes.

P.4.3. The Accommodation of Syllogistic Inferences in the Periodic Table of Arguments
Jean Wagemans (University of Amsterdam, NL)

The Periodic Table of Arguments integrates existing dialectical and rhetorical accounts of arguments into a new standard for the classification of arguments. One of the challenges raised by commentators of the table concerns its potential to accommodate types of argument that are based on syllogistic inferences. In this paper, this challenge will be taken up by comparing the theoretical framework of Aristotelian syllogistic to that of the latest version of the Periodic Table of Arguments.

P.4.4. Towards a Chemical Taxonomy for Types of Arguments and Inferences
Michael Hoppmann (Northeastern University, USA)

This paper argues that there are three available argumentative paradigms: geometry, biology and chemistry, of which the latter will be championed. Of these the chemical approach proceeds in a downwards-analytic manner. Like the biological paradigm, it starts with real
world instances of arguments, but it does not assume that these occurrences are representations of existing ‘species’, but instead that they can be broken up into a set of recurring smallest components (or argumentative ‘atoms’).

P.4.5. From Theory to Practice: The Annotation of Argument Schemes
Elena Musi (Columbia University, USA)
Mark Aakhus (Rutgers University, USA)
Smaranda Muresan (Columbia University, USA)
Andrea Rocci (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)
Manfred Stede (University of Potsdam, DE)

This study proposes guidelines for the annotation of argument schemes empirically validated through inter annotator agreement: 30 microtexts have been annotated each by 3 students following a taxonomy of argument schemes based on frame semantic principles. Besides offering operational guidelines, the annotated data constitute a testbed to uncover systematic correlations between linguistic constructions and the underlying argument schemes as well as to investigate common inferential rules.
Proposal for a Program of Intervention for Developing Argumentative Skills Based on the New Rethoric and the Pragma-Dialectic

Karina Paola García Mejía (Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, MX)
Luisa Josefina Alarcón Neve (Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, MX)

Investigators have discovered trends in certain areas of weakness in the use of argumentative discourse throughout the baccalaureate population. Through critical analysis of the inconsistency between theory and practice in the curricular plans and didactic materials used in Mexico, we have been able to propose a didactical program of intervention based on the Pragma-Dialectic approach. The purpose is to strengthen the linguistic and discursive skills of late acquisition, fundamental for solid development of argumentative discourse.

Cognitive aspects of argumentation

Kira Gudkova (Saint-Petersburg State University, RU)

The paper deals with some cognitive aspects of argumentation. Using language as an instrument, the arguer tries to convey new knowledge and thus tries to change the ideas, values, beliefs and actions of the opponent. This new knowledge is processed by the opponent’s cognitive system and is put into his system of ideas, beliefs and values (or rejected). Argumentation is aimed at persuading the opponent that the knowledge is compatible with his system of values.

Mapping Increasingly Large Networks of Argumentative Inferences

Dana Khartabil (Edinburgh Napier University, UK)
Simon Wells (Edinburgh Napier University, UK)

Argument diagramming has become a standard tool for visualising and exploring the structure of arguments and aiding in their analysis. The advent of digital technologies has lead to increasingly large datasets of analysed argument which can stretch the capabilities of traditional argument diagramming techniques and tools. We report on work to develop new argument visualisation techniques, computational implementations, that aim to support visualisation of arguments at scale, with ad hoc display and filtering of meta-data.
Using Questioning Inhibits Primary Students’ Intuitive Thinking in Geometric Argumentation
Tsu-Nan Lee (The University of Melbourne, AU)

Some international surveys indicate that Taiwanese primary students have weaknesses in the competence of geometric reasoning in comparison with other mathematical competences. The aim of this study is to understand whether questioning could inhibit students’ intuitive reasoning. There are 56 and 57 students in the experimental and control group, respectively. The results showed that using questioning can improve students’ reasoning and shift from the intuitive reasoning to the reflective one in the experimental group.

The Role of Inference in Constructing, Communicating and Sustaining Behaviour Change Arguments
Kate Pangbourne (University of Leeds, UK)
Simon Wells (Edinburgh Napier University, UK)
Alex Baker-Graham (University of Leeds, UK)

Poor communication can undermine the preparatory work, conducted over long periods, to construct favourable conditions for a major societal shift in behaviour. We examine the inferences that the designers of behaviour change interventions aim to produce in their target audience and the mismatch that can occur when interventions are deployed. Additionally we explore the related role and complicating factors that social media and digital technologies bring which can cause persuasive public communication to misfire.

On the emergence of issues in adult-children discussions
Rebecca G. Schär (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

When studying the emergence of the issue in argumentative discussions between small children and adults, it became clear that at the beginning of the discussion, the issue is not always shared by the interlocutors. In the present contribution, I will analyze how the issue is negotiated in such cases and how these discussions evolve. Preliminary results indicate that the adults and the children often use divergent starting points rooted in the culture or the context.
How We Conduct Ourselves and What We Have in Common: A Study on Context under Negotiation in Labor Dispute Mediation

Emma van Bijnen (Università della Svizzera Italiana, CH)

This poster focusses on some of the ways in which mediators are able to create common premises during a dispute mediation session. In order to achieve a successful resolution of a conflict at deadlock dispute mediators establish and re-establish starting points with the aim of creating a favorable context for solution-oriented argumentative discussions.
Conference programme
General programme

Day 1: Tuesday 20 June 2017
12:00-14:00: Registration
14:30-16:30: Excursion (city tour)
17:00-17:30: Conference opening (G140)
17:30-18:30: Keynote 1 – Dan Sperber (G140)
18:30-21:00: Welcome reception

Day 2: Wednesday 21 June 2017
08:30-10:30: Long papers session
10:30-11:00: Coffee break
11:00-13:00: Long papers session
13:00-14:30: Lunch
14:30-16:00: Regular papers session
16:00-16:30: Coffee break
16:30-17:30: Regular papers session
17:45-18:45: Keynote 2 – Sally Jackson (G140)

Day 3: Thursday 22 June 2017
08:30-10:30: Regular papers session
10:30-11:00: Coffee break
11:00-12:30: Regular papers session
12:30-14:00: Lunch
14:00-16:30: Panels session
16:30-17:00: Coffee break
17:00-18:00: Keynote 3 – Ulrike Hahn (G140)
19:00-23:00: Conference dinner

Day 4: Friday 23 June 2017
08:30-10:30: Regular papers session
10:30-11:00: Coffee break
11:00-12:00: Poster session
12:00-13:00: Lunch
13:00-14:00: Keynote 4 – Johan van Benthem (G140)
14:00-14:30: Conference closing
14:30-18:30: Excursion (Maison Cailler, chocolate factory)
## Detailed programme

### Day 1: Tuesday 20 June 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>12:00-14:00</td>
<td>Registration (conference desk, ground floor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:30-16:30</td>
<td>Excursion: City tour</td>
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<tr>
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Day 2. Wednesday 21 June 2017

### Morning session

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<td>Lumer</td>
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<td>Weger &amp; Mohammed</td>
<td>Gascón</td>
<td>Groarke &amp; Kišiček</td>
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<td>Zejnilović</td>
<td>Krabbe &amp; Van Laar</td>
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<td>Dufour &amp; Hample</td>
<td>Greco et al.</td>
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### Afternoon session

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<td>Allison &amp; Bloomfield</td>
<td>Pfeifer</td>
<td>van Leeuwen &amp; van Haften</td>
<td>Simard Smith</td>
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<td>Wein</td>
<td>Visser et al.</td>
<td>Tseronis</td>
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**KEYNOTE 2 – Sally Jackson (room G140)**
Day 3: Thursday 22 June 2017

### Morning session

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<td>Dębowska-Kozłowska</td>
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<td>Bigi &amp; Macagno</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
<td>Hyra et al.</td>
<td>Urbansi &amp; Żyluk</td>
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<td>Hornikx</td>
<td>Plug</td>
<td>Pilgram &amp; Labrie</td>
<td>Càrlan</td>
<td>van Poppel</td>
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<td>Chávez Herrera &amp; Haidar</td>
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<td>van der Geest</td>
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<td>Howes &amp; Hundleby</td>
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### Afternoon session

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<td>14:00-14:30</td>
<td></td>
<td>PANEL1 Schneider &amp; Jackson</td>
<td>PANEL2. Lewinski &amp; Aakhus</td>
<td>PANEL3 Tindale &amp; Olmos</td>
<td>PANEL4 Hoppmann &amp; Wagemans</td>
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<td>PANEL1.1 Schneider et al.</td>
<td>PANEL2.1 Lewinski &amp; Aakhus</td>
<td>PANEL3.1 Olmos</td>
<td>PANEL4.1 Kienpointner</td>
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<td>PANEL2.3 Palmieri &amp; Mazzali-Lurati</td>
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<td>PANEL2.4 Oliveras et al.</td>
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### Day 4. Friday 23 June 2017

**Morning session**

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<td>Kraus</td>
<td>Battersby &amp; Bailin</td>
<td>Demir</td>
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<td>09:00-09:30</td>
<td>Macedo &amp; Leitão</td>
<td>Drehe</td>
<td>Dove &amp; Nussbaum</td>
<td>Ihnen</td>
<td>Ramalhete &amp; Lisi</td>
<td>Kohler &amp; Mehmeti</td>
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<td>Pigozzi</td>
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<td>van Klink</td>
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<td>Estrada &amp; Zárate</td>
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<td>10:30-11:00</td>
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<td>11:00-12:00</td>
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<td>Gudkova</td>
<td>Khartabil &amp; Wells</td>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>Pangbourne, Wells &amp; Baker-Graham</td>
<td>Schär</td>
<td>van Bijnen</td>
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<td>12:00-13:00</td>
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### Afternoon session

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<tr>
<td>13:00-14:00</td>
<td>KEYNOTE 4 – Johan van Benthem (room G140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00-14:30</td>
<td>Conference closing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30-18:30</td>
<td>EXCURSION (chocolate factory and museum)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maps and useful information
Wireless network

The following information will allow you to connect to the university’s wireless network for the duration of the conference:

SSID: public-unifr
Username: eca2017@unifr.ch
Password (case sensitive): nr65yf

Once you select ‘public-unifr’ on your device, a web browser window should open (if it doesn’t, open one and type any address in the url). You’ll be taken to the login page, where you can enter the above username and password to log in.

The University of Fribourg is part of the EDUROAM network, so provided your home university is also part of it, you should be able to log in with your home university account on that network.

Excursions

City tour: (Tuesday June 20th)

The free guided city tour starts at the conference venue at 14:30. Please be on time. After a tour through the city of Fribourg which will take you all the way down to the medieval ‘Basse ville’, you will hop on a bus (ticket included) to go back to the conference venue on the Fribourg public transport network. Be sure to wear some comfortable shoes for this tour!

Maison Cailler (Friday June 23rd):

A bus has been arranged to take you from the conference venue to the chocolate factory and back. The bus ride is approximately a half hour long. It is crucial that you are ready at 14:30 at the conference venue, as the bus cannot wait. Expect to be back in Fribourg by around 18:30.
Conference venue

Registration, all contributions (paper, panel and poster sessions), coffee breaks and welcome reception (Day 1, Tuesday 20 June 18:30) will take place in the PER21 building, located at Boulevard de Pérolles 90 (https://goo.gl/maps/2xXewdDWQP12). Follow the signs!

PER21 building (see next page for floor maps):

- ground floor: ECA2017 conference desk and secretariat
- 1st floor: rooms A140, B130, C130, D130, E140 and G140 for paper presentations (including keynotes) and poster exhibition (hallway)
- 2nd floor: room G230 for paper presentations

Room numbers follow a code:

- the letter gives you in which segment of the floor the room is located (A rooms are located at the West end of the hallway, G rooms at the East end)
- the 1st digit gives you the number of the floor (e.g. A140 is on the 1st floor, G230 is on the 2nd floor)
- the last two digits tell you whether it’s an auditorium or a seminar room (20 and 40 are for auditoriums, 30 is for seminar rooms)
Here’s a schematic layout of the building; only rooms reserved for ECA2017 are indicated.
Lunches and coffee breaks

Lunches will be served at the Pérolles cafeteria (Mensa), across the building where talks take place. Coffee breaks will be served in the main hall in front of the conference desk, ground floor.

Conference dinner

The conference dinner will take place on Thursday 22 June 2017 at 19:00 at the main Mensa, which is located in the Miséricorde building, Av. De l’Europe 20, 1700 Fribourg. Please note this is another University building, closer to the city centre, and which is a 400m walk from the train station (see map below). Do not forget your voucher!
Public transportation

Fribourg is a relatively small town, and much can be done on foot. However, it has a very reliable transportation network. All of your traveling will probably be within one tariff zone. You can purchase tickets and day travel cards from any TPF office or from ticket machines at each bus stop. Most of them accept Swiss bank notes, coins and TPF cards, and the ones in the busiest stops (like the train station) also accept credit cards.

The bus stops that surround the conference venue are Pérolles-Charmettes (bus lines 1, 3 and 7) and Plateau-de-Pérolles (bus line 1) – see map on next page.

All relevant information, including maps, is available on [http://www.tpf.ch/en](http://www.tpf.ch/en).

From the TPF website ([http://www.tpf.ch/en/abonnements-billets/general](http://www.tpf.ch/en/abonnements-billets/general)): “How can you get the ticket that is the most appropriate for your journey quickly and easily? TPF has a wide variety of means of issuing tickets, all of which are user-friendly. If you prefer personal service then you can buy your ticket from a ticket office. If on the other hand you prefer the convenience of a ticket machine then you can get a TPF card from one of our sales outlets. If you have access to the internet you may also buy your ticket using your mobile phone and the TPF application or by downloading a bar-coded e-ticket on to your mobile phone. Convenient sales points are located all over the network.”
Sponsors

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