



Course programme and contents

Program (subject to changes)

	16 JUNE	17 JUNE	18 JUNE	19 JUNE
MORNING SESSION 8:30-12:30		Van Eemeren (part 2)	Goodwin (part 1)	Goodwin (part 2)
AFTERNOON SESSION 14:30-18:30	Van Eemeren (part 1)	Pagliari (seminar)		Greco, Perret- Clermont et al. (seminar)
	<i>Welcoming reception</i>			

Contents

In what follows, we present abstracts of the main courses as well as of the seminars. Registered participants will receive a list of pre-readings in due time, in order to prepare for the summer school.

MAIN COURSE 1: Frans van Eemeren

Frans van Eemeren will first sketch the current state of the art in argumentation theory, concentrating in the first place on promising developments. Starting from the extended pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, he will next discuss the reconstruction of argumentative discourse, paying special attention to the analysis of strategic maneuvering, the institutional preconditions ensuing from the specific conventionalization of communicative activity types, and the detection of prototypical argumentative patterns. In addition, van Eemeren will discuss the evaluation of argumentative discourse, concentrating in the first place on the detection of fallacies as derailments of strategic manoeuvring.

MAIN COURSE 2 Jean Goodwin

Inferences from the fact that an argument was made

When an arguer makes an argument, the audience is then in a position to consider two kinds of inferences. The first, familiar, kind are the inferences suggested by the reasoning conveyed in the argument—some sort of movement from the premises to the conclusions of the argument that was made. In this class, I want to focus on the second kind of inferences:

those warranted by the activity of making itself. In making the argument—and making it in a particular linguistic form, accompanied with specific other discourse—the arguer has changed the world. And as Grice pointed out in both his work on implicature and in his work on speech acts, the fact that the arguer made this change licenses the audience to reason in certain ways. To explore inferences of the second kind, this class provides an overview of the normative pragmatic program on argumentation. We will examine how arguers design their discourse to manage some of the recurrent challenges of argumentative interactions. In the most straightforward cases, by making an argument the arguer can warrant inferences about the kind of person she is (ethos), and about the shape of the disagreement between herself and her audience (disagreement space). More complexly, arguers can design their discourse to modify their relationships with their audiences. An arguer is responsible for what she does intentionally, including intentionally making arguments. By adapting what she is taking responsibility for (burden of proof), she can provide good reasons for her audience to respond appropriately to what she is saying. In this way, the argumentative activities that promote inferences of the second kind create the conditions in which audiences are pressured to attend to arguments, so that inferences of the first kind will actually get made.

SEMINAR 1: Fabio Paglieri

Reasoning mistakes: fact or fiction?

Our native inferential abilities are usually assumed to be defective: intuitive judgements, in particular, have been shown to lead us astray in many experimental tasks. Similarly, the typical performance in critical thinking tests remains quite poor, even for well-educated people. This class aims to challenge this pessimistic outlook on human reasoning, by suggesting a different interpretation of the empirical data used to support it. We will begin by reviewing the extant evidence on our allegedly poor reasoning skills, with a hands-on approach: that is, participants will be given the opportunity to test their own performance in a critical thinking task. Then we will contrast two competing interpretations of such data: a traditional, pessimistic approach, according to which our reasoning is inherently flawed, thus making us often prone to error (Kahneman, 2003); and a newer, more positive view, which sees our inferential skills as being well suited to deal with the particular ecology where they developed (Gigerenzer, 2007; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). It will be shown how recent experimental work on intuitive argument appraisal supports the latter view (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), at the same time raising doubts on the usefulness of the traditional notion of a fallacy (Boudry et al., 2015; Paglieri, 2016a). Moreover, even when cognitive mistakes are made, it will be argued that their nature is not inferential, but rather dependent upon other cognitive faculties – most notably, attention and executive control (Paglieri, 2016b). Finally, participants will discuss the implications of such revised understanding of our reasoning mistakes for the development of new argument technologies (Paglieri, 2016c) and for critical thinking education (Mercier et al., 2016): while we all agree that improving thinking skills should be a key aim of any educational system, the recipe for success may turn out to be very different from those tried so far.

SEMINAR 2: Sara Greco, Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont and other members of the ArgImp Project

Analysing argumentative inference with the Argumentum Model of Topics: the case of the “Analysing children’s implicit argumentation” (ArgImp) project

This seminar has the aim of introducing a theoretical and methodological approach to the reconstruction of inference in argumentation: namely, the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT, Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2010) for the reconstruction of argument schemes. Participants will be introduced to how to use this model in their analysis of argumentation by means of a hands-on approach. We will present some of the data that we are currently analysing as part of the project “Analysing children’s implicit argumentation”¹, while giving a brief account of the interdisciplinary background and research questions in this project. Together with the participants, we will analyse and discuss the ArgImp data by means of the AMT. This will also offer an opportunity to discuss the potential of the analysis of inference and implicit premises via the AMT within the context of this research project. A large part of the seminar will be devoted to discussing data with the participants.

¹ “Analysing children’s implicit argumentation: Reconstruction of procedural and material premises” is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (contract n. 100019_156690). Applicants: Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, Sara Greco, Antonio Iannaccone, Andrea Rocci.